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SECTION I: THE COST OF NUCLEAR POWER
A. Introduction
The economic superiority of fissile or fossil elec-
tric power generation has not yet been demonstrated. Both
sides have proponents, and new contracts are being let by
utilities for both steam systems. Each provides a ceiling
price or comparative standard for the other. In this study
the cost of nuclear power is examined in order to provide a
standard for coal. Nuclear safety is not examined other than
for its contribution to costs.
The reliability, comprehensiveness and bases of
nuclear power, cost estimates are important with respect to
evaluating future energy costs, economically efficient utiliz-
ation of our fuel resources, and the achievement of Project
Independence. In Section I, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
estimates of nuclear power electric generation costs in 19 80
are compared with those developed in this study, with two
utilities seeking nuclear licenses, and with those developed
by Arthur D. Little, Inc. It is found that the AEC cost esti-
mates are relatively low. Furthermore, all cost elements are
not included. Finally, if the costs are calculated at the
bus-bar rather than as the cost to the utility, the increase
in the estimated cost is substantial.
Section II contains an analysis of nuclear power
supply forecasts and an evaluation of nuclear power plant load
factors. The supply forecasts are relevant to Project Inde-
pendence, but an analysis of the delays and downward revisions
in the estimates points to construction problems and increasing
cost of finance due to delay.
Table 1-1 presents a comparison of the supply projec-
tion made in this study with those made by others. With the
exception of the projected maximum for 19 85, all of the esti-
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TABLE 1-1
Comparison of Nuclear Capacity Forecasts
(000 MWe)
1970 1975 1980 1985
AEC Wash 1139 (1972) 5-9
Electrical World 6.2
Department of the Interior —
FPC (National Power Survey) 6.0
NPC (Case III)
Atomic Industrial Forum —
This Study (projected)
(2)(projected maximum) —
5U.2 132.0 280
56.5 128.1 —
50.0 120.0 215
— 1U7.0 —
6U.0 150.0 300
59.0 1U6.0 302
1*7.8 9U.6 —
1*7.8 119.1 250.
(
Sources: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Future
Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry , Hearings
,
93 Cong. 1 Sess., Phase I, July 31 and August 1, 1973,
p. U8.
^ Table II-l.
(2)v
'Table II-2.
- 3 -
mates in this study are lower than those made by any other
agency. It would appear that current events may make even
these relatively pessimistic estimates appear overly optimistic,
This has been recognized by the AEC which reduced its 19 80
estimate first to 125,000 megawatts, ' and later to 102,000
(2)
megawatts of electricity. The projections made in this
study assumed a six year construction time or an eight to ten
year total span between the time a plant is reported and the
time it is on-line. In 19 73, Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF)
reported that the total time for a plant, from its inception
(3)
to the time it was on-line, was between nine and ten years.
By the end of that year it was reported that AEC Commissioner
Dixie Lee Ray had estimated that the time span for reactors
(4)
was between eight and ten years. If Tables II-l and II-2
are revised based on longer construction and lead times, even
the projected maximum estimates presented in Table 1-1 appear
to be too high. Construction delays and slippages are a con-
tinuing feature of the nuclear industry. In late 1973 it was
reported that three out of six plants scheduled for 19 73 were
(5)delayed until 1974. In February 1974, it was reported that
plants currently under construction were experiencing delays
lasting between five and sixty-one months with a mean delay
(
6
)
time of twenty- four to twenty-five months. In March it was
reported that over 50 percent of the plants then under construc-
tion had lost between one and thirteen months between September
1973 and March 19 74. The median slippage was three to six
(7)
months. This does not include those plants recently can-
celled or postponed for financial reasons or because of revised
consumption forecasts.
It has been hoped that by changing the regulations
concerning hearings and licensing, the civilian nuclear power
program can be accelerated. A study by the Federal Power
Commission indicates that this hope may be forelorn. The study
indicates that of 30 nuclear plants orginally scheduled for
- 4 -
operation prior to the summer of 19 73, 29 units were late. A
large number of reasons are cited with many facilities citing
more than one reason. In order, these include the following:
changes in regulatory procedures (14) , late delivery of major
equipment (13) , poor productivity of labor (12) , shortages of
construction labor (10), prolonged regulatory procedures (10),
strikes by construction labor (9) , equipment component failure
(5) , rescheduling of associated facilities (5) , legal chal-
lenges (5) , strikes by equipment manufacturing industries (2)
,
weather (2) , and necessary approval by local authorities (2)
.
Of the total of 89 citations, 25.8 percent were equipment re-
lated, 37.1 were labor related, 27.0 percent were regulatory
related, 5.6 represented legal challenges, while weather and
(8)local authorities accounted for the remaining 4.5 percent.
In another study, the Federal Power Commission analyzed con-
struction delays in the 2 8 nuclear plants that were scheduled
to become operational in 19 74. It found that 32 plant-months
of delay had been caused by public law suits or changes in
regulatory requirements, but 229 plant-months of work had been
lost through low labor productivity and shortages, late deliv-
eries, or breakdowns of components and similar economic or
(9)technological failures.
In a later study, itKwas found that modifications in
licensing and regulatory requirements accounted for 85 percent
of the delays cited for the 46 plants covered. However, this
accounted for only 42 percent of the total delay time. More
specifically, review, public hearing problems, intervenor
tactics, and regulatory work accounted for only a total of
nine percent of the delay. Non-hearing delays accounted for
49 percent of the total delay time. This included, for exam-
ple, late delivery of components, labor shortages, and labor
immobility. Of the 46 plants, no plant cited less than two
reasons; the average number of citations was six to seven.
- 5 -
Because nuclear power plants cost more per kilowatt
to build than fossil plants, to be economic the fuel cycle
costs must be low enough to offset the difference. The amount
that must be offset is inversely proportional to the load fac-
tor and directly proportional to the capital cost. Furthermore,
because the ratio of fuel cycle to total costs is higher for
fossil than it is for nuclear plants, the cost advantage of
nuclear over fossil fuel plants is directly proportional to the
assumed load factor. In its cost comparisons, the AEC has
almost consistently used an 80 percent load factor for its
nuclear plants. In Section II it is shown that the historical
load factor has been about 65 percent, or lower.
In its recent forecast, the AEC, Office of Planning
and Analysis, reduced its operating capacity assumption to 75
percent rather than the 80 percent capacity upon which it had
formerly counted. The discussion in Section II indicates that
even 75 percent is considerably higher than the historic aver-
ages. Therefore, in examining Table 1-1, it should be remem-
bered that the estimates in the table should be reduced to 60
or 70 percent of those tabulated in order to arrive at the
amount of electricity that can be expected to be available to
the consumer.
Section III presents a complete methodology for the
estimation of fuel cycle costs from the mine and mill, through
the reactor, to storage or recycle. Although the AEC in its
nuclear cost analysis, has not published a consistent accounting
system, the methodology is derived from AEC documents and a
study by the NUS Corporation. ' The procedure is sufficiently
detailed to allow anyone with better numbers to make his own
estimates
.
The fuel cycle costs developed are greater than those
reported by the AEC by at least a factor of two. Major differ-
ences arise due to differences in cost escalation, mining and
milling, and enrichment costs.
- 6 -
Sections IV and V review the components of the fuel
cycle. Because 19 80 costs are forecasts, these sections reviev;
the literature in order to assess probable per unit component
costs. It is argued that the unit costs used in this study are
conservative. Section IV is devoted to uranium mining and
milling. Section V reports the remaining component costs.
Capital and other non-fuel costs are discussed in
Section VI. Given the lack of consistency, inadequate report-
ing, and multiple bases used, most of this section is qualita-
tive. Much that has been reported must be taken on faith or
not at all. Even when direct capital costs are given, escala-
tion has been at less than market indicated rates, the cost of
capital has been kept consistently low and the load factor,
used to convert to mills/Kwhe has been higher than either cur-
rent or historic levels. As a result, capital costs in mills/
Kwhe reported by the AEC and some companies seeking licenses
are too low.
Finally, Section VII relates nuclear power to Project
Independence. The aggregate energy output of nuclear reactors
is compared with the aggregate direct and indirect energy input
required for their construction and operation. The period cov-
ered is 1974-1985. The estimate is conservative because waste
management, transportation, and fuel cycle costs, other than
enrichment, are excluded. Because nuclear generated power must
be compared with its alternatives, government funding of re-
search, development, and insurance are discussed in this section
B. Power Generation Costs
In 1973, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) projected
19 81 power generation costs at 15.20 mills/kilowatt hour of
(12)
electricity (Kwhe) for a 1000 MWe light water nuclear reactor.
This was the sum of 11.70 mills/Kwhe for capital, 2.50 mills/
Kwhe for fuel and 1.00 mills/Kwhe for operation and maintenance.
Based on these 19 73 estimates and the five percent escalation
rate suggested by the AEC, 19 80 costs would be 11.57, 2.50 and
0.95 mills/Kwhe respectively; a total of 15.02 mills/Kwhe. The
fuel cost used by the AEC for 19 81 was that calculated for 19 73
and was not escalated. The AEC claimed that nuclear fuel cycle
costs, "...will remain constant because of improvements in
technology and cost reductions as a result of increases in
, • « 4. ,.'(13)scale in manufacturing.
For comparison, Table 1-2 summarizes the nuclear
power generation costs developed in this study. The 19 80 costs
are projected at 22.11 mills/Kwhe, a difference of more than
seven mills/Kwhe over the AEC estimate. The basis for this dif-
ference is the methodology and assumptions concerning nuclear
plant availability factors, fuel cycle component cost increases,
and the method of escalating costs.
The capital costs assumed in the AEC estimate, esca-
lated to 19 80, are presented in Table 1-3. The influence of the
load factor is shown as it is of particular relevance to the
cost comparison between nuclear and fossil fuels. Based on AEC
estimates, total 19 80 capital costs for a 1000 MWe nuclear plant
are $608 million or 16.02, 14.87, 13.88, and 13.01 mills/Kwhe
for load factors of 65, 70, 75, and 80 percent respectively.
These costs include interest, added as an indirect cost at seven
percent annually, and escalation due to inflation compounded at
seven percent annually.
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TABLE 1-2
Projected 19 80 Generation Costs
for an Average 1000 MWe
Light Water Nuclear Power Plant
(mills /Kwhe)
Cost Component
Capital . 16,02
Fuel k. 97
Operation and Maintenance (0 and M) 1.12
Total Generation Costs 22.11
Sources: Tables 1-3, III-2, and Atomic Energy Commission,
The Nuclear Industry 1973 , WASH 117^-73, p. 15.
Note: The AEC estimated 1973 and M costs of 0.70 mills /Kwhe,
escalating at 7 percent annually results in a 1980 cost
of 1.12 mills /Kwhe.
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A justification of AEC capital costs has not been
made other than to note some of the procedures used to obtain
the estimates:
(1) In escalating costs from 19 73 to 19 80 dollars,
the AEC used a method which approximates the
summation of simple interest on the direct
(14)
costs over the construction period.- In-
flation rates are usually compounded annually.
Hence, this method is used in place of the AEC
method. Obviously, the AEC procedure leads to
lower projected costs.
(2) The AEC states that their estimates include
environmental assurance equipment such as
natural draft cooling towers and a near-zero
(15)
radwaste system. The costs of these devices
is not made clear. In 1972, capital costs for
natural draft cooling towers were estimated by
the Atomic Industrial Forum to range from $12
million to $15 million for a 1000 MWe nuclear
power plant. A radwaste system that would
131limit the average annual dose of I to an
individual located offsite to 0.0 4 mrem/year
(17)
would cost about $3.5 million.
(3) The AEC assumed a plant construction period of
7h years. However, a construction period of
almost ten years appears to be developing in the
industry. The longer construction period in-
creases costs.
- 11 -
(4) The reported capital costs do not include
provision for permanent or temporary waste
disposal, changes in emergency core cooling
or radiation standards, or decommissioning.
Inclusion would raise both direct capital
costs and contingency reserves.
(5) The cost of land has been set at an arbitrary
$1 million. By way of comparison, land costs
reported by the Illinois Pcwer Company are
about $10 million, (18)
challenged as too low.
and these have been
(6). In determining costs in mills/Kwhe, an annual
fixed charge of 15 percent was used to change
total to annual capital costs. Interest rates
have increased since 19 73; it should be assumed
that the fixed charge rate would increase cor-
respondingly. Increasing the annual charge
rate by one percent results in a cost increase
of about one mill/Kwhe.
Based on an analysis of nuclear power costs made by
(19)Arthur D. Little, Inc. , it is possible to derive consider-
ably higher nuclear power electric generation costs. The
Arthur D. Little study analyzes the construction of two 1150 MWe
nuclear power plants for the Northeast Utilities System. The
start-up dates of the two plants are 19 81-82 and 19 8 3-84, re-
spectively. The cost estimates of each differ, reflecting
expected savings on the second plant in terms of licensing,
engineering, and construction costs. Using the methodology and
estimates employed for the first plant, the capital costs de-
rived in the present study were revised. In Table 1-4 they are
- 12 -
TABLE I-U
Revision of Table 1-2 Based on
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Methodology
(Millions of Dollars) (mills /KwheT 1 '
a) Direct Costs (1973 Dollars) 260
(2)b) Escalation 158
c) AFDC VJ/ 100
Subtotal 518
(It)
d) Use and Sales Taxes 12
e) Utility Cost (5 ' Ul
f) Contingency 78
Total (1980 dollars) 61*9 (7)17.09
(1) - Load Factor = .65
(2) - 7$ annually
(3) - Allowance for funds during construction (proportioned to A. D. Little)
(h) - 7$ of equipment and materials costs
(5) - Based on Table 1-6
(6) - 15$
(7) - Annual fixed charge on capital = 15$
In Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs for Nuclear Evalua-
tion
,
WASH 1099 > Dec. 1971, p. 9^, fixed charge rates on depreciable
capital are assumed to include i) recovery of investment, ii) return on
investment, iii) all taxes (federal, state and local), iv)interim replace-
ments, and v) property insurance. Total fixed charge rates are calculated
as follows
:
Weighted average of cost of money 12.70$
Depreciation (sinking fund, 15 years) 2.^U%
Federal income tax 5-69$
State and local taxes 2.51$
Interim replacements 0.35$
Property insurance 0. 25$
Total fixed charge rate 2U.0U$
The capital cost shown above, excluding taxes, is $637 million, if the
2U.0U$ fixed charge rate on capital is used to determine costs in terms
of mills /Kwhe, a capital cost of 26.89 mills/Kwhe is found.
Sources: Arthur D. Little, Inc., A Study of Base-Load Alternatives for the
Northeast Utilities System, July 5, 1973, Table 7, and Table 1-3.
- 13 -
shown to be $649 million. Based on a 65 percent availability
factor and annual ciipital cost rate of 15 percent, these costs
are 17.09 mills/Kwhe . From the revised capital costs shown
in Table 1-4 and an annual fixed charge rate on capital of
24.04 percent, a capital cost of 26.89 mills/Kwhe is derived.
Assuming that fuel, operation and maintenance costs are those
found in Table 1-2, 19 80 nuclear power electric generation costs
could be 32.9 8 mills/Kwhe. This is shown in Table 1-5.
The projected capital costs derived by Arthur D.
Little, Inc., can be revised in order to compare them with the
AEC estimates discussed above. Table 1-6 is the result. Taxes
and utility costs have been subtracted from total costs to give
a semi-comparative total. Further reduction and additions have
been made in order to compare these estimates with the AEC
estimates by using equivalent assumptions for interest, escala-
tion, and contingency costs. Total capital costs of $585 mil-
lion were derived. Table 1-3 shows an AEC cost estimate of
$608 million.
.The state of the art of cost estimation and reporting
may be further exemplified by a comparison between estimates
provided by the Illinois Power Company, the Union Electric Power
Company, and Arthur D. Little, Inc. The first is for a 9 50 MWe
boiling water reactor with a cooling lake, the second for an
1175 MWe pressurized water reactor with natural draft cooling
towers, and the third is for an 1150 MWe reactor, apparently
without cooling towers. The expected dates of operation and
the load factors are similar. The 1980 Union Electric (UE) cost
estimate is 21.1 mills/Kwhe at the bus bar. This includes a
fuel cost of only 2.23 mills/Kwhe. * By contrast, the
Illinois Power Company (IPC) estimates the costs at 12.3 mills/
Kwhe excluding taxes and 13.9 mills/Kwhe if taxes are in-
cluded. IPC includes a decommissiong cost of 0.13 mills/
Kwhe, which UE does not, and estimates fuel consumption
(21)
costs at 4.2 mills/Kwhe.
. Finally, Arthur D. Little,
- 14 -
TABLE 1-5
Possible I960 Generation Costs
1000 MWe Light Water Nuclear Power Plant
(mills /Kwhe)
Cost Component
Capital 26.89
Fuel J+.97
Operations and Maintenance 1.12
Total Generation Costs 32.98
Sources: Tables l-k [cf. footnote (?)], and 1-2.
- 15 -
TABLE 1-6
Revised Authur D. Little, Inc. Capital
Costs Applied to an Average 1000 MWe
Nuclear Power Plant in 1980^
(Millions of Dollars)
a) Direct Costs (1973 dollars)
(2)
b) Escalation
c) AFDC VJ;
Equipment Materials Labor Row Total
12U 31 150 306
k2 6 89 137
k2 10 59 110
Subtotal:
d) Use and Sales Tax
e) Utility Cost wy
f) Contingency (l%)
(h)
208 hi 298 553
15
Ul
83
TOTAL (1980 dollars):
minus d) and e)
Comparative Total (198O dollars)
minus contingency, escalation, and
interest cost differences from those if
AEC assumptions were used. (6)
Comparative to AEC Totals (1980 dollars)
692
-56
636
-61
-30
+1+0
585
(1) Estimate relates to the power plant proper, exclusive of site and the
required investment in nuclear fuel inventory.
(2) Weighted average = G.k% on direct costs, simple interest calculation.
(3) Allowance for Funds During Construction, computed at 8% per annum.
(U) Computed at 7% of equipment and materials costs.
(5) Based on data supplied by Northeast Utilities.
(6) AEC computes contingency costs at less than k%, escalation at ^% annually,
and interest at '(% annually. cf: Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear
Industry 1973 , WASH 117 1+-73, P- 19-
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., A Study of Base Toad Alternatives for the
Northeast Utilities System
,
July 5, 1973, Table 7.
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Inc., estimates capital costs at 16.52 mills/Kwhe, fuel costs
at 3.11 mills/Kwhe, and operation and maintenance at 1.66
mills/Kwhe. The total is 21.29 mills/Kwhe. ^ 22) Given these
differences, it is worth looking at capital costs as a whole
and some of the components. This is deferred until Section VI
17 -
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SECTION II: NUCLEAR POWER
FORECASTS AND POWER AVAILABILITY
A. Forecasts
Delays in the completion of nuclear power plants
have become a common occurrence. Of 35 plants scheduled to
begin operation in the summer of 1973, 30 we^re delayed.
In the previous year, 29 plants did not meet their scheduled
deadlines. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) reported that
in 1973, 50 of 56 nuclear plants scheduled to begin commercial
operation between 19 72 and 19 73 had experienced some delay
during construction. Furthermore, 19 of 36 plants scheduled
for operation between 19 76 and 19 78 had been rescheduled for
(2)later start-up dates.
By November, 1973, there were 37 operating reactors
in the United States. Five more were expected to be on line
by the end of the year. Four more would have been added but
for construction problems. Early in 19 73, the AEC reviewed 35
pending applications for operating licenses. It was found
that 18 reactors had construction delays due to design prob-
lems with the rods that hold the fuel and 17 had problems with
the location of lines carrying the steam that runs the elec-
(3)trie turbines. The Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) announced
that in the short time between September, 19 73, and March,
19 74, 77 nuclear plants then under construction had their
start-up dates delayed from 1 to 13 months each. ' This rep-
resented nearly one-half of the nuclear plants then under con-
struction.
In December, 19 73, the AIF made a survey of 95
nuclear power plants under construction or awaiting construc-
ts)tion permits. It was found that 70 of the 95 plants had
experienced some delay. Of the 47 plants under construction,
46 reported delays ranging from five months to five years.
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Twenty-four of the 48 plants waiting for construction permits
had experienced delays ranging from two months to five and
one-half years. The average delay in both categories was
slightly over two years. Measured from the date of order,
nuclear plant completion time had increased from eight years
to ten years. Whether further delays can be avoided de-
pends on a number of factors. These include: equipment
delivery delays and equipment component failures, strikes by
both construction labor and equipment manufacturers 1 employees,
rescheduling difficulties, changes in regulatory procedures,
prolonged regulatory procedures, legal changes and challenges
on both the federal and local level, material shortages, low
.
. (7)productivity of labor and the weather.
For the nuclear forecast in this study a five and
one-half to six year construction period has been assumed.
For plctiiLiD noL yet under cuiistx taction , an eiyht yedi lead time
has been assumed. This includes the period from the date of
application for a construction permit to the expected date of
commercial operation. For plants for which there is not
even a reported date of filing for a construction permit, a
ten year lead time from the date of order was assumed.
The results are given in Table II-l. It can be seen
that new plant completions are expected to continue at a level
below 10,000 MWe per year until 19 81. Subsequently, plants
ordered in 19 72 and 19 73 are scheduled to begin operation.
Table II-l shows that installed generating capacity at the end
of 19 73 was about 2 4,000 MWe. This capacity level is expected
to increase to 47,788 MWe by the end of 19 75. Plant capacity
in 19 80 is estimated to be 9 4,5 62 MWe. The 19 8 3 estimate was
based on present nuclear plant orders and a five and one-half
year completion allowance from the date construction is report-
ed to begin. This resulted in an estimate of firm nuclear
plant capacity of 173,854 Me. By including those plants which
- 21 -
PAD District
As)
(3)
I: Finn*
Othe
Curaul ativc
:
Firm
Other
II: Firm
Other
Cumulative
:
Firra "
Other
III: Firra
Other
Cumulative
Firm
Other
IV: Firm
Other
Cumulative:
Firm
Other
V:' Firm
Other
Cumulative
:
Firra
Other
Subtotal : Annual
Firm
Other
Total
Cumulative Total
Firm
Other
Total
TABLE II-l
Projection of Nuclear Plant Capacity
(K.Ve)
1973 197** 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
5267 802? 1*015 2055 2733 2120
119C0 } 72*47 25269 29281) 31339 3>*072 36192
2200 105>* 317.5 3133 2250 3105
9373 11573 12627 15802 18935 21185 21*290
1968 1978 926 860
1718 3686 566!< 6590 7**50 7U5O 71*50
330 - -
330 330 330 330 330 330
913 2190 1156 1100
795 1708 3898 5051* 61
5
1
* 615I* 615 1*
IO678 IS? 1* 1* 927? 801*3 1*983 5225
I.0678 132'i!i 9272 80t*3 1*983 5225
23866 3^5kh 1*7783 57060 65103 70086 75321
23866 1*7708
I960 1981 1982 1983
11932 11*918 8078 6000
8150
1*8121* 630I12 71120 77120
8150
1181* 8960 ll*770 5500
3862
251*71* 31*1*31* 1,9201* 51*701*
3862
3765 5750 79>*0 2150
2300
11215 16965 21*905 27055
2300
330 330 330 330
2370 - 1*1*66 760
9100
8521* 8521* 12990 13750
9100
19251 29628 35251* 11*1*10
23>*12
19251 29628 3525'* 37822
91*562 121*190 1591* 1* 1* 17385 1*
23>*12
9'*562 197266
Source: Atomic Industrial Forura, Nuclear Industry .
March 1973, pp. 26-27
December 1973, p. 39
February 197'*, pp. 26-27
March 1971*, pp. 2l*-25
(1)
(2)
(3)
The 1973-1933 estimates are based on actual orders for nuclear plants through the year 1973. A ten year
lead time for construction cciipletion based on the year of order or an 8 year lead time for construction
completion based on the expected year of application for a construction permit (whichever yielded the
earliest yenr of completion) vas used when these lead times were not projected by the ordering utility.
The AKC (1972) and AIF (1973) project nuclear capacity to reach 280,000 !-Me and 365,000 MWe respectively
by 1985. in view of the 1903 firm estimate, if these figures are to be reached, 106 and 191 1000 MWe plants
would hnve to be ordered, respectively, during the years 197**-1975 for installation durlnc 1981* and 1985-
With respect to the total estimate, 83 and 168 nuclear plant:-., respectively, must be ordered during
Wi-1975 for installation in the years 198U-1985.
Firm projections are for nuclear plants which are under construction or have been ordered and a specific
vendor and site announced.
Other projections include nuclear plants on which options hnve been taken, only letters of intent have
been issued, or no vendor or site has yet been selected.
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were announced only by letters of intent or options plus
those plants for which no site or vendor was named, the
estimate of installed generating capacity was increased for
1983 to 197,266 MWe
.
Assuming no further increase in construction delays,
Table II-l indicates that if the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
nuclear power estimate for 19 85 of 2 80,000 MWe is to be
reached, firm commitments for the completion of 10 6 additional
1000 MWe plants must be made. These plants will have to be
operational in 19 84-19 85. Therefore, they will have to be or-
dered in 19 74-19 75. Based on orders published in the journal
of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , a maximum
estimate of cumulative installed nuclear plant generating capa-
city was made. Table II-2 shows this maximum estimate given
the assumption that the trend of plant orders indicated in
Table II-3 continues. The estimate assumes that installation
rates are maintained near the 19 80-19 81 rates and are higher
than the assumed 1982-1983 rates shown in Table II-3. Nuclear
capacity levels in Table II-2 for 1975, 1980 and 1985 are
47,788 MWe, 119,111 MWe and 250,331 MWe, respectively.
The capacity levels projected in Table II-2 differ
from those in Table II-l for the years 1976-19 85. The differ-
ences are due to the fact that in many cases utilities have
projected the completion time of their nuclear plants to be
less than eight years from date of order. This is inconsistent
with developing trends in the nuclear reactor construction in-
dustry, and is reflected in the large difference .found in the
1980 projection in this study (Table II-l) compared to the
maximum projection (Table II-2) based on a speed up in con-
struction trends. Thus, the projected 19 80 capacity level is
94,562 MWe (Table II-l) while the projected maximum is 119,111
MWe (Table II-2) . No 1985 nuclear capacity estimate is made
in Table II-l because the 19 74 and 19 75 nuclear plant orders
- 23 -
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are not known. Therefore, a complete inter-tabular comparison
is not possible.
If the conditions assumed in Table II-l are met,
nuclear plant additions will be less than 10,000 MWe per year
through 19 79. After that, a surge of plant additions will
occur. In 1982, capacity additions will be 35,254 MWe. An
additional capacity of 37,822 MWe will be added in 19 83. This
may produce a bottleneck in construction, given the type of
labor and material needed for the completion of certain high
technology .operations.
Tables II-3 and II-4 show nuclear plant capacity
additions based on AIF data. Table II-3 includes not only firm
plant orders, but also orders for plants based only on letters
of intent, on options, or plants for which no vendor or site
has been selected. Table II-4 includes only firm plant orders
diid plants ali. eddy under construction. If schedules are met,
in 1980 almost 27,000 MWe of plant capacity will be installed.
By March, 19 74, nuclear plant capacity of 51,9 72 MWe to be
installed through 19 80 was under construction. Table II-5
shows the yearly installation rate.
If administrative and regulatory delays are elimi-
nated, operational lead times depend on construction time.
Figures II-2, 3, and 4 are graphed projections of construction
expectations for nuclear plants (capacity and number) due to
be in operation prior to 19 86. Figure II-2 is a projection of
the nuclear capacity presently contracted to be concurrently
under construction. The annual projected levels of plant con-
struction fall below the contracted levels yearly through
1978 due to methodological differences. All utilities which
have announced the intention of constructing a nuclear facility
have established a commercial operating goal date. This in-
evitably means that some nuclear plants are scheduled to be
under construction for only three years while others are sched-
- 26 -
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uled for up to nine years of actual construction time. These
construction periods represent the contracted time span. The
projected nuclear construction levels by year are based
strictly on a six year plant construction time. This means
that some utilities planned on filing construction permit
applications in 1974 to begin construction in 19 76 for plants
not projected to begin construction in 1976. Instead, they
were projected to begin construction six years prior to their
expected start-up date. Therefore, under the methodology used
for the projection, a utility which had announced its intention
of filing a construction permit in 19 74 for a plant ordered in
1973, and expecting commercial operations in 19 83, was not pro-
jected to begin construction until 1978.
Projections of both nuclear capacity and the number
of plants concurrently under construction by year are shown in
total for concurrent construction for the years 19 74 through
19 84.
The projection in Figure II-3 is based on a six year
construction lead time with respect to the installed nuclear
generating capacity forecast in Table II-l for the period 19 74
through 19 83 and Table II-2 for 19 84 and 19 85.
In Figure II-4, all nuclear plants shown for which
the construction period begins before 1977 are based on actual
orders made prior to 1974. The completion dates were specified.
The initial construction dates v/ere determined by allowing a
three year period from the date of order or a one and one-half
year period from the anticipated application date for a con-
struction permit. This led to construction periods ranging
from three to nine years with an average period of five to six
years.
Allowing some relaxation of the strictness of the
projected estimates with respect to construction lead times and
- 29 -
the possibility of some delays in contracted construction, a
median level of total yearly plant construction between the
contracted and projected levels should be expected through
1977. Subsequently, differences in contracted and projected
capacity must be made up through increased commitments. Even
an annual linear increase in total concurrent nuclear plant
construction from 19 74 on, would result in significant demands
on skilled labor, materials, components and equipment. With
(9) ....
current shortages in these areas, a construction crisis in
the future does not appear unreasonable.
In addition to domestic orders, U.S. vendors are
supplying components, systems, and engineering manpower for
foreign contracts. This may add to potential U.S. construction
bottlenecks. Tables II-6 and II-7 relate to foreign commit-
ments of American suppliers. Table II-6 shows which countries
ordered plants from U.S. suppliers during the years 19 72 and
1973. Japan, a heavy buyer of U.S. reactors, did not place
any orders in 19 72 and 19 73. A listing of earlier Japanese
construction contracts with U.S. vendors' is given in Table II-7
Suppliers listed with a slash (e.g., W/) are building the
nuclear reactor jointly with a Japanese company.
As a result of construction and other delays, the
AEC has reduced its 19 72 forecast of about 151,000 MWe by 19 80.
Its 1973 estimate was only 132,000 MWe. By March, 1974, it was
expected that a new estimate for 19 00 would be around 100,000
MWe. This is close to the projection developed in this
study. Given the delays, the completion time for a nuclear
power plant is about 25 percent longer than for a fossil fuel
plant.
Both the AEC estimates and those presented in this
paper may be overly optimistic. The recent rash of planned
nuclear power plant delays and curtailments due to financing
problems and utility re-evaluations of projected demand post-
- 30 -
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TABLE II-T
Japanese Reactors Built or Being Built,
Supplied by U.S. Vendors (1973)
Start of MWe
Construction (net ultimate) Supplier
Kansai (Ohii - 2) 1972
Kansai (Ohii - l) 1972
JAPC.(Tokai - 2) " 1972
Tokyo (Fukushima - 6) .1971
Kansai (Takahama - l) 1969
Tokyo (Fukushima - 2) 1968
Tokyo (Fukushima - l) 1966
Kansai (Mihama - l) 1966
JAPC (Tsuruga - l) 1966
Total 7317
Source: Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , May 1913» p. ^0.
1175 w/
1175 v/
1100 w/
1100 GE
826 W/
I6h GE
k6o GE
3^0 W
357 GE
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date the AEC forecasts and have not been accounted for in any
of the tables presented in this study.
B. Plant Availability
The amount of nuclear power available depends not
only on plant capacity but upon plant availability as well.
The latter has been the subject of some controversy. A sum-
mary of nuclear plant availability through August, 1973, is
given in Table II-8. The total population of 35 plants was
evaluated. Of these, 18 had an average plant factor (avail-
ability) of 60.9 percent from start-up through October, 19 72.
Subsequently, quarterly ratings were made. These plant fac-
tors ranged from 6 6.3 to 72.9 percent.
Using quarterly data, of the 35 plants considered,
plant: raccor data existed for 29 plants with 2 4 iiavixiy dctLct
for the first two quarters of 19 73. In the first quarter,
eleven plants were available for less than 60 percent of the
time; one plant was available between 60 and 70 percent of the
time; five plants were available between 70 and 80 percent;
and seven plants had factors above 80 percent. In the second
quarter, five plants were available less than 60 percent of
the time, three plants were available between 60 and 70 per-
cent, five plants between 70 and 80 percent, and eleven plants
had factors over 80 percent. These plants had been in opera-
tion at least one full quarter. Two new plants were rated
between 60 and 70 percent and 70 to 80 percent availability
,
respectively. These amounted to the total of new additions
and yielded a high plant factor level for this quarter.
In the future, as new plants are added at an in-
creasing rate to the availability ratings, the trend will be
downward because initial start-up rates have been historically
closer to 60 percent availability than to 80 percent avail-
- 33 -
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ability. The new plants will weight the average more than the
debugged older plants.
For comparison with an AEC publication containing
nuclear operating statistics for 1972, a similar compilation
using AIF data was made. The AIF data are presented in Table
II-9. The AEC figures are given in Table 11-10. The AIF
statistics involve 20 plants for the period from February 1 to
December 31, 1972. The AEC statistics include 19 plants for
all of 19 72. The AEC includes only those nuclear plants that
had been operating for at least three months during 1972. The
AEC study did not include those plants which began operation
after August, 1972. As a result, they estimated plant factors
slightly higher than would be expected if these newer plants
were included. In both tables the plant availability factor
is measured as the percent of total possible time that a plant
was actually producing electricity. That is, the plant factor
is equal to generating time divided by total time during the
period. Stand-by time was not included in the generating time
figure.
Table II-9 shows that the 20 plants included in the
AIF study generated electricity for a total of 102,237 out of
142,741 possible hours for an average plant factor of 71.6
percent. On a weighted scale, using plant capacity as the
weight, the 20 plants accounted for 8221 MWc of electricity
generation out of a possible installed generating capacity of
11,6 82 MWe for a weighted plant factor of 70.4 percent. The
AEC (Table 11-10) estimated plant factors for the 19 plants at
73.4 percent unweighted and 73.3 percent weighted. It should
be noted that all three availability ratings (Tables II-8, 9,
and 10) are significantly below the 80 percent used in most
publications for the estimation of power costs and sales.
The differences between the AEC and the AIF results
are probably due to alternative data bases. The methodology
- 38 -
TABLE II-9
Plant Factors for Plants in Operation February 1 - December 31, 1972
Plant NSSS Start
Up
Plant Size
MWe (net)
Total
clock
time
(Mrs)
Total Time Plant
Generator Factor
on Line (Hrs)
Operation
Availability
MWe
/PAD District 1/
Mass (Y) W 2/61 175 8039 3819 .1*75 83
y (ipi) BCW 10/62 265 8039 5728 • 712 189
Conn (CY) W 1/68 575 8039 6978 .868 1*99
NJ (OC) GE 12/69 61*0 8039 61*75 .805 515
NY (NMP1) GE 12/69 620 8039 5520 .687 1*26
NY (RE. G) W 7/70 1+90 8039 5290 .658 322
Conn (MP1) GE 3/71 652 8039 1*1*39 .552 360
SC (HBR2) W 3/71 700 8039 6802 .81*6 592
Virginia (Si) W 9/72 820 2208 1170 .530 1*35
Vermont (VY) GE 11/72 5^0 26U9 1970 .7"*!* 1*02
Total 71377 U9706 .696
Weighted Total 51*77 .698 3823
/PAD District 11/
Illinois (Dl) GE 8/60 200 6039 6866 .851* 171
Illinois (D2) GE 8/70 809 8039 1*1*92 .559 1*52
Vise (PB1) W 12/70 1*97 80 ?0 sfino -723
Minn. (M) GE 6/71 5U5 8039 6993 -870 1*71*
Illinois (D3) GE 10/71 809 8039 6985 .869 703
Mich. (P) C-E 12/71 800 7200 1*500 .625 500
Illinois (QC1) GE 8/72 809 6756 1*935 • 731 591
Illinois (QC2) GE 8/72 809 5502 2805 .510 1*13
Wise. (PB2) W ' 3/73 1*97 3672 2997 .816 1*06
Total 63325 1*6382 .732
Weighted Total 5775 .705 1*069
/PAD District v/
Calif. (SO) W 1/68 1*30
'
8039 611*9 .765 329
TOTAL
Unweighted Total lU27l*l 102237 .716
Weighted Total 11682 ' .701* 8221
Sources: Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry .
June, 1972, p. 39
October, 1972, p. 33
February
, 1973, p. 53
Vx
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TABLE 11-10
AKC Plant Factors for Plants in Operation January 1 - December 31, 1972
Plant NSSS Start Plant Size Total Total Time Plant Operation
Up MWe (net) clock Generator
time on Line (hrs)
(hrs)
Factor Availability
MWe
PAD District I
Mass (Y) W 2/61 .175 8781( 1*565 .520 91
Y (IPl) BCW 10/62 265 8T8h 5878 .669 177
Conn (CY) W 1/68 575 878IJ. 7702 .877 50k
NJ (0C) GE 12/69 6Uo 878U 7097 .808 517
NY (KMP1) GE 12/69 620 878I4 6167 • .703 1*36
NY (RE. G) W 7/70 U90 878U 6030 .687 337
Conn (MPl) GE 3/71 652 878U 5183 .591 385
SC (HBR2) W 3/71 700 878U 7^83 .852 596
Total 70272 50105 .713
Weighted Total kin • 739 30!* 3
PAD District II
Illinois (Dl) GE 8/60 200 Bj&h
.
6968 .782 156
Illinois (D2) GE 8/70 809 878U 521*1 .596 1*82
Wise. (PB1) W 12/70 U9T 878'* 63^9 • 723 359
Minn. (M) GE 6/71 51*5 878I4 6977 .79»t 1*33
Illinois (D3) GE 10/71 809 878U 75**8 .860 696
Mich. (P) C-E 12/71 800 UU16 31^2 .712 570
Illinois (QC1) GE 8/72 809 Mu6 3535 .802 • 61*9
Illinois (QC2) GE 8/72 809 l*l*l6 2350 .532 1*30
Wise. (PB2) W 3/73 1*97 3612 2975 .823 1*09
Total £0780 1»5085 .7U2
Weighted Total 5775 • 725 1*181*
PAD District V
.....
Calif. (HB) 8/63 65 878U 7296 .831 5U
Calif. (SO) 1/68 1*30 878U 6819 .776 33l»
Total 17568 ll»115 .803
Weighted Total 1*95 .78U 388
Unweighted Total ll) 8621 10920U • 731*
V-
Weighted Total 10387 • 733 7615
Source:
Wilson, T. B.
,
et al. Atomic 1.,'nergy Comrai.ssion, Office of Operations ; Evaluatiian. Evaluation f
Nuc lear Power Pl-i.n1. Availability , Jan. 1971*, p. 1* -
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TABLE 11-11
Plant Identification for Tables II-8, 9 and 10
PAD District I
Penn (Si)
Mass (Y)
NY (IP1)
Conn (CY)
NJ (OC)
NY (NMP1)
NY (G)
Conn (MP1)
SC (HBR2)
Florida (TP»0
Virginia (Sl)
Vermont (VY)
Florida (TP3)
Maine (MY)
Mass (PI)
Virginia (S2)
SC (01)
NY (IP2)
PAD District II
Illinois (Dl)
Mich. (BRP)
Illinois (D2)
Wise. (PB1)
Wise. (G2)
Minn. (M)
Illinois (D3)
Mich. (P)
Illinois (QC1)
Illinois (QC2)
Wise. (PB2)
Illinois (Zl)
Illinois (Z2)
Nebr. (Ft. C)
PAD District III
Ala (BF1)
PAD District IV
Calif. (HB)
Wash (H)
Calif. (SO)
Shippingport 1
Yankee
Indian Point!
Connecticut Yankee
Oyster Creek
Nine Mine Point 1
R. E. Ginna
Millstone Point 1
H. B. Robinson 2
Turkey Point h
Surry 1
Vermont Yankee
Turkey Point 3
Maine Yankee
Pilgrim 1
Surry 2
Oconee 1
Indian Point 2
Dresden 1
Big Rock Point
Dresden 2
Point Beach 1
Genoa 2
Monti cello
Dresden 3
Palisades
Quad Cities 1
Quad Cities 2
Point Beach 2
Zion 1
Zion 2
Ft. Calhoun
Browns Ferry 1
HumboIt Bay
Han ford
San Onofre
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used in this study was the same as that used by the AEC. That
is, outage time, both forced and scheduled, was subtracted
from the total available plant operating time to obtain gener-
ating time. Forced outages were considered as immediate plant
removals from service due to a malfunction of component,
structure, or system. Scheduled outages were preplanned re-
movals of a plant from service for inspection, refueling,
maintenance and general overhaul. Standby status was included
as a scheduled outage. Partial outages, resulting from com-
ponent failures, were not included nor were temporary restric-
tions on plant capacities considered. Therefore, plant factors
are statistically biased upward.
It should be noted that there is a difference between
the plant availability factor and the plant capacity factor.
The former is the percent of the total time in a given period
that a pj_ant or unit was prouu^iiiy uxecLi.jL.ci.Ly. IL j.t> tsyucix
to the time the generator was on line divided by the total time
during the period. The capacity factor is the percent of the
total electrical energy actually produced by a plant or unit
during the period compared to the energy it might have produced
had it operated at the licensed design power level for the
entire period. It is equal to the electrical megawatt hours
actually produced during the period divided by the product of
the licensed design power level (MWe) times the number of hours
in the reporting period.
Testimony by D. D. Comey indicates that the unweight-
ed average capacity factor for commercially operating nuclear
power plants over 100 MWe has been 5 4.0 percent from start-up
to June 30, 19 74. It was 57.3 percent in 19 73, and 50.4 per-
cent for the first six months of 19 74. Ke further shows that
average capacity factors generally rise through the first four
years of operation and decline with increasing age of the
plant thereafter. This last conclusion is based on very small
- 42 -
samples in each age group and does not appear to consider
recent advances in reactor types. His data are based on the
AEC report, Nuclear Pov/er Plant Availability and Capacity
Statistics for 1973 , (May, 197 4) with 19 74 data compiled from
data supplied by the AEC, Office of Operation Evaluations.
Unfortunately, the Comey report does not provide sufficient
(12)
methodology for checking.
SECTION II APPENDIX: AEC FORECASTS
The basic methodology for the supply projections of
nuclear power made in this study is akin to counting. Con-
struction starts, progress, orders, options, and letters of
intent are all known. There may be some disagreement concern-
ing assumed time periods, but the range of the disagreements
will be small. AEC forecasts, however, appear to be based on
an hypothesized quasi-exponential demand curve for electricity,
Apparently, it is assumed that supply will grow at the same
rate and that nuclear power will get a given rising share of
the augmented demand. The AEC position with respect to demand
is characteristically stated in the following excerpt:
The. planning of additional generating capacity
must be based on estimates of future peak de-
mand for power and energy consumption. Because
of the long lead times for base-load plants
(4 to 6 years for fossil- fueled, 7 to 10 for
nuclear) , corresponding long-term forecasts of
demand and consumptions are required.
Historically, both the peak and average con-
sumption of electric power have tended to
increase exponentially with time, i.e., with
about the same percentage increase each year.
The most common approach to long-term fore-
casting has been to assume continued exponen-
tial growth, estimating the growth rate from
historical data. Refinements have generally
involved breaking down total demand (or con-
sumption) into components of use such as
' residential, commercial, industrial and carry-
ing out the growth-rate determination separately
for each component. The assumption of exponen-
tial growth may also be modified for one or
another component because of other information.
For example, the increasing popularity of air
conditioning has contributed substantially to
growth of residential and commercial consump-
tion during the past 20 years. As the satura-
tion of air conditioning (percentage of actual
use divided by potential total use) approaches
100%, this contribution to growing consumption
will become small. If reasonable estimates of
- 44
future saturation can be made, it may be
appropriate to reduce the estimated future
growth constants correspondingly.
A number of academic economists have attempted
to relate consumption of electric energy to
other socio-econometric variables such as
"real" price (price relative to some index of
general price level) of electricity and of
fuels, population, per capita real income,
etc. With respect to long-term forecasting,
even a totally satisfactory econometric model
of this sort would only transform the problem
to that of forecasting values of the supposed
explanatory variables. These input forecasts
would require the same assumption of historical
regularity continuing into the future that is
made in the more direct techniques described
above
.
The staff belief is that the most that is
possible is the preparation of reasonable
projections based on the available information.
Quasi-exponential growth of electricity con-
sumption has persisted over many decades and
it is reasonable to assume that it will persist
for the next decade. (13)
The primary difficulty with this type of forecasting,
one which requires a constant revision of the estimates as the
future approaches the present, is that the projection of, say,
a reasonable nine percent growth rate over the next ten years
based on past data becomes absurd if carried on for a further
twenty- five or thirty years. To argue that this is not what
was intended is to negate the basis of the AEC argument from
the very beginning.
In forecasting, history merely establishes the ini-
tial conditions, not the future. Alternatively stated, it is
quite plausible that an AEC forecaster, twenty years in the
future, will look back at his past and establish the initial
conditions, not on an exponential, but on a logistic curve. At
the present time it is commonplace to estimate future demand
along an exponential curve while supply is estimated along a
- 45. -
logistic or Gompertz curve. The result is an intersection in
a year of crisis.
It is possible to show that given an exponential
curve, both a logistic and a Gompertz curve can be grafted on
to it such that the curves are smoothly continuous and, for a
given future date, the curves pass through a wide range of
possible demand levels. In other words, we may within a wide
margin pick our own personal year of crisis,
A demonstration of this for both a logistic and a
Gompertz curve follows. It must be noted that these are purely
mathematical. If the exponential curve, which provides the
root of the graft, is only statistically determined, more free-
dom exists.
The equation of the logistic curve is:
y =
1 + ae" pt
Given a point (t ,y ) y > 0, a slope m > 0, and a number y >
it is possible to find a logistic curve passing through the
given point with the slope m and whose critical point has
t - coordinate t + y. The calculations are as follows:
dy_
=
abpe"
dt ..
-pt. 2(1 + ae )
^2 . 2 -pt , -pt ,
.
d y _ abp e (ae - 1)
dt 2 (1 + ae" pt )
3
d 2The critical point occurs where: 2_Z = o. I.e., ae~ p = 1,
dt
x
t = — log a.
P
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The equations we have for determining the parameters a,b,
<« y„ =
P are
1 + ae o
(2) m = —^-pe
/T , -Pt . 2(1 + ae o)
(3) t + y = i log a
o p
The solutions of the equations are:
From (3) we obtain,
(4) • a = e p(to + Y)
Substituting this into (2)
,
ra
_
e
p(t
o
+
^bpe- pto
(1 + ep(to + Y, e- pto) 2
bpe PY
(1 + e PV
so, (5) b = m(1 + ePY '
2
P Ype '
m(l + e PV
P Y
Using (1), y = _£SL
° 1 + e
p (t
o
+ Y)
e~
pE
o
_
m(l + e PY ) 2 . m(l + ePY )
pe^(l + e PY ) pe PY
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We must solve for p
:
m(l + e PY ) = pe PY y
py
PY me mpe - = —
y y
PY mor, e '
y , in \
*o (p - --)
; o
e
^
(p _
m_)
= HL.
^o ^o
The function e PY (p - — ) for y > is zero at p = — , increases
1 o J o
to °° as p -> °° , and is continuous. Therefore, it takes on the
value — at some value p = p . Nov/ from equations (4) and (5)
^o
we can determine a and b. Clearly these are the desired para-
meters .
GOMPERTZ CURVE
The equation of the Gompertz curve is
:
Rfc . < R < 1
y = ca where
< a < 1
Given a point (t ,y ) , a slope m, and a number y, with t ,y ,c OO ~ O^O
m,y all strictly greater than 0, we can determine c,a, and R
so that the corresponding Gompertz curve passes through (t ,y )
with slope m and has its critical point at t = t + y
.
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The calculations are:
y = ca
|£ = c(log a) (log R) ^a*
d2 t
—£ = c(log a) (log R) 2 RtaR [1 + (log a)Rfc ]
dt z
The critical point is at: t =
" 1°g(-lo cT a)
log R
The equations for a,c, and R are then:
yu., y^ _
Rfco
t
(2) m = caR Vodog R) (log a)
O) t + y = - lQg(-ioq a)
o log R
Solving:
From (3), (tQ + Y )log R = -log (-log a)
so, (4) log a =
-e"
(t
o
+ y) locj R
Substituting this and (1) into (2) :
m = y/odog R)[-e~ (to + y)1(XJ R ]
- Y^^o) [ (log R) (-R" (t o + y) ) ]
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=
-y
o
(log R)R~ Y
y
or, R = (- — ) log R where y >
For < R < 1, log R takes on all values in the open interval
yo
{-<*>, o) so with y > 0, m > 0, (- —-) log R monotonely takes on
all values in the interval (0,°°). Furthermore, for < R < 1,
y > 0, R monotonely takes on all values in (0,1). Since these
are both continuous functions, they must be equal for some value
of R, say R , with < R < 1.
'
J o' o
The value of "a" can now be determined from (4) . In fact,
_ e
-(t + Y )log R
a = e
It is clear that < a < 1 since,
_e
-(t
o
+ T)log R
<
Finally, from (1)
,
R o
y = caJ o
o-v, a. ~R oso that, c = y aJ o
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Environmental Statement related to the proposed
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Power Company, Docket Nos . 50-461 and 50-4G2, p. 8-6,
Section 8.3.1.
SECTION III: FUEL CYCLE COSTS
An analysis of nuclear fuel cycle costs is necessary
due to wide variation among estimates made by the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) , the National Petroleum Council (NPC) and
others. Calculations made by these organizations and others
are based on different cost estimates or noncomparable assump-
tions. Further, a simple and direct methodology is not pre-
sented with the cost estimates. Table III-l shows how wide are
the differences in cost estimates among the AEC, the NPC, AEC
Commissioner Larson and Holdren. Nowhere was there a detailed
explanation of how their estimates were calculated. A quanti-
tative study was. not presented. The current study is an effort
to put the methodology for calculating nuclear fuel cycle costs
on a consistent and comprehensible basis. It is also an attempt
to measure these costs under several different conditions. The
present study is an attempt to evaluate the fuel cycle costs
that can be expected in the nuclear power industry in the
1980 's on a consistent basis.
Between exploration and burnup in a light water
nuclear plant, uranium must be mined, milled, prepared (con-
verted) , enriched, processed and fabricated. Each step in-
volves a cost, the most expensive of which are mining-milling
and the enrichment process. Once the enriched uranium is used
in a nuclear plant additional costs due to waste management or
recycling of the spent fuel arise. Finally, fuel inventory
charges must be accounted for. Together, these costs make up
the nuclear fuel cycle costs. Costs due to safeguarding the
fuel and insurance liability are considered separately.
The projected fuel cycle costs, in 19 80 dollars, for
a typical light water nuclear power plant are given in Table
III-2. These costs were derived from Table III-3 by using a
seven percent annual rate of inflation on the most likely cost
estimates. These are shown in the first row of each cost com-
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.fuel Cy cle Ccitpor.rnt
TAM.K II I- 1 '
A ComjisrlBon or llu-1 Cycle I'ont' Ksilir.aten
for * 10\>0 KWe M tht Water factor
[mills/Hullo]
AKC (1) AKrflvI,l (?) NPt:[IVH] (3> Moldrfn"4 ' Larson' 5 '
(1973 (l'V>y (i.jfj
dollars* dollars) dollars)
a^ Mining and Milling
U
3
U
8
trt/ib u
3
o
6
$10/lb 10(1
$12/lb UjOj,
$25/ lb U Og
$50/lb UjOg
b) Conversion to Uy. $l-35/lb U
$?/k£U
$2.52/l«U
(a) plus (b) $8/ lb UjOg 4
*:'/kgu
d) Enrichment
Tails Assav
0.20/, $26/kg SWU
0.20* $30/kg SWU
0.2Y5i $32/kg SWU
o.poX $36/kg SWU
0.275* $36/kg "SWU
- $!t?/kg SWU
'0.20£ $50/kg SWU
0.20* $75/ kg SWU
0-«i*l
0.07
0.76
0.66
0.08
O.U l-5 ,5
O.83
1.77
3.W.
0.1)2 0.5
O.W
0.8
0.5
0.65
i&V 0.78
tg.?]
1.09
l.Ch
e) Reconversion
and .fabrication
*70/kgU 0.33
T) Spent Kuel Shipriiit $5/kgU 0.02
g) Reprocessing $35/kgU O.lU
h) Waste Management o.oi*
0.1)0 O.liO
1) (O plus (g) plus (hi *3f'/hG"
$U0/ kv.U
*i»5/keu
Jl I'lutonium Credit $7.50/g
$7.70/g
$8.oo/e
$1-10/g
(0.22)
0.17
(0.22)
O.lU 0.2
(0.15*
(0.2)
k) Subtotal 1.68 1-37
1) Subtotal wltltout
(J) 1.90 1.59 2.1(1 1.0
ill f\icl Inventory
Carrying Choree or
Working Cn^ltal
cost of
lot,
l/^ad Kactor
O.fiO
0.70
0.B2
0.37
0.1..?
0.5
n) Total
,
excluding (J) .72 l.or, 23
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Table III-l Sources:
'"'"'Atomic Energy Conaaission, The Nuclear Industry 1973 WASH 117^-73 (1973),
p. 15. This is an estimated 1981 fuel generation cost.
(2)Atomic Energy Commission, Current Status and Future Technical and Economic
Potential of Light Water Reactors WASH-1082, (March 1968), p. 5-^2.
National Petroleum C<
look
, (1973), p. Ik.
(3) ouncil, "Nuclear Energy Avai lability" U.S. Energy Out-
(k)
Holdren, John P., Uranium Availability and the Breeder Decision , Environ-
mental Quality Laboratory, January 197^
,
p. 13.
(5)
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Future Structure of the
Uranium Enrichment Industry
,
Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess., Phase I, July 31
and Aug 1, 1973, p. 31.
1
'Adjusted Total with enrichment costs at $36/SWU.
y
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TABLE III-2
1930 Fuel Cyclt; Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant
(1980 Dollars)
Cost Component Cost/Unit Quantity/Yr. Cost/Yr. mills/kwhe
a) Mining and Milling $20/lb U Og 270,930 lbs U Og $5,^18,600 •95
b) Conversion to uTV $5/kg U 10^,192 kg U $520,960 .09
c) Enrichment $97/kg SWU 102,7^5 SWU $9,966,265 1-75
d) Fuel Preparation
end Fabrication
$112/kg U 25,622 kg U $2,869,66U • 50
e) Spent Fuel Shipping $8/kg U 22, 93^ kg U $183,^72 .03
f) Reprocessing $56/kg U 22,93*+ kg U $1,28H,30U • 23
g) Reconversion $2/kg U 22,705 kg U $!+5,Ul0 .01
h) Waste Management $l6/kg U 23,607 kg U $377,712 .07
i) Shipping
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Shipping total
i !
!
<
$-
;.l+2/kg U
;. 90/kg U
i. 72/kg u
..U5/kg U
103,671 kg U
75,622 kg U
2U,98l kg U
22,705 kg U
$1+3,5^2
$23,060
$17,986
$32,922
$117,510 .02
Subtotal $20,783,897 3-65
j) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge (12 percent)
k) Safeguarding
1) Insurance
$7,^97,522
NA
NA
1.32
Total (excluding k and l) $28,28l,l|19 M7
Assumptions
Load factor = .65
Burnup = 30,000 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency =33.5 percent
Inflation rate = 7 percent If the SWU cost of $6U.91 in 197 1* was inflated annually at
five percent instead of seven percent, the I960 SWU cost would
result in an annual enrichment charge of $8,938,815 or 1.57
• •-' mills/kwhe. The total cycle cost would be U . 79 mills/kwhe.
Source: Table III-3 '
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TABLE I II-
3
Potential 1980 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Code for an Average
1000 KWe Light Water Nuclear Reactor
Cost Component Cost/Unit Quantity/Year Cost/Year Mills/kwhe
a) Mining and
Milling
$20/lb U Og 270,930 lbs U Og $5,1+18,600 •95
$8/lb U Og $2,167,1+1+0 • 38
$10/lb U Og $2,709,300 .1+8
$15/lb u
30g
$^,063,950 •71
$25/lb U
30g
$6,773,250 1-19
$30/lb U Og $8,127,900 1.1+3
b) Conversion
to UF, $3/kg U 10l+,192 kg U $312,576 .06
$2/kg U $208, 38U .01+
$Vke u $1+16,708 .07
$5/kK U $520,960 .09
$6/kg U $625,152 .11
$7/kg U $729,3^ •13
$8/kg U ''- $833,536 .15
$9/kg U •$937,728 .16
c) Enrichment $65/kg swu 102,71+5 kg SWU $6,678,1+25
'"
1.17
$36/kg SWU $3,698,820 .65
$38.50/kG swu $3,955,682 .69
$l+2/kg SWU $^,315,290. • 76
$50/kg SWU $5,137,250 • 90
$6o/kg SWU $6,161+, 700 1.08
$70/kg SWU $7,192,150 1.26
$75/kg SWU $7,705,875 1-35
$80/kg SWU $8,219,600 1.1+1+
$90/kg SWU $9,21+7,050 1.62
$100/kg SWU $10,271+, 500 1.80
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TABLE III-3 Continued
Cost Component Cost/Unit
$70/ kg U
Quantity/Year
25,622 kg. U
Cost/Year
$1,793, 5^0
Mills/kwhe
d) Fuel
Preparation
and
Fabrication
•32
$8o/kg U $2,01+9,760
•36
$90/kg U $2,305,980
.1*0
$100/kg U $2,562,200
.k5
$120/kg U $3,07U,6l*o
• 5h
e) Spent Fuel
Shipping
$5/kg U 22,93*+ kg U $lll+,670
.02
$10/kg U $229, 3to - .01+
$15/kg U $3^,010
-.06
f) Reprocessing $35/kg U 22, 93^ kg U $802,690
.Ik
$Wkg u ' $917, 360 .16
$l+5/kg u $1,032,030
.18
$50/kg U $1,1*46,700
.20
$60/kg u $1,376,01*0 .2lf
$70/kg U $1,605,380 ' .28
g) Reconversion
(spent fuel to
UF6 )
$l/kg U 22,705 kg U $22,705 .00
$2/kg U $'(5, UlO .01
$3/kg U $68, 115 .01
$l+/kg U
$5/kg U
$90,820
$113,525
.02
.02
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TABLE III-3 Continued
Cost Component Cost/Unit Quantity/ Year Cost/Year Mills/kwhe
h) Waste $10/kg U 23,607 kg U fuel $236,070 .Ok
Management
(reactor fuel)
t $8/kg U $188,856 •03
$9/kg U $212,U63 .Ok
$ll/kg U $259,677 .05
$12/kg U $283, 28U .05
$13/kg U $306,981 • 05
• $iV^g u $330, U98 .06
$15/kg U $35^,105 .06
$l6/kg U $377,712 .07
i) Shipping
b) to c) $.26/kg U 103,671 kg U $26,955
c) to d) $.56/kG U 25,622 kg U $1U,3^8 .
d) to d) $.l+5/kg U 2k, 981 kg U $ll,2i+l
f) to g) $.90/kg U 22,705 kg U $20,1+35
Shipping Total $72,979 .01
i ) Shipping (alternative)
b) to c) $.U2/kg U
c) to d) $.90/kg U
d) to d) $-72/kg U
f) to g) $l.l*5/ kS U
Shipping Total
Subtotal
j) Fuel Inventory
Carrying Charge
<$k3,5k2
$23,060
$17,986
$32,922
$117,510
$15,1+52,255
$U, 669, 080
$7,500,000
.02
2.71
.82
1.32
Total (initial row for each cost component)
k) Safeguarding
1) Insurance
$20,121,335
NA
NA
3-53
Nuclear FJant Assumptions
Load factor = .65
Burnup -- 30,000 MW( t)D/KTU
Efficiency = 33.5 percent
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent U ?35
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TABLE III-3 Sources: Cost Estimates -
a) $20/lb U 0~ - Corner: cnl Stiles , Rio Algom and Denison
J Mines, 19o0 dollars.
$8/lb U Oq - Atomic Energy Conmiss
Technical and Econoini
ion, Current Status and Future
c Potential oi' Lirht Water
Reactors (WASH-1002, March 1'Jbii)
,
p. 5-k2.
Holdrcn, John P. , Uranium Availability and the Breeder
Deci sion (Environmental Quality Laboratory, January
i?(Wv^ 13-
U.S.- Congress , Joint Committee on Atonic Energy, Future
Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry , Hearings
,
93 Cong. 1 Sess., Phase 1, July 31 and Aug. 1, 1973,
p. 31.
National Petroleum Council, "Nuclear Energy Availability"
U.S. Energy Outlook (1973), p. Ik.
$10/lb U On - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry 1973 ,
3
° WASH 117U-73 (1973), P- 15.
$15, $25 and $30/lb UJDg - Extrapolation of possible charges at $5
intervals. Some reserve estimates
oro mado rplptivp to $15 and $30/lb U_On.
b) $3/kg U - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry 1Q?3 >
WASH 117 1+-73 (1973), p. 15.(1973 dollars)
$2/kg U - Holdren, John P., Uranium Availability and the Breeder
Decision (Environmental Quality Laboratory, January
197'0 p. 13.
$k and $5/kg U - Extrapolations based on present costs. $3 escalated
at 7% annually through I98O yields a cost of $5.
$2 through $9/kg U - Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry
,
May 1972, p. 31. The market prices of U
Q
•and UF. contracted in 1972 for delivery between
1975 and 1977 show differences in cost ranging from
$2.?5/kg U to $9.11/kG U.
c) $65/kg SWU
- U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atonic Energy, Future
Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry
, Hearings,
93 Cong. 1 Sess., Fhai;e I, July 31 and Aug. 1, 1973,
'
p. 1U6. (197I+ dollars)
$36/kg SWU - ibid
., p. 31.
$30'5O/kc SWU - 197*1 charge
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TABLE III-3 Sources Continued:
$l)2/kg SWU - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 1973
WASH 117M3 (1973), p. 15.
$50 and $75/kg SWU - U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy , Future Structure of the Uranium
Enrichment Industry
,
Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess.,
Phase I, July 31 and Aug. 1, 1973, p. 31.
$60/kg SWU - Extrapolation.
$70 and $80/kg SWU - U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Future Structure of the Uranium
Enrichment Industry
,
Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess.,
Part 2, Phase II, October 2, 3, and k, 1973,
pp. 102 (Hosmer) and 30^ (Commonwealth Edison).
Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , April 1973,
pp. 7-9.
The Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) has calculated
the component costs of a separative work unit based on AEC data. Using 1965 as
a base year, three components were assessed and summed to arrive at a (ceiling)
charge of $30 /SWU. The components were power, labor and other costs at $15, $5»
oy^a .4nn r^s^ect ivel,r . The NAC cho*..'c the ~c.."cr and labor coots to have esco.lo.tic
to $21.68 and $7.1*U by 1973. The NAC assumed that all other costs including
amortization, depreciation, maintenance, research and development, interest on
pre-production and contingency allowances did not escalate from 1965 to 1973.
By summing the three components together a (celing) charge of $39.12/SWU was
found. (It should be noted that in 1973, the AEC was charging $36 /SWU.) * NAC
projected power, labor and other costs for separative work to be $31.09,
$10.80 and $20.00 respectively by 1980. This amounts to a separative work
(ceiling) charge of $51.89.
A calculation of percentage increases in costs pre-
dicted by NAC reveals the following:
Time Period
1/1/67 - 1/1/70
Escalate*
i
0.89
d Power Co;
i
5.9
;t Charge
*/Yr.
1.97
Escalated
.89
Labor Cost
%
16.9
Charge
<tfYx.
5.63
1/1/70 - 1/1/73 5.67 35.U 11.80 I.29 21.0 7.OO
7/1/72 - 1977 5.76 27.1 5.U2 2.09 29.0 5.80
1977 - 1980 i*. 10 15.2 5.07 I.50 15.1 5-37
1981 - 1983 1+.61 1H.8 U.93 1.71 15.8
.
5.27
Although from 1970 to 1973 power and labor costs inflated at rates of 11.8 per-
cent and 7.0 percent annually, NAC assumed that these costs would not continue
to inflate at these rates. Rather, they forecast a decline in the rate of
inflation.
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TABLE III-3 Sources Continued:
Based on a 7.0 percent annual increase in costs from 1973 to 19 80, the power
and labor cost components in 1980 would be $3^.81 and $11.95 respectively.
Holding other costs constant, a (ceiling) cost of $56.76 is obtained. If
power costs escalate at 11.8 percent, as they did from January 1, 1970 to
January 11, 1973, a power cost of $1*7.33 would be encountered in 1980. This
cost along with a 7 percent annual increase in labor costs, suggests a 1980
separative work unit cost of $69.28 for a government plant. These inflation
rates were not assumed by the NAC. Hence they arrived at lover cost projec-
tions .
$90 and $100/kg SWU - escalations of lover costs at 7$ annually
through 1980.
d) $70/kg U - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry 1973
WASH II7U-73 (1973), P. 15- (1973 dollars)
National Petroleum Council, "Nuclear Energy Availability"
U.S. Energy Oxitlook (1973), P- 1*+-
Holdren, John P., Uranium Availability and the Breeder
Decision (Environmental Quality Laboratory, January
197*0 P- 13-
$80 and $90/kg U - Atomic Energy Commission, Current Status and Future
Technical and Economic Potential of Light Water Reactors
(WASH-1082, March 1968), p. 5-42.
$100 and $120/kg U - escalation of lover costs at 7% annual through
1980.
e) $5/kg U - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry 1973
WASH 1171+-73 (1973), P- 15. (1973 dollars)
$10 and $15/kg U - extrapolations and escalation at 7% annually
National Petroleum Council, ":,ruclear Energy Availability"
U.S. Energy Outlook (1973), P> 1^-
f) $35/kC U - Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear IndurJ.ry 1973 WASH
117^-73 (1973), P- 15. (1973 dollars) •
$1+0 and $U5/kg U - National Petroleum Council, "Nuclear Energy Avail-
ability" U
;£;_J^ejj^Outlj^k (1973), P. 1*+.
Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry, Decem-
ber 1972, p. 31, $'i0,000/MTU (reprocessing cost).
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TABLE III-3 Sources Continued:
Holdren, John P. , Uranium Availability and the Breeder
Decision (Environmental Quality Laboratory, January
197*0 p. 13.
$50, $60 and $70 /kg U - escalations of costs at 7 percent annually
through 1980.
g) $1 through $5 /kg U - extrapolations based on (b). (1973 dollars)
h) $10/kg fuel - Atonic Energy Commission, Nuclear Industry 1971 ,
WASH 117^-71, p. 162. (1971 dollars)
$8 through $12 /kg fuel - Idem .
$10 through $15 /kg fuel - Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry ,
April 197^> p. 31 (Waste Management Cost,
$10,000 - $15 ,000 /ton of processed fuel.).
$lU, $15 and $l6/kg fuel - escalations of costs at 7 percent annually
through I960.
i) Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs for Nuclear
Evaluation
,
WASH 1099, Dec. 1971, p. 9^; escalated
to 1973 dollars at a 7 percent annual increase from
1967 dollars.
i ) $117,510 - escalation of costs at 7 percent annually through 19 80.
j) Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 1973 , WASH 117U-73
(1973), p. 15.
$7,500,000 - escalation of costs at 7 percent annually through 19 80.
Quantity Estimates - Table III-3 —
If the cost figures used by the AEC in their fuel generation cost estimates
reported in The Nuclear Industry, 1973 , WASH 117U-73, are used, the fuel cycle
cost is about $lU,9'*3,220 or 2.63 mills/kwhe. This cost excludes reconversion
and shipping costs. It does not include a plutonium credit. Including these
elements as found in Table III-2 or on page 15 (plutonium credit) of WASH 117^-73,
brings the total fuel cycle cost down to 2.Ul mills/kwhe. This is .09 mills/
kvhe below the AEC estimate. Limiting this comparison is the fact that the
average nuclear plant considered in this estimate and that implied in the AEC's
estimate have different engineering and availability factors.
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ponent in Table III-3. Excluding mining and milling costs,
these are expressed in 1973 or 1974 dollars. They are
based on present and projected nuclear fuel cycle market
indicators including current fuel contracts for delivery in
the next decade, an evaluation of the enrichment industry,
assuming costs are commercial and at least part of the sector
is private, and recent forecasts by the AEC of future costs
for each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle.
In Table III-2, an annual nuclear fuel cycle cost of
$28,281,097 or 4.97 mills per kilowatt hour of electrical gen-
eration is projected for an average 1000 MWe nuclear power
plant. This average plant is expected to have a 65 percent
load factor, a high core burnup rate and an efficiency rating
slightly above normal. The costs are reported in 19 80 dollars.
Table III-3 is a composite summary of possible fuel
cycle costs for the model nuclear power plant. The range of
possible total nuclear fuel cycle costs from the component
unit cost- potentials presented in this table is from 2.41 mills
to 5.70 mills per kilowatt hour of electrical generation. This
is implied from annual costs ranging from $13,739,164 to
$32,4 72,9 05. The lower estimate represents charges being made
prior to 19 74. The upper estimate represents a potential cost
in 1980. The most likely component cost estimates have been
summed to give a fuel cycle cost of 3.5 3 mills per kilowatt
hour of electrical generation. This estimate is quoted mainly
in 1973 dollars. (2)
The model plant used in this study does not possess
some standard characteristics that have been assumed by the
AEC in the past. In estimating fuel cycle costs, the AEC has
assumed a load factor of 80 percent, a lower core burnup rate
than that used by the model plant and an efficiency rating of
32.5 percent. Table III-4 shows the fuel cycle costs, if
the AEC charactcristi.es are used. The costs are quoted in
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TABLE III-U '.
1980 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant Based on Historic
AEC Assumptions * (19&0 dollars)
Cost Component Cost/Unit Quantihy/Yr. Cost/Yr. mills/kwhe
$20/lb U
3 Q 507 122 lbs u\0g $10,11+2,1+1+0 1.1+5
$5/kg U 195 025 kg U $975,125 0.11+
$97/kg SWU 192 317 kg SWU $18, 651+, 7^9 2.66
$112/kg U 1+7 960 kg U $5,371,520 0.77
$8/kg U 1+2 929 kg U $3^3,^32 0.05
$56/kg U 1+2 929 kg U $2,l+0l+,02^ 0.3^
$2/kg U 1+2,500 kg U $85,000 0.01
$l6/kg U W+,l89 kg U .$707,021+ 0.10
$.l+2/kg U
$.90/kg U
$.72/kg U
$l.l+5/kg U
19l+,050 kg U
1+7,960 kg U
1+6,761 kg U
1+2,500 kg U
$81,501
$1+3,161+
$33,668
$61,625
- - $219,958 0.03
• $38,903,272 5.55
$9,227,720 1.32
NA -
NA -
$1+8,130,992 6.87
Mining and Milling
Conversion to UJV
Enrichment
Fuel Prep and Fabric
Spent Fuel Shipping
Reprocessing
Reconversion
Waste Management
(reactor fuel)
Shipping
•b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Shipping total
Subtotal
j) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge
(at 12%)
k) . Safeguarding
1) Insurance
Total (excluding k and l)
Assumptions (AEC; historical)
Load factor = .80
Burnup = 20,333 !W(t)D/KTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
Inflation rate = 7 percent annually
Sources: Tables III-3, IIIA-1 and IIIA-1+.
(1) Atomic Energy Commission , Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs
WASH-1099, December 1971, p. 13** and Atomic Energy
Nucjear Industry, 1973 . WASH-li7li-73 (1973), p. 15.
for Nuclear Power
,
Commission, The
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1980 dollars and show a total fuel cycle cost of 6.87 mills
per kilowatt hour of electrical generation. This is implied
from an annual cost of $48,130,992. The cost is 1.9 mills
greater than that found for the model plant.
The assumptions concerning the technical and opera-
tional levels and requirements of the model 1000 MWe light
water nuclear power plant determine the quantity flow of uran-
ium, from- which the costs are estimated. The percentage dis-
235tribution of the isotope U in the enriched uranium and the
uranium waste or tails separated in the enrichment process
affect the amount of uranium moving through the first three
stages of the fuel cycle but not the cost.
The cost of enrichment is measured by the amount of
work required to separate uranium into an enriched product
235
with a higher concentration of U and a low-level waste.
Small changes in the degree of enrichment alters costs only
235
slightly. An increase in the percentage of U allowed in
the waste increases the amount of feed needed to produce a
kilogram of enriched uranium, but the amount of separative
(4)
work is decreased. As shown in Table III-5, the net cost
effect is minimal.
The enriched uranium requirements for initial and
subsequent core loadings for a nuclear power plant are depen-
dent on three factors. First, the plant's irradiation or core
burnup rate. This is the rate of production of thermal power
per unit of enriched uranium stated in megawatt days (thermal)
per metric ton of uranium. This varies under certain condi-
tions: (1) the initial core irradiation level is lower than
the steady state (subsequent) levels. For purposes of calcu-
lation, it should be noted that over the plant's life (30 years)
the average irradiation level approaches the steady state level,
while over a ten year span the levelized rate averages slightly
less than the steady state level. (2) these levels are lower
3.
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for boiling water reactors (BWR) than they are for pressurized
(5)
water reactors (PWR) . Second, with respect to the thermal
to electrical conversion efficiency, the higher the efficiency
the lower the uranium requirement. The efficiency tends to be
higher for BV7R's than PWR's. Third, the nuclear plant's load
factor (percent time the nuclear plant produces electricity)
:
the higher the load factor, the greater the quantity of uranium
needed. Together, these three factors determine the annual
uranium loading requirements for a nuclear reactor. The fol-
lowing equation expresses this relationship.
e x k x 8760 hoursK — b x eff x 24 hours/day
R = the annual enriched uranium requirement
for the nuclear reactor (kilograms of
enriched uranium)
b = the core burnup rate (MW(t) days/metric
tons U)
eff = the reactor's thermal to electrical
conversion efficiency
k = the nuclear plant's load factor
e = plant size | KW ( e )
|
For consistency, in this paper the nuclear plant
size has been fixed at 10 00 MWe , with an availability factor
of 0.65. The 0.65 availability factor requires less uranium
in each step of the cycle than if the usual AEC load factor
of 0.P0 had been used. This means that both the component and
total annual fuel cycle costs are lower for a plant qcnerating
electricity 65 percent of the time than for a plant generating
electricity 00 percent of the time. In terms of mills per
iff
(7)
kilowatt hour of electrical generation, the d erent avail
ability factors have very little affect on cost.
The major factor affecting the quantity of uranium
cycled and the cost of acquiring and recycling uranium is the
67
engineering capability of the plant. Here, the principal com-
ponents are: the irradiation or core burnup rate of the plant,
the efficiency with which thermal generation is converted to
electrical generation, the level of uranium enrichment required
for loading the reactor, and the level of uranium enrichment
remaining in the reactor's discharge.
In Tables III-2 and III-3, the nuclear plant is
assumed to be a light water reactor with an average core burnup
rate of 30,000 megawatt days (thermal) per metric ton of uran-
/ 8
)
ium and a thermal plant capacity of 29 85 megawatts. The
thermal plant capacity is based on an efficiency rating of
33.5 percent. This is slightly above the historic average
shown in Table III-6. There it is shown that efficiency
ratings have varied by plant from 19.8 to 35.9 percent.
Nuclear plants with installed electrical capacity levels above
1000 MWe have experienced efficiency ratings of 33.3 and 33.4
percent. Furthermore, it is expected that the reactor will
operate with 3.0 percent enriched uranium and will discharge
(9)
a 0.85 percent enriched uranium. Changing the core burnup
rate significantly affects both the quantity of uranium passing
through the fuel cycle and the cost of the cycle. In
general, the higher the burnup rate the lower the demand for
uranium feed. Therefore, when a high burnup rate is used, the
result is lower fuel cycle costs, both total cost and in terms
of mills per kilowatt hour. In order to introduce a bias
towards low costs, the model nuclear plant analyzed in this
study is assumed to have a high ten year levelized burnup.
As an example of how these conditions factor into the
annual uranium requirement for the model nuclear plant, the
following is representative:
- 68 -
TABLE III-6
Thermal to Electrical Conversion
Efficiencies of Nuclear Power Reactors
Nuclear Plant
Shippingport
Dresden 1
Yankee
Indian Point 1
Big Rock Point
Humbolt Bay
Peach Bottom 1
n/wppss
Oyster Creek
Genoa
Nine Mile Point
Ginna 1
Robinson 2
Millstone ' 1
Point Beach 1
Dresden 2
Dresden
.3
Monticello
Palisades
Quad Cities 1
Vermont Yankee
Quad Cities 2
Point Beach 2
Pilgrim 1
Surry 1
Turkey Point 3
Maine Yankee
Surry 2
Oconee i
Indian Point 2
Turkey Fbint h
Zion 1
Fort Calhoun 1
Browns Ferry 1
Oconee 2
Zion 2
TOTAL
Installed Capacity
Thermal MW Electrical MW( gross) Efficiency
505 100 .198
700 210 .300
6oo 185 • 308
615 285 .1*63
2^0 75 .312
2l+0 75 .312
115 1*2
• 365
1*000 860 • 215
1930 670 • 3^7
165 55 • 333
1850 6U0 .31+6
H+55 U90 • 337
2200 739 • 336
2011 682.3 • 339
lSlfi S2U .3^5
2527 850 .336
2527 850 .336
1670 568.7 .3^0
2212 722 .326
2511 850 • 338
1593 537.3 • 337
2511 850 • 339
1518 52U .3^5
1998 687 .3^i
2hhl 82U .338
2200 728 • 331
2U1+0 827 • 339
2khl 82lt .338
2568 922.5 • 359
2758 906 .328
2P00 728 • 330
3250 1086 • 33^
1U20 U81.5 • 339
3293 1098. k • 333
2568 922.5 • 359
3250 1086 • 33'*
68,oUo 22,505.2 • 331
Source: Atomic Energy Commission, Operating History of U.S. Nuclrnr Power pcu-1 t;,
WASH - ]203-73, 1973.
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Annual uranium input = 23,60 7 KgU =
1, 000,000KW(e) x 0.65 x 87G hours
'-.n non
KW(t)days ~ KW(e)_ 2430,000 KqU x O--3 -^ KW(t) X
hrs
g
-
"
"
w *"—' " "* day
KW(t)DWhere: burnup = 30,000
efficiency = 0.335
KgU
KW(e)
KW(t)
load factor = 0.65
plant size = 1000 MWe
The amount of uranium that will flow through each
step in the fuel cycle can be determined once the nuclear
reactor load requirements are calculated. What needs to be
known is how much uranium is lost and recycled at each step
and some assumptions concerning enrichment. As an example,
Table III-7 shows that 2 3,60 7 kilograms of 3.0 percent enriched
uranium enters the model reactor yearly. This uranium comes
from a fuel fabrication plant where it is assumed that 0.5
(12)percent is lost during fabrication. Five percent of the
uranium going through this process is recycled. To determine
the number of kilograms of uranium (F) that must enter the
fabrication plant, it is necessary to solve the following
equation:
F = 23,607 kg U / (1-0.055).
The UO~ in the fabrication plant was converted from
. 235UFg which had previously been enriched to 3.0 percent U
In this process it is assumed that there is a 0.5 percent loss
of uranium and a 2.0 percent recycling of material not properly
prepared. The amount of uranium (P) that enters into this step
fits the equation:
P = F / (1-0.025)
.
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TABLE III-7
Uranium Flow for a Typical
1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
• Uranium
Ktf/Year Percentage Weight of U235 SWU/Year
Conversion
(0.5% loss)
(in)
(out)
10U 192
103 671
• 711
.711
•
Enrichment (regular in)
(regular out )
(recycled in)
(recycled out
(out)
103 671
18 922
22 636
) h 939
23 861
.711
3.0
.85
3.0
3-0
81 U78
21 267
102 7^5
Recycled U
i
1 761 3.0
Fuel Preparation (in) 25 622 3-0
(2% recycled) • (recycled) 512 3.0
(0.5$ loss) (out) 2k 981 3-0
Fabrication (in) 2k 981 3.0
(5? recycled) (recycled) 1 2U9 3.0
(0.5/5 loss) (out) 23 607 3-0
Reactor (in) 23 607 : 3-0
(out) 22 93^ .85
Reprocessing (in) 22 93^ .85
(1% loss) (out) 22 705 .85
Conversion (in) 22 705 • 85
(0.3$ loss) (out) 22 636 .85
Enrichment '. (in) 22 636 .85
(tails) 17 697 .20
, . Tout) k 939 3.0 21 267
Assumptions
:
Load Factor =
.65
Burnup = 30,000 MW(t)n/MTU
Efficiency = 33.5 percent
101*, 190 KgU = 122 ,071 KgU
3 Q
= 270,930 lbs U
3 Q
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent U2^5
Source: Table III-9
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Subtracting from this figure (P) , the amount of uranium recycled
in the two processes, indicates the amount of uranium in the
form of.UF 6 that must be produced by the gaseous diffusion
enrichment process. In Table III-7 this is shown to be 2 3,861
kg U. Some of this enriched product will be the result of
reconditioning converted spent fuel from the nuclear reactor
but most will be converted natural uranium from the mill.
The amount of uranium lost during the enrichment
235
process is dependent on the percentage weight of the U
isotope in the uranium going into the gaseous diffusion plants
(spent fuel typically has a higher assay than the .711 percent
of natural uranium) , the percentage weight to which the uran-
ium is to be enriched, and the tails assay. A relatively high
235tails assay (a high percentage weight of U in the waste)
implies that a relatively high feed component is needed per
(13)kilogram of Grric^s 1^ ,.22rcm 2.\2rn ^r^duce^ T^ils rno? r, s '"'i^t the
higher the tails assay (all other factors remaining constant)
the higher will be the waste or material lost in the enrichment
process. Additionally, the desired level to which the uranium
is to be enriched directly affects the feed and waste compo-
(14) 235
nents , while the amount of U in the fuel inversely
affects these components
.
(15)The number of separative work units must be
changed with changes in each of the factors noted above. This
affects the enrichment cost but not the amount of uranium feed.
The fact that changing all or some of these factors changes the
cost at this point of the fuel cycle does not mean that the
total fuel cycle costs are changed significantly. This is
due to an offsetting effect that occurs at the mill. In gen-
eral, the more feed used to produce equivalent units of enriched
uranium, the less the number of separative work units necessary.
This assumes the tails compensation noted above
.
A comparison between Tables III-7 and III-7A shows the
relationship between conversion and enrichment and the tails
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TABLE III-7A
Enrichment and Conversion of Uranium
for a 1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
(0.3 Percent Tails Assay After Enrichment)
Conversion
(0.52 loss)
Enrichment
(in)
(out)
(regular in)
(regular out)
(recycled in)
(recycled out)
(out)
Uranium
Kg/Yrar
130 335
129- 683
129 683
19 7^2
22 636
it 119
23 86l
Percentage weight
of XT*'
.711
.711
.711
3.0 •
.85
3.0
3.0
SWU/Year
67 616
Ik 108
87 72l4
Assumptions: Load factor = .65
Burn up = 30,000 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 33. 5. percent
.
.
130,335 KgU = 153,700 KgUo0„J o
* 338,910 lbs U o Q
? 3 o
Enrichment tails assay =0.30 percent U235
Source: Tables III-8 and III-9
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assay. At the higher 0.3 percent tails assay (Table III-7A)
with recycling, to obtain 23,861 kilograms of uranium per year
from the enrichment process requires a greater amount of feed
and fewer separative work units than that shown in Table III-7.
In the present case, 130,335 kilograms of uranium are converted
yearly using 87,724 separative work units. This may be compared
to Table III-7, where the figures are 104,192 KgU and 102,745
SWU, respectively. Table III-5 corresponds directly with the
quantities developed above. It shows that at the anticipated
costs per unit, the total cost difference due to alternate
tails assays is less than 0.1 mills per kilowatt hour of elec-
tricity.
In Table III-7, the uranium is enriched to 3.0 per-
O *5 £ *^ ^
cent U ; in the enrichment process the .711 percent U
uranium feed is separated into a 0.2 percent waste component
and a 3.0 percent enriched product. The ratio of natural
uranium feed to product and the amount of SWU's needed was
derived from Table III-8.
In Table III- 8, the uranium feed is natural uranium
converted to the form UF
fi
. However, not all the uranium that
enters the government gaseous diffusion plants is natural
235
uranium. Some of it has a higher percent of U' . This uran-
ium is in the form of spent fuel discharged from the nuclear
235
reactor. Since this feed is richer m U than the feed
considered in this table, it is logical to assume that it will
take less feed to produce a unit of enriched product.
In the example under consideration, it is known that
23,607 KgU of 3.0 percent enriched uranium will be used annual-
ly in the reactor and that 23,861 KgU of 3.0 percent enriched
uranium will come from the gaseous diffusion plants annually.
This product comes from servicing both spent fuel and natural
feed. How much of each can be calculated by examining the
recycling process.
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In Table III-7, it is assumed that 97 percent of the
uranium entering the reactor is discharged as spent uranium
fuel with an assay of 0.85 percent. The rest is discharged in
the form of plutonium r fissile products and other materials
which must be stored or deposited. This means, that if 23,607
KgU of 3.0 percent enriched uranium goes into the reactor,
22,9 34 KgU of spent uranium fuel with an assay of 0.85 percent
(17)
comes out. This can be sent to the enrichment plant for
recycling. Assuming a 1.0 percent loss of material during
reprocessing and a 0.3 percent loss of material during conver-
(18)
sion, 22,636 kilograms of 0.85 percent enriched uranium
reaches the gaseous diffusion plants yearly. The method of
deriving this is as follows:
If: R = kilograms of uranium entering the
reactor annually
D = kilograms of uranium leaving the
reactor (to be reprocessed) annually
C = kilograms of uranium entering the
conversion process annually
E = kilograms of uranium entering the
enrichment plants annually,
then: D = (.9 7)
R
C = D - (O.Ol)D
E = C- (0.003)C = (.997) (.99) (.97)R = (.957)R
The spent fuel feed reaching the diffusion plants is
0.85 percent enriched. Table III-8 shows that 5.479 kilograms
of natural uranium is needed to produce one kilogram of 3.0
percent enriched uranium when a 0.2 percent tails assay is
used. But, 0.8365 kilograms of 0.85 percent enriched uranium
235
contains the same weight of U as one kilogram of natural
uranium (.711 percent). By fixing the separative work compo-
nent at 4.306 SWU, proportionally it would take 4.583 kilograms
- 76 -
of 0.85 percent enriched uranium to produce one kilogram of
(19)3.0 percent enriched uranium. This is a rough estimate.
It is possible that the SWU requirements change with differing
feeds. However, it is assumed that this type of change is
very small and is disregarded. From the above, the amount of
3.0 percent enriched recycled uranium produced in an enrichment
plant annually from feed supplied by the model 1000 MWe nuclear
plant, is about 4000 KgU. This is estimated as follows:
If: E = kilograms of 0.85 percent spent uranium
entering the enrichment process annually
S = kilograms of 3.0 percent enriched uranium
produced from spent fuel annually,
then: S = E / 4.583
The rest of the enriched uranium must come from con-
verted natural uranium. Since 4939 kilograms of the 23,961
kilograms of enriched uranium that leaves the enrichment plants
has been accounted for, only 22,636 KgU must be traced to the
source. Referring to Table III-7, the amount of feed necessary
to produce this much enriched uranium is 10 3,671 KgU. This is
calculated as follows:
If: P = kilograms of enriched uranium entering
the feed preparation plant annually
r = kilograms of uranium recycled in the fuel
preparation and fabrication process
annually
Enr = kilograms of enriched uranium produced
in the gaseous diffusion plant annually
S = kilograms of enriched uranium produced
from the spent fuel annually
B = kilograms of enriched uranium produced
from converted natural feed annually
N = kilograms of converted natural (.711
percent U 235 ) uranium fed to the enrich-
ment process annually,
- 77 -
then:
Enr = P - r
B = Enr - S
N = B x 5.479
In the conversion of natural uranium to UF g , the
enrichment feed, the loss of uranium is assumed to be 0.5 per-
cent. (20 * Therefore, if 103,671 kilograms of uranium is needed
by the gaseous diffusion plants, 104,192 KgU is needed by the
conversion plants. This is the amount of uranium that must be
purchased from the uranium mills annually, and can be derived
in this way:
If: N = kilograms of converted natural uranium
feed entering the enrichment plants
annually
U = kilograms of natural uranium converted
to UFg annually,
then: U = N / (1-0.00 5)
For the cost analysis of the fuel cycle two further
calculations are required. Because milled uranium is sold by
the pound and the enrichment charge is based on SWU's and
because all other processing activity is costed relative to
the number of kilograms of uranium affected, it is necessary
to convert the kilogram figures to pounds. There are 10 4,19 2
kiloqrams of uranium in 122,871 kilograms of U,0 Q (or 270,930
(21) .pounds of U-jOq) . The separative work units are derived
from Table III-8, i.e., (23,861 KgU) x (4.30G SWU's) = 102,745
KgSWU's.
Table JII-9 is a summary of the equations used to
justify the quantity estimates.
The method involved in calculating the amount of
uranium entering each stage of the cycle is based on the method
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TABLE III-9
Equations for Deriving the
Annual Uranium Flow for a Typical
1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
Equations U23'5
for Deriving Percent
Kilograms u/yr. Weight
Formulas for
Deriving
SWU's/yr.
Conversion
(0.5* loss)
Enrichment
Recycled U
Fuel Preparation
(in)
(out)
(regular in)
(regular out
)
(recycled in)
(recycled out)
(out)
(in)
U = N/.995 .711
N .711
N = (5.^79)B .711
B = Enr -S 3.0
E .85
S 3.0
Enr=P-r 3.0
r = (0.02P)+(0.05F) 3.0
P = F/.975 3.0
,
{2% recycled) (recycled)
(out. )
(0.02)P
F
3.0
3.0
Fabrication (in) F = R/.9 !*5 3.0
(5$ recycled)
(0.5/5 loss)
(recycle
(out)
sd) (0.05)F
R
3.0
3.0
Reactor (in)
(out)
R=(e)(k)(8T60hrs)
(b)(eff)(2l4hrs/day)
D=(0.97)R
3.0
.85
Reprocessing (in) D .85
(1% loss) (out) C=(0.99)D .85
Conversion
(0.35& loss)
(in)
(out)
C
E=(0. ;997)C
.85
.85
Enrichment (in)
(tails)
(out)
E
E-S
S=EA.583
.85
.2
3.0
B(lt.306)
S(U.306)
Enr(U.306)
Sources: Atomic Energy Commission, M- 'ictor Fuel Cycle Costs for Nuclear Evaluation ,
WASH-1099, Dec. 1971, p. 1
3
1
*
.
Atomic Energy Commission, Forec ast of Growth of Nm-1 t?ar Power, WASH-1139j
January 1971, p. L8.
U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Future Structure of the
Urnniun Enrichment. Industry , Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess., Phase I, July 31
• and August 1, 1973, p. 39.
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TABLE III-9 Continued
Notation
U = kilograms of natural uranium entering conversion (leaving the mill)
N = kilograms of natural uranium entering enrichment (leaving conversion)
B = kilograms of enriched uranium leaving regular enrichment
E = kilograms of spent uranium entering (re) enrichment (leaving (re)conversion)
S = kilograms of enriched uranium leaving (re) enricliment
Enr = - kilograms of enriched uranium leaving total enrichment
r = kilograms of recycled uranium from fuel preparation and fabrication
P = kilograms of . enriched uranium entering fuel preparation
F = kilograms of enriched uranium entering fabrication (leaving fuel preparation)
R = kilograms of enriched uranium entering the reactor (leaving fabrication)
D - kilograms of spent uranium entering reprocessing (leaving the reactor)
C = kilograms of spent uranium entering (re) conversion (leaving reprocessing)
e = nuclear plant size ' (megawatts of electricity)
k = nuclear plant availability factor
b = levelized nuclear core burnup rate ( MW( t) days /MTU
)
eff = the nuclear reactor's thermal to electrical conversion efficiency
[MW(e) / Mtf(t)]
- 80 -
for deriving the fuel requirements for the nuclear reactor
alone. All calculations in the fuel cycle ultimately come back
to this factor. In Table III-9, the method is presented.
Basically, it involves dividing the nuclear plants electrical
generating capacity by the nuclear core's fuel burnup rate and
the plant's thermal to electrical conversion efficiency. In
order to determine the margin of error in this method of cal-
culations, it was used on specific AEC data in order to compare
the results with those reported by the AEC. Referring to
Table 111-10, the AEC estimates an annual nuclear plant loading
requirement of 46,782 kilograms of uranium. If the plant
assumptions listed at the end of the table are fitted into the
equation for deriving fuel loading levels, an error of 0.36
percent is determined. That is,
|l, 000, 000 Kw(e) 1 (.85) (8760 hrs)
(20,333 Kw(t) days/KgU l^/^^yl (24 hrs/day)
R = 4 6,9 50
The difference between the AEC calculation of R and the one
based on the methodology presented in this paper is 16 8 kilo-
grams or 0.36 percent.
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TABLE II I- 10
Uranium Flow for a Typical
1000 KWe Light Water Reactor
Conversion
(0.5% loss)
Enrichment
Recycled U
Fuel Preparation
(2% recycled)
(0.5% loss)
Fabrication
(5% recycled)
(0.5% loss)
Reactor
Reprocessing
(1% loss)
Conversion
(0.3# loss)
Enrichment
(in)
(but)
(regular in)
(recycled in)
(out)
(in)
(recycled)
(out)
(in)
(recycled)
(out)
(in)
(out)
(in)
(out)
(in)
(out)
(in)
Uranium
Kg/Year
ll|6 391
11*5 659
11+5 659
1+1+ 859
1+7 28k
3 1+90
50 77*+
1 015
1+9 505
1+9 505
2 t+75
1+6 782
1+6 782
1+5 1+1+8
1+5 1+1+8
kk 99I+
1+1+ 99!+
1+1+ 859
1+1+ 859
Percentage Weight of U235 SWU/Year
•711
• 711
•711
1.016
2.51+8
•2.51+8
2.51+8
2.51+8
2.51+8
2.51+8
2.5H8
2.51+8
2.51+8
1.016
1.016
1.016
1.016
1.016
1.016
139 380
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .85
Burnup = 20,333 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
,
11+6,391 KgU = 172,635 KgU Q
= 380,660 lbs U
g
235
Enrichment tails assay =0.20 percent U
Source: Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs for Nuclear Evaluation
,
WASH- 1099, December 1971, p. 13*+.
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TABLE IIIA-1
1980 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant
Cost/Unit Quantity/Yr.Cost Component
a) Mining and Milling
b) Conversion to UTV
c) Enrichment
d) Fuel Prep and Fabrication
e) Spent Fuel Shipping
f) Reprocessing
g) Reconversion
V\\ Uactf" Mnnq crprnpirh
i) Shipping
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Shipping Total
Subtotal
j) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge
(at 12/,)
k) Safeguarding
l) Insurance
Total (without k and 1)
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .80
Burnup = 20,333 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
Mining and milling costs are quoted in 1980 dollars.
Enrichment costs are quoted in 197^ dollars. •
All other unit costs are quoted in 1973 dollars.
Cost/Yr. mills/kwhe
$20/lb U 0g 507 122 lbs U Q $10,11*2, 1+1+0 1.U5
$3/kg U 195 025 kg U $585,075 .08
$65/kg SWU 192 "317 kg SWU $12,500,605 1.78
$70/kg U 1*7 960 kg U •$3,357,200 .1*8
$5/kg U 1+2 929 ke U $211*, 6U5 .03
$35/kg U U2 929 kg U $1,502,515 .22
$l/kg U U2 500 kg U $1*2,500 .01
$10/kg U
(reactor fuel)
1*1*. 189 kg U
(reactor fuel)
',1+1*1,890 .08
$.26/kg U
i.56/kg U
$.l*5/kg U
$.90/kg U
19!+, 050 kg U
1+7,960 kg U
. 1*6,761 kg U
1*2,500 kg U
$50,1*53
$26,858
$21,01*2
$38,250
$136,603 .02
$28,923,^73 I*. 13
$5,7^,560 .82
$3^,670,033 H.95
Sources: Table3 III-3, III-9, and IIIA-1*.
SECTION III APPENDIX A: EFFECT OF
PARAMETERS ON FUEL CYCLE COSTS
Assumptions concerning the operational and technical
parameters of a nuclear power plant play a major role in
determing the fuel cycle costs. The effect of changed assump-
tions are shown in the fuel cycle costs presented in Tables
IIIA-1 through IIIA-3 (and Tables III-2 and III-4) . In Table
IIIA-1 a load factor of 80 percent, a burnup rate of 20,333
MWD(t)/MTU, and an efficiency level of 32.5 percent are assumed.
Table IIIA-2 differs from Table IIIA-1 in that a burnup rate of
30,000 MWD(t)/MTU is used. Table IIIA-3 differs from IIIA-2
because a load factor of 65 percent and an efficiency rating
of 33.5 percent is used.
The increase in the burnup rate by 10,000 MWD(t)/MTU
results in a fuel cycle cost decrease of 1.4 mills per kilowatt
hour. The changes in the load factor and efficiency ratings
result in a fuel cycle cost change of less than 0.05 mills per
kilowatt hour. In order to introduce downward cost bias, the
assumptions in Table IIIA-3 were adopted for the model plant
analyzed in this study.
Tables IIIA-4 and IIIA-5 are source tables for tables
IIIA-1 and IIIA-2. They show the quantity or uranium that must
be processed in the fuel cycle given the assumptions listed.
The source table for Table IIIA-3 is Table III-7.
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TABLE IIIA-2
1^80 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe
Nuclear Power Plant
Cost/Unit Quantity/Yr
$20/lb U-Og 326 178 lbs U Q
$3/kg U 125 U39 kS U
$65 /kg SWU 130 3^3 Kg SWU
$70/kg U
$5/kg U
$35/kg U
$l/kg U
$10/kg U 29 9^9 kg U
(reactor fuel'U reantnr -PiipI )
Cost Component
a) Mining and Milling
b) Conversion to UEV
c) Enrichment
d) Fuel Prep and Fabrication
e) Spent Fuel Shipping
f) Reprocessing
g) Reconversion
h) Waste Management .'.'.':"'
i) Shipping
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) tod).
f) to g)
Shipping Total
Subtotal
j) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge (at 12$)
k) Safeguarding
1) Insurance
Total (without k and l)
Assumptions:
Load factor = .80
Burnup = 30,000 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
•Mining and milling costs urc quoted in 1980 dollars,
Enrichment costs are quoted in 197*4 dollars.
All other unit costs are quoted in 1973 dollars.
Cost/Yr Mills /kvhe
32 505 kg U
29 095 kg U
29 095 kg U
28 80U kg U
$.26/kg U
4.56/kg U
$.l+5/kg U
$.90/kg U
22k 812 kg U
32,505 kg U
31,692 kg U
28,801+ kg U
$6,523,560 0.93
$376,317 0.05
$8,1472,295 1.21
$2,275,350 0.33
$11+5,1+75 0.02
$1,018,325 0.15
$28,801+ 0.00
$299,^90 0.6k
$32,U51
$18,203
$lU,26l
$25,921+
$90,839 0.01
$19,230,1+55 2.7k
$5,7^,560 0.82
NA
NA
$2l+,977,015 3-56
Sources: Tables III-3, III--9 and IIIA-5.
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TABLE IIIA-3
1980 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant
Cost Component Cost/Unit Quantity/Yr. Cost/Yr.
$20/lb U
g
270,930 lbs U
30g $5,
"418,600
$3/kg U
$65/kg SWU
$70/kg U
•
$5/kg U
$35/kg U
$l/kg U
$10/kg U 23,607 kg U
(reactor fuel) (reactor fuel)
$.26/kg U
$.56/kg U
$.i+5/kg U
$.90/kg U
103,671
25,622
2h, 981
22,705
a) Mining and Milling
b) Conversion to UFV
c) Enrichment
d) Fuel Prep and Fabrication
e) Spent Fuel Shipping
f) Reprocessing
g) Reconversion
*
h) Waste Management
i) Shipping*
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Subtotal
i) Fuel inventory carrying
charge
(at 12%)
k) Safeguarding
l) Insurance
Total (without k and 1)
Assumptions
:
'
Load factor = .65
Burnup = 30,000 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 33.5 percent
Mining and milling costs are quoted in I960 dollars
Enrichment costs are quoted in I97I4 dollars.
All other unit costs are quoted in 1973 dollars.
1014,192 kg U $312,576
102,7145 SWU $6,678,*425
25,622 kg U $1,793,5^0
22,93*+ kg U $1114,670
22,93'+ kg U
.22,705 kg U
$802,690
$22,705
$236,070
-$26,955
$1"4, 3"+8
$11,2)41
$20,U35
$72,979
$15,1452,255
$U,669,080
NA
NA
$20,121,335
mills/kwhe
•95
.06
1.17
•32
.02
.114
.00
.014
.01
2.71
.82
3.53
Sources: Tables III-3, III-7 and III-9.
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TABLE IIIA-U
Uranium Flow for A Typical
1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
%
.
Uranium
Kg /Year
Percentage Weight
of U235 SWU/Year
Conversion (in) 195 025 •711
(0.5* loss) (out) 19U 050 .711
Enri chment (regular in)
(regular out)
(recycled in)
(recycled out)
(out)
19^ 050
35 hll
1+2 372
9 2I+6
1+1+ 663
.711
3.0
.85
3.0
3.0
152 506
39 811
192 317
Recycled U 3 297 3-0
Fuel Preparation (in) 1+7 960 3.0
(2* recycled) (recycled) 959 3-0
(0.5* loss) (out) 1+6 761 3.0
Fabrication (in) 1+6 761 3.0
(5* recycled) (recycled) 2 338 3.0
(0.5* loss)' (out) 1+1+189 3.0
Reactor (in) 1+1+ 189 3.0
(out) 1+2 929 • 85
Reprocessing (in) 1+2 929 .85
(1* loss) (out) 1+2 500 .85
Reconversion (in) 1+2 500 • 85
(0.3* loss)
'
(out) 1+2 372 .85
Enrichment (in) 1+2 372 .85
(tails) 33 126 .20 39 811
(out) 9 2l+6 3-0
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .80
Burnup = 20,333 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
195,025 KgU = 229,987 KgU Q
= 507,122 lbs U
30g
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent U
Source: Table III-9.
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TABLE IIIA-5
Uranium Flow for a Typical
1000 KWe Light Water Reactor
Uranium
Kg/Year
Percentage Weight
of U2 35 SWU/Ycar
Conversion (in)
.
125,^39 • 711
(0.5? loss) (out) 12^,812 .711
Enrichment (regular in)
(regular out)
(recycled in)
(recycled out)
(out)
124,812
22,780
28,718
7,1*90
30,270
.711
3-0
1.016
3-0
3.0
98,091
32,252
130, 3^3
Recycled U 2,235 3.0
Fuel Preparation (in) 32,505 3-0
(2% recycled) (recycled) 650 3-0
(0.5? loss) (out) 31 ,692 3.0
Fabrication • (in) 31,692 3.0
( £,% rpwpl prll ( j-^rMrrO pr) ^ 1 585 3.0
(0.5? loss) (out) 29,9^9 3.0
Reactor (in) 29,9^9 3-0
(out) 29,095 1.016
Reprocessing (in) 29,095 1.016
(l? loss) (out) 28,804 1.016
Reconversion (in) 28,804 1.016
(0.3? loss) (out) 28,718 1.016
Enrichment (in) 28,718 1.016
(tails) 21,228 .20
(out) 7, ^90 3.0 32,252
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .80
Burnup = 30,000 MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 32.5 percent
125, ^39 KgU = 1^7,926 KgU
3
= 326,178 lbs U
3 g
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent U
Sources: Table II 1-9 and 111-10.
235
SECTION III APPENDIX B: FUEL
CYCLE COSTS - AEC BASIS
Information supplied by C. E. Larson, Commissioner,
Atomic Energy Commission, provided some precise nuclear plant
(22)
assumptions. These yielded fuel cycle costs approximately
equal to those found for the model plant considered in this
study. Furthermore, the calculated average burnup rates and
efficiency levels serve to justify those assumed for the model
plant. The load factor was higher than that found historical-
ly, but, as shown in Appendix IIIA, Tables IIIA-2 and IIIA-3,
this has very little effect on total fuel cycle costs.
Tables IIIB-1 and IIIB-2 present nuclear fuel cycle
costs based on the assumptions listed at the end of each table.
Over a 30 year period, such a plant would experience a fuel
cycle cost of 4.96 mills per kilowatt hour of electrical genera-
tion (milis/Kwne) . This cost, m terms o± 1980 dollars, should
be compared with the cost of 4.9 7 mills/kwhe for the model
plant in Table III-2. If the fuel cycle costs for the nuclear
plant using Commissioner Larson's assumptions were assessed
after ten years of operation, the fuel cycle cost would be
5.2 2 mills/kwhe.
Table IIIB-3 and IIIB-4 present the computed annual
uranium flow through the fuel cycle and serve as back-up tables
to Tables IIIB-1 and IIIB-2. The methodology for computing the
amount of uranium passing through each process was slightly
different than that used previously in this study. Instead of
calculating the amount of natural uranium that must enter the
enrichment process and the separative work needed from Table
III-8, the amounts were determined from Tables IIIB-5 and
IIIB-G. Both of these tables account for recycled uranium.
The remainder of the calculations wore made exactly as stated
before. Tables IIIB-5 through IIIB-7 are calculations based
on Commissioner Larson's correspondence and serve as source tables
- 89 -
TABLE IIIB-1
1980 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant (1900 Dollars)
(30 Year Life)
Cost Component
a) Mining and Milling
t>) Conversion to UF--
c) Enrichment
d) Fuel Prep and Fabric
e) Spent Fuel Shipping
f) Reprocessing
g) Reconversion
h) Waste Management
i) Shipping
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Shipping total
Subtotal
j) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge
• (at 12$)
k) Safeguarding
1) Insurance
Total (without k and l)
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .75
Burnup = 30,56l MW(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 33.5 percent
Inflation rate = 7 percent annually
30 year plant life
Cost/Unit Quantity/Yr. Cost/Yr. mills/kvhe
$20/lb U 0g 321,022 lbs U 0g $6,U20,i+Uo 0.98
$5/kg U 123, ^56 kg U $617,280 0.09
$97/kg SWU 116,822 kg SWU $11, 331, 73^ 1.72
$112/kg U 29,021 kg U $3,250,352
•
.0.50
$8/kg U 25,937 kg U $207,1196 0.03
$56/kg U 25,937 kg U $1,U52, 1+72 0.22
$2/kg U 25,677 kg U $51,35*+ 0.01
$l6/kg U
(reactor fuel)
26,739 kg U $1*77,821; 0.07
$.U2/kg U
$.90/kg U
$.72/kg U
$l.l+5/kg U
122,839 kg U
29,021 kg \f
28,295 kg U
25,677 kg U
$51, 592
$26,119
$20,372
$37,232
$135,315 0.02
$23,89'+, 267 3. 61+ .
$8,672,1*00 1.32
NA -
NA -
•
$32,566,667 1+.96
Sources: Tables IIIB-3 and III-3.
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TABLE IIIB-2
1980 Fuel Cycle Costs for an
Average 1000 MWe Nuclear
Power Plant (I98O dollars)
(10 Year Operation)
Cost Component
Mining and Milling
Conversion to UF,
Enrichment
Fuel Prep and Fabrication
Spent Fuel Shipping
Reprocessing
Reconversion
i) Shipping
b) to c)
c) to d)
d) to d)
f) to g)
Shipping total
Subtotal
J) Fuel Inventory Carrying
Charge
(at 12$)
k) Safeguarding
1) Insurance
Total (without k and 1)
As suir.pt ions :
Load factor = .75
Burnup = 29,883 MV(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 33-5 percent
Inflation rute = 7 percent annually
Plant operation = 10 years
Cost/Unit Quanta ty/Yr. Cost/Yr. mills/kvhe
$20/lb U Og 360,^00 lbs U 0g $7,208,000 1.10
$5/kg U 138,600 kg U $693,000 0.10
$97 kg SWU 12^,1+67 kg SWU $12,073,299 1.81+
$29,679 kg U 29,679 kg U $3,324,0^8 0.50
$8/kg U 26, 525 kg U $212,200 0.03
$56/kg u 26,525 kg U $1,^85,^00 0.23
•
$2/kg U 26,181 kg U $52,362 0.01
6"! £ hrr- TT
(reactor fuel) (reactor fuel)
C.C7
$.l
r2/kg U •
$.90/kg U
$.72/kg U
$l.U5/ke u
137,907 kg U
29,679 kg U
28,937 kg U
26,260 kg U
•
$57,921
$27,711
$20,835
$38,077
- $1U3,5 I+ 1+ 0.02
$25,629,373 3.90
$8,672,1+00 1.32
NA -
NA -
.$3*+, 301,773 5-22
Sources: Tables IIIB-U and III-3.
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TABLE IIIB-3
Annual Uranium Flow for A Typical
1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
(30 year'life)
m Uranium
• Kg/Year
Percentage
of U235
Weight
SWU/Year
Conversion (in) 123,^56 .711
•
(0.5£ loss) (out) 122,839 •711
Enrichment (regular in) 122,839 • 711
(recycled in) 25,600 .87.
(out) 27,026 3-02 116,822
Recycled U 1,995 3-02
Fuel Preparation (in)' 29,021 3.02
(2% recycled) (recycled) 580 3.02
. (0.5% loss) (out) 28,295 3-02
Fabrication (in) 28,295 3.02
(5^ recycled) (recycled) 1,415 3-02
(0.5$ loss) (out) 26,739 3.02
Reactor (in) 26,739 3.02
(out) 25,937 .87
Reprocessing (in) 25,937
.
-87
(1% loss) (out) 25,677 •87
Reconversion (in) 25,677 .87
(0.35? loss) (out) 25,600 •87
Enrichment (in) 25,600 .87
Assumptions
:
Load factor = .75
Burnup = 30.561 MW(t)DA:fU
Efficiency = 33.5 percent
,235Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent U
Sources: "Tables IIIB-5 through IIIB-8 and III-9.
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TABLE IIIB-fc
Uranium Flow for A Typical
1000 MWe Light Water Reactor
(10 year operation)
(in)
(out)
Uranium
Kg/Year
130,600
137,907
Percentage Weight
of V2^ SWU/Year
Conversion
(0.5$ loss)
.711
.711
Enrichment
Recycled U
(regular in)
(recycled in)
(out)
137,907
26,181
27,638
2,0Ul
•711
.86
2.97
2.97
i2k,uej
Fuel Preparation (in) 29,679 2.97
(2$ recycled) (recycled) 591* 2.97
(0.5$ Iocs) (out) 28,937 2.97
Fabrication (in) * 28,937 2.97
1 R'f, tpcvpI prl ^ ( ronvnl or) ^ 1 )<),T
J ' ' 1
O CTT
(O.556 loss) (out) 27,3*45 2.97
Reactor (in) 27,3^5 2.97
,
(out) 26,525 .86
Reprocessing ', (in) 26,525 .86
(1$ loss) (out) 26,260 .86
Conversion (in) 26,260 .86
(0-3$ loss) . (out) 26,181 .86
Enrichment (in) 26, 181 .86
Assumptions:
Load factor =
-75
Burnup = 29,883 Mtf(t)D/MTU
'
Efficiency = 33-5 percent ___
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent XT^
Sources: Tables IIIB-5 through IIIB-8 and III-9.
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TABLE IIIB-5
238
Calculation of U-OnYellowcake and U
Required Annually for a Model Light Water Reactor
Assume: Plant size = 1000 MWe 235
Enrichment tails assay =0.20 percent U
Load factor = .75
Feed Required (lbs U On) BWR PWR
Initial core 988,000 8^,000
Replacement loadings 288,000 308,000
10 year average ' 358,000 361,600
30 year average 311,333 ' 325,867
[Assume: 2 mil's to 1 BWR]
10 year average 360,UOO
30 year average 321,022
Feed Required (kgs U ) LWR
10 year average 163,^7
30 year average 1^5,588
Feed Required (kgs U) LWR
10 year average . 138,600
»
30 year average . 123,^56
Source: Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C. 205^5, June 27, 197^-
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TABLE II IB- 6 .
Calculation of Separative Work Required
Annually for a Model Light Water Reactor
Assume: Plant size = 1000 MWe
Enrichment tails assay =0.20 percent U
Load factor =
.75
SWU's Required (kg SWU's) BWR PWR
Initial core 239,000 222,000
Replacement loadings 105,000 117,000
10 year average 118,U00 127,500
30 year average K>9,1»67 120,500
[Assume: 2 PWR's to 1 BWR]
LWR
10 year average 12U,'467
30 year average 116,822
Source: Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C. 205^5, June 27, 197I1.
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TABLE IIIB-7
Calculation of the Burnup (Irradiation Level)
Rate for a Model Light Water Reactor
(MW(t)D/MTU.)
Burnup rate BWR PWR
Initial Core,
Replacement loading's
10 year average
30 year average
17,000
27,500
26,1*50
27,150
22,600
32,600
31,600
32,267
Assuming two BfR's to every one BWR the burnup rates for an average light water
reactor are: L^h
10 year average 29,883
30 year average 30,561
Source: Letter from: C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, B.C. 205U5, June 27, I97U.
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TABLE IIIB-8
Calculation of the Initial and Subsequent
Fresh and Spent Fuel Ac says for
a Model Light Water Reactor
(Percent weight of isotope U )
Fresh Fuel Assay BWR FWR
Initial core
Replacement loadings
10 year average
30 year average
[Assume: 2 PWR's to 1 BWR]
10 year average
30 year average
2.03
2.73
2.66
2.71
LWR
2.97
3.02
2.26
3-21
3-12
3.18
Spent Fuel Assay
Initial core
Replacement loadings
10 year average
30 year average
10 year average
30 year average
BWR
.86
.8U
.8»+
.8k
[Assume: 2 PWR's to 1 BWR]
LWR
.86
.87
PWR
.90
.88
.89
Source: Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C. 205^5, June 27, I97U.
SECTION III APPENDIX C: COMPARATIVE
FUEL CYCLE COSTS - BOILING WATER
AND PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
This appendix compares the fuel cycle costs of a
model pressurized water reactor with those of a boiling water
reactor. The analysis is based on data supplied by Commis-
sioner C. E. Larson, Atomic Energy Commission, referred to in
Appendix B. The data supplied specific thermal reactor charac-
teristics essential to the calculation of fuel cycle costs.
The methodology is that used previously in this study.
Table IIIC-1 shows the fuel cycle costs for a boil-
ing water reactor (BWR) in 19 80 to be 4.9 9 mills per kilowatt
of electric generation (mills/kwhe) . For a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) these costs were 4.91 mills/kwhe. The fuel
cycle costs for the model plant analyzed in. Table III-2 were
4.9 7 mills/kwhe; falling within these bounds.
The ciiixerences in costs between the two plant types
is small and can be traced to differences in core burnup rates
and the required enrichment level of the reactor fuel. A BWR
requires more feed at the reactor but, since the enrichment
level of the feed is lower than that required for a PWR, the
natural uranium requirements are lower.
Tables IIIC-2 and IIIC-3 show the average annual
uranium flow required for the fuel cycle processes of both
the BWR and the PWR. They serve as source tables for Table
IIIC-1. Table IIIC-4 gives the calculations necessary before
the standard methodology of this study could be applied to
Commissioner Larson's plant characteristics.
The methodology of this study is presented entirely
in Table III-9. The changes in methodology that must be made
prior to adopting Commissioner Larson's statistics are given
at the end of Table IIIC-4. What these changes indicate are
the different amounts of recycled fuel enrichment and separa-
tive work units employed, given the different plant charac-
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TABLE IIIC-2
Uranium Flow for a Typical
1000 MWe Boiling Water Reactor
Percentage Weight
(in)
Kilograms U
99,023
of U?35 SWU's
Conversion .711
(0.5$ loss) (out) 98,528 .711
Enrichment (regular in)
(regular out)
(recycled in)
98,528
20,058
2*1,607
.711
2.71
'
.84
73,753
(recycled out)
(out)
5,918
25,976
2.71
2.71
21,761
95,514
Recycled U 1,918 2.71
Fuel Preparation (in) 27,89** 2.71
(2$ recycled) (recycled) 558 2.71
(0.5$ loss) (out) 27,197 2.71
PoV>*^rtO+-(^»l (in) *- 1 , *---' 1
(5$ recycled) (recycled) 1,360 2.71
(0.5$ loss) (out) 25,701 2.71
Reactor (in)
(out)
25,701
24,930
2.71
.84
"
Reprocessing (in) 2k, 930 .84
(l£ loss) (out) 24,681 .84
Reconversion (in) 24,681 .84
(0.3$ loss) (out) 24,607 .84
Enrichment (in)
(out)
24,607
5,918
.84
2.71 21,761
Assumptions:
Load factor = .65
Burnup = 27, 150 M^( t )P/M'1'U
Efficiency = 34-0 percent
Plant life = 30 years
Enrichment tails acsny = 0.20 percent U
99,023 kgu = 116,775 Keu og
= 257, 489 lbs u
3
o8
•Sources: Letter from C. E. Larson, Com:iiissioner, U.G. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, B.C. 205't5, June 27, I97I+.
Tables III-9 and IIIC-1*.
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TABLE IIIC-3
Uranium Flow for A Typical
1000 MWe Pressurized Water Reactor
Percentage Weight
(in)
Kilograms U
105,133
of U2 35 SWU's
Conversion .711
(0-5$ loss) (out) 10U,607 .711
Enrichment (regular in)
(regular out)
10U,607
17,9^0
.711
3.18 8U,35^
(recycled in)
(recycled out)
(out)
21, 332
i+,579
22,519
.89
3. 18
3- 18
21,530
105,88U
Recycled U 1,163 3.18
Fuel Preparation (in) 2^,182 3-18
(2$ recycled) (recycled) kok 3-18
(ri.Z.& lncc)
\— * / 3«lo
Fabrication (in) 23,578 3.18
(5$ recycled) (recycled) 1,179 3-18
(0.5$ loss) (out) 22,281 3-18
Reactor (in)
(out)
22,281
21,613
3-18
.89
Reprocessing (in) 21,613 • 89
(1$ loss) (out) 21,396 .89
Reconversion (in) 21,396 .89
(0.3$ loss) (out) 21,332 .89
Enrichment (in)
(out)
21,332
U,579
.89
3.18
Assumptions:
Load factor = .65
Burnup = 32, 267 M'rf(t)D/MTU
Efficiency = 33-0 percent
Plant life = 30 years
Enrichment tails assay = 0.20 percent IT
105,133 KgU = 123,y80 KeUjOg - 273,377 lbs U
3 Q
Sources: Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C. 20^5; June 27, 19fk.
Tables III-9 and II1C-U.
,235
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TABLE IIIC-4
Calculation of Enrichment end Feed Required
Separative Work Units to Produce One Kilogram
2^5
of Enriched Uranium with a 0.20 Percent U Tails Assay
Enrichment Level Natural Feed
(kg U/kR U Product)
3.0 5.1+79
1.1+0 2.348
3.18 5.831
2.71 If. 912
189 enriched feed
3-18 • 4.658
.84 enriched feed
Separative Work
(SWU's/kp, U Product) *
4.306
1.045
4.702
3.677
1+.702
2
-Tl 4.158 3.677
Sources: NU3 Corporation, Guide for Economi c Evaluation of Nuclear Reactor Plant
Desipns
,
Jan. i960, pp. D.l-o through D.l-10.
U.S. Congress, Joint. Committee on Atomic Energy, Future Structure of the
• Uranium Enrichment Industry, Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess., Phase I, July 31
and August 1, 1973, 1973, pp. 12 and 39.
Table III-9.
Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C. 20545, June 27, 1974.
Calculations for determing enriched feed:
(1) Kgs of .89 and .84 enriched uranium containing equal weights of XT as one Kg
71] 711
of natural uranium =
-hrf- = -7989 and ' m = .8464
Multiplying (l) by the amount of natural feed required gives step (2).
(2) Kgs of .89 enriched feed = .7989 X 5.831 = 4.658
Kgs of .84 enriched feed =: .8464 X 4.912 = 4.158
In Table III-9 the calculation changes that must be made with respect to the
enriched feed requirements are:
for a PWR: S = E/4.658
N = (5-831) X B
SWU = [B, S or Enr] X 4.702
for a BWR: S = E/4.158
N «= (4.91?) X B
SWU - [B, . S Enr] X 3.677
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teristics. The different plant characteristics are stated
in terras of required and discharged uranium enrichment levels
What is necessary for a change in the enrichment
criteria are the uranium ratios of slightly enriched recycled
uranium to fully enriched uranium feed. The ratios are
determined in two steps. First, the amount of discharged
235
uranium that contains an equivalent amount of U as a kilo-
gram of natural uranium is determined by dividing the natural
enrichment level by the discharged enrichment level. Second,
this fraction is multiplied by the natural feed that would
be required to produce a kilogram of uranium at the lower
level. In this process the separative work units are kept
constant, where it is assumed that the error thus involved is
insignificant. These results are then substituted into the
indicated equations.
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SECTION III FOOTNOTES
1. Estimates are as follows: mining and milling-19 80 dollars,
enrichment-1974 dollars, all others-1973 dollars.
2. See footnotes to Table III-3.
3. Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 1973 ,
WASH 1174-73 (1973), p. 15; and Atomic Energy
Commission, Nuclear Power , WASH - 1099, Dec. 19 71,
p. 134.
4. See Table III-8.
5. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Forecast of Growth of
Nuclear Power , January 1971, WASH-1139, Table 9,
p. 18.
6. A mill is a unit of value equal to 1/1000 of a dollar
or 1/10 of a cent.
7. Compare Tables IIIA-2 and IIIA-3. If all factors are
held constant except the availability (load) factor,
then the difference in cost is less than .05 mills/
kwhe
.
8. In the literature the burnup rate ranges between 8,20 8
MW ( t ) D/MTU and 3 3,000 MW ( t ) D/MTU . See : Atomi
c
Energy Commi ssion, Reactor Fuel Cycle Cos t.s for
Nuclear Evaluation, WASH-1099, December"" 19 71
,
p. 134, Atomic Energy Commission, Current Status
and Future Technical an d Econopij c Potential of
Light Water Reactors , WASH- 10 82 , March "196 8,
p. 1-26, and 7\tomic Energy Commission, Forecast of
Growth of Nuclear Power, WASH- 11 39, January 19 71,
p. 18. See Table IIIB-7.
9. Atomic Energy Commission, Forecast of Growth of Nuclear
Power
,
WASH-1139,' January 19 71, p. 18.
10. Compare Table IIIA-1 and IIIA-2, plus IIIA-4 and IIIA-5.
11. Compare with Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle
Costs for Nuclear Evaluation
,
WASII-1099, December
1971, p. 134, and Table III-3.
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12. The uranium is lost when uranium in the form of UCU is
formed into pellets, sintered into a desired density,
loaded into Zircaloy or stainless steel tubes, fitted
with end cups, welded, and assembled in fixed arrays.
Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs
for Nuclear Evaluation
,
WASH- 109-9, December 1971,
p. 134.
13. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Future
Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry
^
Hearings, 93 Cong. 1 Sess.
,
Phase I, July 31 and
August 1, 1973, p. 39.
14. Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 39.
15. "Separative Work Units - It is common practice to express
capacity and production rate of a uranium enrichment
plant in terms of separative work units. A separa-
tive work unit is not a quantity of material, but a
measure of the effort expended in the plant to separate
a quantity of uranium of a given assay into two com-
ponents, one having a higher percentage of uranium-235
and one havinq a lower percentage. Separative work is
generally expressed in kilogram units to give it the
same dimensions as material quantities, i.e., kilo-
grams or metric tons of uranium. It is common prac-
tice to refer to a kilogram separative work unit
simply as a separative work, unit or as SWU." Atomic
Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry, 19 73 ,
WASH-1174-73, p. 42.
16. See Table III-5 and III-8.
17. Atomic Energy Commission, Forecast of Growth of Nuclear
Power , WASH-1139, January 1971, p. 10.
18. Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Fuel Cycle Costs for
Nuclear Evaluation , WASH-1099, December 1971, p. 134.
19. I.e., 0.8 36 5 x 5.4 79 KgU = 4,58 3 KgU.
20. Ibid
.
,
p. 134.
21. This calculation is based on molecular weights and the
conversion tables.
22. Letter from C. E. Larson, Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission Washington, D.C., June 27, 1974.
SECTION IV: URANIUM COSTS
A. Uranium Reserves
Reserve estimates are price dependent. As the
London Economist succinctly states, "The higher the uranium
price goes, the larger published reserves become. Reserves
are calculated in terms of production costs, when the price
justifies a cost increase from the standard $10 a pound to
$15, companies tend to find that their accessible reserves
double, because there are now more 'accessible 1 areas (i.e.,
areas that it is economic to mine) . " * '
Several reserve and resouce estimates are available,
For the U.S., one of the most general can be derived from
U.S. Geological Survey data. This is presented in Table IV- 1,
In the table, the identification of the resource by type is
based on the assumpLion of an $8 cost. The tonnages quoted
include not only economically recoverable reserves, but re-
sources which are not recoverable at that price. If, for
example, the basic cost was $10, identified submarginal re-
sources (at an $8 base) become identified recoverable re-
sources. Finally, the price base used in the table refers,
not to the mine price for ore, but to the concentrated ore
price at the mill; the yellowcake price.
The inclusion of uranium recovery from phosphate
rock is based on a process which has now become commercial.
The rock is processed into phosphoric acid (a base for high
potency fertilizer production) ; the uranium is removed during
processing. Gulf Research and Development, using a recovery
process based on an AEC laboratory scale process, is demon-
strating a mobile pilot recovery plant. The plant, mounted
on two enclosed truck trailers, can be moved to various phos-
phoric acid production facilities. * '
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TABLE IV-1
U.S. Uranium Resources and Reserves (1972)
Price /Pound
U3°8 Short Tons
Short Tons
(Cumulative)
Identification
($8.00 per pound base)
<$8.00 250,000 250,000 Conventional, identified
recoverable resources
(± 20 percent)
<$10.00 50,000 300,000 Conventional, identified
submarginal resources.
$10.00 -
$15.00
150,000
1,000,000
1,U50,000
Conventional, identified
submarginal resources.
Identified, paramarginal
resources from phosphate
rock.
>$20.00
500,000
5,000,000
6,950,000
Undiscovered, conventional
resources in known districts.
Identified submarginal
resources from phosphate
rock.
Source: P.K. Theobald, et al , in U.S. Geological Survey, Energy Resources
of the United States, Circular 650, 1972, pp. 23-2H.
Note: Undiscovered conventional recoverable resources in known districts
(500,000 tons) and undiscovered conventional submarginal resources
in known districts (U00,000 tons) are both subject to an error
factor of 2; they may be twice as large or only one-half as large.
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On a more ambitious scale, the Uranium Recovery
Corporation, a subsidiary of United Nuclear Corporation, is
building a fully commercial plant to recover uranium from
phosphate rock. The output is rated at 1000 tons per year.
Production is scheduled on or after 19 74. The technology
was established in the mid-1950' s, but the $15-20 per pound
price range was uneconomic. The plant is located in Florida
where it is estimated that the area potential is currently
2000 tons per year rising to 70,000 tons per year by the
(3)year 2000. A second facility is planned with construc-
tion due to begin about 19 75.
Because uranium and phosphoric acid are joint pro-
ducts recovered from phosphate rock, the cost of. both are
partially dependent on the production and sale price of each.
As the price of fertilizer increases, on a joint cost basis,
the cost of producing uranium may decrease. Alternatively,
as the price of uranium rises and more is produced from phos-
phate rock, the cost of production allocated to phosphate
fertilizers may decline.
Limiting the discussion to conventional sources of
(4)
uranium, many areas of the U.S. have not been explored.
Furthermore, the AEC has acknowledged suggestions that its
estimates of potential uranium resources may be too conserva-
tive. Currently, it is taking steps to broaden the base of
(5)knowledge of the undiscovered resources.
The AEC estimates conventional uranium reserves
yearly. Table IV-2 shows domestic reserve-resource estimates
in relation to cut-off cost levels. These are maximum costs
below which the ore is considered exploitable. The reserve
category of resources refers to deposits that have been quan-
titatively measured and qualitatively analyzed. The estimated
additional resources category refers to appraisals of the
amount of undiscovered uranium the existence of which is sur-
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TABLE IV-2
Cumulative U.S. Uranium Resources
(thousand short tons U„0 o )
3 o
(1)
Cut-off Cost Estimated
($/lb. 1
'3 8»
.
Reserves Additional
8 275 U50
10 3U0 (2) 700
15 525 1000
30 665 1650
50 6000 1*000
100 - 12000 13000
Total
725
10 Uo
1525
2315
10000
25000
Source: Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , March 197^, p. 7,
and Atomic Energy Commission, Potential Nuclear Power Growth
Patterns
,
WASH-IO98, December 1970, pp. 2-11.
Notes: (l) Uranium estimates at cut off costs less than $15 as of
January 197^. Uranium estimates at cut off costs from
$15-$100 as of January 1970.
(2) 90,000 additional tons may be available as a by product of
phosphate and copper production through the year 2000.
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mised on the basis of probabilistic geological evidence.
This category corresponds to potential reserves.
By the end of 1972, the AEC estimated reasonably
assured reserves, recoverable at no more than $8 per pound
(for yellowcake) , at 273,000 tons with potential reserves at
(6)
the same price yielding an additional 450,000 tons. In
1973, a net addition to reserves of 2000 tons was made.
Gross additions to reserves was 21,000 tons. Subtracting
14,000 tons of deliveries yields a net of 7000 tons added.
However, 5000 tons were reclassified out of the $8 class.
Some of this was due to additional costs and some was due to
the practice of mining the highest grade ore and leaving the
(7)
rest in the spoil banks where it may be irretrievable.
This latter form of loss can only be considered a waste of
a reportedly very scarce resource.
As of January 1, 19 74, uranium ore reserves, pro-
ducible at a cut-off cost of $8 per pound U^O
R ,
were estimated
at 275,00.0 short tons. An additional 450,000 tons of uranium
recoverable at $ 8 per pound U o o were hypothesized. At $15o o
per pound U-.0 , the reserves and estimated additional resource
o o
categories indicate 525,000 and 1,000,000 tons respectively.
Data for uranium resources in higher cost brackets are avail-
able only for 1970. In the past, there has been little in-
centive to evaluate uranium resources at cost levels in excess
of $30 per pound U
3
. These estimates are considered both
crude and conservative.
The vast majority of known domestic resources of
uranium are concentrated in the v/estern part of the U.S.;
specifically in the Colorado Plateau and Wyoming Basin regions,
Table IV- 3 gives a 1972 AEC estimate of resources confined to
this sector.
Recent world wide interest in nuclear power has
caused an increase in uranium exploration. Early results of
110
TABLE IV-
3
Cumulative AEC Estimates of Uranium Resources in Western
United States (as of 1/1/72)
(thousand short tons U )
Cut-off Cost
($/lb. U
3 8
) Reserves
Estimated
Additional
8
10
NA
333
U60
650
Total
NA
983
Source: Atomic Energy Commission, Statistical Data of the Uranium
Industry
,
January 1, 1972, pp. 17, 2k.
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this exploration are shown in Table IV-4. It can be seen
that over a four year period total resouices estimated to be
available at costs up to $10 per pound U...0 increased from
1,720,000 to 2,300,000 tons. Significant increases occurred
in the U.S. and Australia. It must be emphasized that ura-
nium exploration in the rest of the world is at a much ear-
lier stage than U.S. exploration. It is likely that much
more uranium will be found.
Estimates of uranium resources in the U.S.S.R.
plus China are reported to be at least equal to those of the
U.S. plus Canada. If, therefore, one takes 1,500,000 short
tons as the estimate for the latter two countries (at a $10
per pound cut-off) and assumes a distribution of phosphate
rock similar to that of the U.S., then if the U_0„ price
becomes $20 per pound, the estimate of world resources ex-
cluding the East Bloc increases from 2,300,000 ton» to at
least 11,109,000 tons. Including the East Bloc increases the
total to 18,354,000 tons.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
world wide exploration is down due to low prices. However,
they estimate that reasonably assured resouces (reserves) are
about 1,126,000 tons at a price not greater than $10 per
pound. Additional resources at that price are estimated to
be 1,192,000 tons. (8)
Canada, one of the major producers, has a stock-
pile of U^O
fl
that is still growing. At current prices and a
soft market due to low demand, mines and mills are operating
below capacity. Both government and utility planners are
reserving a large block of low cost reserves for domestic
use. Little exploration is being conducted now. According
to the Canadian Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, at
a price of not more than $15 per pound producible resources
are estimated at 400,000 tons of U o o . They estimate cumu-
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lative Canadian demand to the year 2000 at about 100,000 tons
with an additional 60,000 tons committed to exports. There
is, therefore, a significant surplus of low to medium cost
resources proved or indicated. The Department estimated that
if Canada was to keep 2 percent of the world market, current
production of 5000 tons per year would have to increase to
(9)14,000 tons per year in 1980. ;
/Australia has a surplus of low cost U_0
R
. Resources
far exceed reserves. It is reported that at a price of $6 per
pound for concentrate, recovery costs, even in remote areas
with their concomitant problems, are low enough to make opera-
•r-4 ui (10)tion profitable.
In' the Republic of Niger, one mine is already rated
at 600,000 metric tons per year. Two mills are due for com-
pletion in 1976-77. Their combined capacity is rated at 3500
metric tons metal equivalent per year. v "LX/ Finally, huge but
(12)
undeveloped deposits have been found in South-West Africa.
Reserves and resources are positively located only
by drilling. Two types of drilling may be identified: ex-
ploratory and developmental. The former locates a new area or
extends an old area in a new direction. The latter defines
the extent of an area, gauges the quantity of the reserve on
a preliminary basis and provides the information needed for
planning a mine.
The record of drilling in the U.S. is shown in
Table IV-5. The early exploratory peak was reached in 1956-
57 while the associated development drilling peak occurred in
1960. Subsequently, exploratory drilling peaked again in
1968-70 with a development drilling peak in 1969. There is
some confusion concerning present operations. In comparison
with Table IV-5, 17 million feet of drilling was planned for
1973, 29.1 million feet was planned for 1974, and 33.7 mil-
lion feet is planned for 1975. (13) In the period 1958-1967,
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TABLE IV-
5
U.S. Exploratory and Developmental Drilling, 19U8-1972
(1) (2) (3)
Exploratory- Development Column (2)
Drilling Drilling Divided "by
Year (mil. feet) (mil. feet) Column (l)
19 1+8 .170 .0U0 ,2k
19^9 .360 .053 .Ik
1950 .570 .208 .36
1951 1.080 .3U8 .32
1952 1.365 .300 .22
1953 3.61+8 .367 .10
19 5 U 1+.057 .553 .11*
1955 5.267 .762 ,1k
1956 7.287 1.503 .21
1957 7.352 1.81+8 .25
1958 3.759 3.W .93
1959 2.368 3.282 1.39
I960 1.399 1+.211 3.01
1961 1.319 3.190 2.1+2
1962 1.U83 2.^31 1.6U
1963 .880 1.977 2.25
196 h .967 1.21+5 1.29
1965 1.161+ • 9^9 .82
1966 1.800 2.1+00 1.33
1967 5.^50 5-350 .98
1968 16 . 200 7.600 .1+7
1969 20.500 9-1+00 .U6
1970 18.000 5.500 .31
1971 11.1+00 1+.100 .36
1972 11.800 3.600 .31
1973 13.900 U.600 .33
197*+ 15.200 5.100 \3U
Source: Atomic Energy Commission, Ur•anium Exploration Expenditures in
1972 and Plans for 1973-7^ May 1973, figure 2.
Notes : (1) J-973-197 1* are estimated.
2) Exploratory drilling includes the search for new deposits
and extensions. Development drilling is needed for mine
planning.
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development drilling in previously explored areas almost
(14)
equalled or exceeded exploratory drilling. It was the
major factor in the reserve increase at that time. However,
the reduced level of exploratory drilling meant that uranium
resources, which could later be developed, were not being
actively searched out.
In part because of the lack of new areas, ore
quality declined. In terms of the ore grade processed (per-
cent of U o per tons of ore milled) , the grade of ore milled
declined steadily from 0.26 percent in 1963 to 0.20 percent
in 1969. It rose to 0.21 in 1971 and 1972. This means that
to bring one ton of U„0 to the mill in 19 63 required that
a total of 384.6 tons of uranium bearing ore be brought to
the mill. In 1972, the number of tons that had to be taken
to the mill was 476.2. Additionally, the recovery of U_0 o
fxuui the uie processed by the mills also declined. In the
period 1963-1967 the percentage of contained U o recovered
o o
from the ore was about 95 percent. This fell to just over
93 percent by 1972. Together, these two factors mean that to
get ore for yellowcake in 19 6 3 required the delivery of 40 4.8
tons of ore to the mill. By 1972 this had risen to 512.0
(15)tons
.
In large measure, the record shown in Table IV-5
is an outgrowth of AEC policies. First, subsidization of ex-
ploration and milling plant construction; second, uranium
purchase policies; and third, ore prices.
In the early years, the AEC contributed $25,000 per
mine, subsidized discovery and maintained prices with govern-
ment purchases. To this day, the depletion allowance for
uranium is 22 percent, as it is for oil, rather than the five
percent allowed for coal.
A measure of the support given to mining and milling
can be seen in Table IV-6. The table shows the ratio of AEC
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TABLE IV-6
Non-AEC Uranium Purchases as a
Percent of Total Uranium Ore Receipts
v (1)Year Percent
19hQ 2k
19^9 62
1950 78
1951 75
1952 61
1953 1*9
mqli )u^ s i5
1955 1*7
1956 80
1957 9U
1958 97
1959 98
i960 97
1961 99
Source: Atomic Energy Commission, Statistical Data of the Uranium
Industry
,
January 1973, pp. 7, lb.
Note: (l) AEC purchases are for fiscal years, total ore shipments are
for calendar years.
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purchases of uranium at buying stations and under special
arrangements compared to total uranium ore receipts at buying
stations and mills. The table is only approximate as the AEC
purchases are reported for fiscal years while shipments to
mills are reported for calendar years. The closer the per-
centage is to 100, the less is the AEC involvement.
AEC purchases of uranium ore peaked in 19 56.
Between 1949 and 1962 the AEC purchased 2.992 million tons
of ore plus an additional 0.631 million tons bought under
special arrangement from the mills while they were under con-
struction. The total of 3.623 million tons was sold back to
the mills by 1966. The buying program ended in 19 62. On the
whole, this represented an augmented cash flow to the com-
panies involved.
AEC concentrate (yellowcake) purchases were high
Perhaps more important, the AEC paid a price of over $10 per
pound of concentrate for the entire period from 1951-1957.
The high was $12.35 per pound in 1953. Subsequently, it fell
steadily to $5.54 per pound by 1971. (18)
As of January 19 73, the characteristics of U.S. ore
reserves in the $8 per pound category could be described as
follows: the median grade of ore contained 0.221 percent
U-.C" per ton of ore, the median depth of deposits was 350-400
feet, the median ore thickness was 9-10 feet and the median
size of the ore deposit was 1-2.5 million tons. Drilling
depth, both exploratory and for development were increasing.
In 1958 the average was 150 feet, by 1972 it was 421 feet. ;
In terms of production, the median mine depth was 350-400
feet.< 20 >
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B. Uranium Prices
There does not appear to be any long run shortage
of uranium ore. Therefore, it is necessary to find some ex-
planation for the following observed price behavior.
In 19 72 inventories of yellowcake were estimated
to be 20 million pounds with potential production through
19 75 exceeding unfilled requirements by over 8 million pounds
It was reported, on the basis of the expected rate of utility
construction, that the situation would level out by 19 76 and
that future shortages would develop. Obviously, with the
stretchout of construction this has not yet developed. Since
196 8, when the AEC was about to terminate purchases, prices
for future delivery had been falling. Spot prices for imme-
diate delivery from 19 69-19 72 were in the range of $6-$6.25
per pound but were expected to rise to $u-$b.2b per pound by
ton
(22)
(21)
mid- 1977. In response to a tender for the Washing
public power supply, the following bids were received:
for U
3 8
1972 delivery - $6 . 10-$6 . 50/lb.
1975 delivery - $7
.
57-$8. 25/lb
.
1976 delivery - $7 73-$8 . 50/lb.
1977 delivery - $7 .95-$9 . 00/lb.
for UF
6^
19 72 delivery - $18.60/kg U
1975 delivery - $20 . 45-$20 . 80/kg U
1976 delivery - $21. 00-$26. 15/kg U
At the time, domestic prices were generally above world
(23)prices
.
By the end of 19 73, the situation had changed. The
response to a TVA bid invitation included only throe offers
from U.S. suppliers. Prices quoted for 1979 delivery were
upward from $12 per pound with only one-third of the offering
covered. TVA was reportedly considering a negotiation ap-
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proach. This would undoubtedly mean even higher prices.
According to AEC data, past prices for 19 00 delivery were
about $7.80 per pound, in 1973 dollars, with then current
contracts for 19 80 delivery in the $11-12 range, excluding
escalation. Both producers and the AEC were pointing out
that only a small number of firms control large quantities
of uncommitted reserves for which production costs could be
estimated. Therefore, the producers wanted either a cost-
plus type of contract or prices high enough to cover pessi-
mistic supply price estimates. It was noted that producers
were holding back supply in the speculative expectation of
(24)price increases. By early 1974, Business Week noted
that the current price was $7 per pound but that price expec-
tations for the mid-19 80' s was $15-20 with some talk of $30
per pound for yellowcake. They pointed out that the industry
only 7400 tons had been sent to enrichment plants. While
uranium was in substantial surplus, there was no hurry to
enter into contracts, the market was almost entirely a
futures market.
In August, 19 74, the Wall Street Journal reported
that the United Nuclear Corporation had contracted to sell
1.8 million pounds of concentrate over a three year period
beginning in 1977. The price was $2.8 million with a $3.6
million advance payment. They noted that such advance pay-
ments are being written into contracts with increasing
( 2 6)frequency. Excluding the cost of money on the advance
payment, the contract calls for $15.56 per pound.
Finally, recent spot prices are reported to be $12
per pound. This is a doubling over the past year. Producers
argue that they must redouble if they are to receive a favor-
(27)
able return on their investment.
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The results are quite consistent with oligopoly
behavior. Price analyses are made difficult because quota-
tions are confidential, even the AEC is excluded. However,
the FPC may soon require that they be made public. Even then
it may not be easy to translate quotations to a common dollar
(OQ)
basis because of ancillary conditions. However, the
utilities must be making at least partial translations in
order to compare offers.
On an open market basis, Dennison Mines of Canada
contracted a sale of 20,000 tons to Tokyo Electric Power.
Deliveries at the rate of 2000 tons per year are to start in
19 83. The value of the contract was reported to be $800
(29)
million including a $10 million down payment. Assuming
an interest rate of six percent for ten years on the down
payment, the apparent cost is $20.19 per pound for the
t 7q T_ ~\_ or.-.?n nV Q
The unwillingness of producers to make quotations
can be seen in the response to the recent TVA tender. Invita-
tions to bid were extended to over 50 foreign and domestic
suppliers for an order of 43,000 tons. Delivery was to start
in the 19 80's and extend into the 1990' s. There were very
few bids although this time suppliers v/ere asked to state
4-u a- (30)their own terms.
Finally, the Canadian company, Rio Algom, contracted
to sell a total of 10,000 tons of U O at the rate of 1000
tons per year starting in 19 82 to British Nuclear Fuels. The
price v/as subject to escalation, with the starting average
set at $20 per pound. In the mid-1960' s the same two com-
(33 )panics contracted at about $6 per pound.
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C. Uranium Pricing Factors
Given the reserve-resource estimates for the U.S.
and the rest of the world, some explanations, if only as
hypotheses, of the price behavior are needed. Possible ex-
planations are: demand greater than supply at current prices,
lack of competition in the domestic producers' market, car-
telization in the rest of the world, and specific actions and
implied goals of the AEC.
1, Demand
In 19 71, the uranium market was described as soft.
Commercial prices were depressed and exploration was cur-
tailed. A shelf price of $8 per pound and escalation from 1972
was expected with the government (AEC) surplus expected to
remain off the market until about 19 80. With exploration
curtailed it was thought that supplies would be inadequate to
meet the expected surge in demand due in the late 19 70's and
(32)
early 19 80's. Hence, prices would rise.
Part of the market softness at that time was ex-
plained by the action of the electric utilities. Reportedly
they were contracting forward for 76 percent of the UO
necessary for their initial cores but only 39 percent of their
fourth reload. This was due to doubts about construction and
u * i (33)operating schedules.
The price problems existed into late 1973. There
was a free market but power schedule slippages resulted in a
short-term pile up of U^O
R
inventories. Future prices might
have gone down but for the embargo on imports and the regu-
( 34)lations concerning plutonium recycle.
By December, 19 73, Nuclear Industry was reporting
a rapid increase in medium to long-term contracts which
started in June. Utility requirements were not covered for
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more than a few years. They could get few replies to bid
invitations and supply negotiations were reported, "...which
practically guarantees the producer a 'reasonable* profit."
(35)The import embargo remained.
Estimates of annual domestic uranium requirements
made by the AEC, assuming a 0.3 percent tails assay for
enrichment were:
1973 - 10,000 tons U ?
1975 - 18,200 tons uM
1980 - 38,500 tons uM
1985 - 71,500 tons U^O„
5 o
Cumulating from 1973 through 19 85 yields 474,200 tons of
( "3 p> \
U_,O
fl
. Between 1973 and 1990, production was expected to
total 902,000 tons. However, by adding an eight year reserve
in 1990 of 1,086,000 tons, the cumulative total amounts to
1,9 8 8,000 tons. It was argued by the AEC that the desired
level of potential resources in 1990 should be 2,664,000 tons.
When added to production and reserves, this amounts to
(37)4,652,000 tons. Based on Table IV- 1, this corresponds
to a 1972 based supply price of $15-20 per pound.
Based on the AEC data, Nuclear Industry forecast a
current need for 14,000 tons per year with 120,000 tons per
(3 8)year needed in the 1990's. A more detailed forecast of
concentrate requirements was made by the AEC in 19 7 3 for the
period 1973-1985. If the tails assay at the enrichment plant
was assumed to be 0.20 percent, concentrate requirements
totalled 391,000 short tons of U_0 , at a tails assay of 0.25
percent it was 428,100, at 0.30 percent it was 474,100 short
tons of U-,0 o . The AEC noted that for the two higher tails
assays the added enrichment would come from the AEC stock-
(39)pile. It may be noted that the AEC non-military stockpile
was reported to be 38,000 tons of concentrate in March, 19 74,
y Se
(41)
and was expected to be used up by 1978. B ptember, the
stockpile was reported to be only 25,000 tons.
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The AEC forecast can be translated into mining
requirements. Assuming the current 9 3 percent recovery at
the mill (1972) and a 0.21 percent of U_0 in the mill feed,
at a 0.20 percent tails assay 200.2 million tons of ore must
be delivered to the mills, at a 0.25 percent tails assay
219.2 million tons must be delivered, while at a 0.30 percent
assay 242.8 million tons must be received.
Short-term supply problems were expected due to an
eight year lead time between exploration and the construction
of milling capacity. It was reported that as producers
needed adequate prices to cover exploration, development and
profits, utilities and the government could help finance ex-
(42)ploration and development.
While demand estimates are usually made on the
basis of light water reactors, the development of which was
AEC supported, demand would be reduced somewhat if high
temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGR) were utilized. The
AEC has only recently contributed a relatively small amount
to their continued development. The initial R and D funds
were private. For an IITGR with direct cycle gas turbines,
the plant efficiency is 37 percent compared to only 33 percent
for a light water reactor. The efficiency approaches 50 per-
cent if a bottoming cycle using the reject heat from the
helium turbine cycle is utilized. With lack of intensive
support, the first commercial service is expected no earlier
(43)than 19 85/ ;
In the foregoing review one critical element has
been omitted: the price and availability of competing fuels.
Nuclear power is limited to electric utilities and a few
military and demonstration propulsion units. In utilities
it competes with coal, residual fuel oil and natural gas. In
propulsion it competes with diesel fuel oil.
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Prices of natural gas have been controlled by
government fiat. The result has been that for existing con-
tracts the price is relatively low. For new contracts, if
supplies are unavailable, the price may be considered in-
finite.
The use of coal has been limited by air pollution
control regulations and the relative lack of government sup-
port for stack gas scrubbers, liquefication and gasification
research and development compared to the support levels for
nuclear power. Low sulfur coal is in short supply. Its
price includes the scarcity factor and the cost of transpor-
tation. The latter is high given the distance of western
coal from the major consuming markets.
The price of residual fuel oil reflects the current
price of crude oil and the greater returns derived from mini-
the other fuel components contained in a barrel of crude.
The percentage of residual oil produced from a barrel of
crude in the U.S. has been falling slowly but steadily. The
need to desulfurize the oil has increased its price. While
it does not appear likely that crude oil prices will remain
at present levels in the absence of the consuming countries
effectively ratifying some form of world price stabilization
agreement, there is a question of supply security. Protective
measures would add to the costs.
Diesel oil is essentially the same as No. 2 home
heating oil. Demand for the latter has been rising as home
owners, utilities and industry seek to offset the shortage
of natural gas.
Government policy has not been antagonistic to high
international oil prices. The higher are such prices, the
greater the price umbrella over high cost domestic oil, over
U.S. coal and over nuclear power. It must be noted, however,
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that the prices of foreign and domestic competing fuels is
alien to the supply-demand arguments of the AEC and the
uranium producers. As seen above, their arguments are
couched in terms of the supply and anticipated demand for
uranium alone. The competing fuels argument suggests that
the price of uranium can be high because the price of other
fuels is high. This would be true even if the costs of
uranium production were very low. The AEC-producer argument
is that uranium prices must be high if we are to get more of
it. The current world surplus of low cost uranium is a fac-
tor against which the industry must be protected.
2. Competition
The lack of competition in the uranium market has
been alluded to above. The bottleneck in the U.S. appears
to be in the number of uranium mills which concentrate the
ore.
However many independent mining operations exist,
the ore is concentrated in relatively few milling plants.
Virtually all of these are also engaged in mining operations.
Table IV- 7 shows the size and identity of these firms. Of
the total of 16 firms, the largest eight account for over 77
percent of the nominal milling capacity in the U.S., the
(45)largest four account for almost 52 percent. The situa-
tion is best described as oligopolistic. One would expect
an absence of individual price competition.
Part of the problem can be traced to AEC policies.
In 19 72 a new lease sale was announced for the Urvan Belt in
western Colorado. The Belt came into existence when the AEC
was paying up to $12.37 per pound for U~0
R
concentrate. High
quality ore was plentiful and five mills were operating in
the area. Four of these were closed in 1962 along with some
40 mines when the AEC ended its initial procurement program.
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TABLE IV-7
U.S. Milling Capacity, 1972
Company
Nominal Capacity
(tons of ore /day)
Kerr McGee
United Nuclear - Homestake
Anaconda
Union Carbide
Utah International
Exxon
Susquehenna - Western
Continental Oil - Pioneer Nuclear
Atlas
Petrotomics
Western Nuclear
Federal - American
Mines Development
Dawn Mining
Rio Algom
Cotter
7000
3500
3000
3000
2^00
2000
2000
1750
1500
1500
1200
950
650
500
500
U50
31900
Source: Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , February
1973, p. 53.
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Subsequently, the remaining mill was operating at about one-
half capacity in a relatively soft market on low quality ore.
Lease sales at that time were made on the basis of negotia-
tion and on AEC contract. The new lease sale was to be on a
cash bonus basis. The extent of the deposits in the new ex-
tension were not accurately known as only a small part had
been subject to development drilling. It was hoped that 40
mines would be reopened and 40 new mines started. The
timing is important as it takes about six years to explore,
three years to open a mine and two years to open a mill.
With overlaps, this amounts to about eight years. Initially,
milling would not be in short supply as there is excess
capacity.
Price, in the absence of AEC contracts, has also
been a problem. During 19 72, it was argued that a price of
$1U.4U was necessary to recover ten percent on capital in-
vested in mining and milling if the producing cost was $7.25
per pound of concentrate (yellowcake) . On this basis,
given past prices, an oligopolistic industry would be expected
to reduce output and exploration even more than a competitive
one.
On the international market, Nuclear Industry
reports evidence of a supply cartel with South African,
French, Canadian and Australian membership. They cite a
decline in the number of firm quotes available for post-19 80
delivery. Members only offer options to buy with prices to
be negotiated later and an agreement to raise prices for late
1970's delivery. In Australia, a probable major pro-
ducer in the future, the government appears to be controlling
(49)
exports m order to maintain prices. The Canadian govern-
ment, citing increased demand and increased world prices, has
announced a series of measures restricting exports. These
include restriction of export contracts to a ten year duration
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with a possible five year extension subject to price renego-
tiation and possible recall , the use of the domestic market
as a price floor for exports, supply contract requirements
for Canadian utilities and producers, disposal of the govern-
ment stockpile only on a short-term basis and only to domestic
companies, and limitations on the ability of importers to
re-export Canadian uranium without prior approval. ' While
some of these restrictions may simply be "Canada first" re-
quirements, others are clearly an attempt to prevent market
arbitrage.
Canadian reserve estimates in 19 72 were 400,000 tons
(exploration ended in the 19 60 ! s) with 19 73 production set at
only 5000 tons. Future needs were quoted at about 80,000 tons
for the 15,0 00 megawatt capacity of Canadian reactors slated
for 1984. An additional 73,000 tons v/ere contracted for
export to sJanan. Encrland and others over the same oeriod.
This would imply an excess reserve for the period of 2 4 7,000
tons. However, the reserve set aside is for 30 years (200 4)
(51)
and could use up the entire current reserve. •
In a short summary, the London Economist describes
the current worldwide rush for uranium reserves in Klondike
terms. But it warns that potential host governments are
guarding reserves as if they were oil. They link increased
future uranium prices to oil prices and new nuclear construc-
tion programs. Previously low prices are explained as a re-
sult of lack of demand.
Some of the new companies entering into exploration
contracts are Continental Oil, Compagnie Francais des Petroles
and Rio Tinto-Zinc. While reserves and resources should rise
as a result of the activity, host governments arc expected to
(52)
claim a larger share of the take.
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3. Government Options
By its activities the AEC has an effect on uranium
prices.
a. AEC Stocks
In 19 72, the AEC had a stock of 50,000 tons of U
3
O
g
.
Rather than auction this off, thereby reducing the price or
maintaining a low one, the AEC elected to run down the stock
slowly. The method used is to specify a low transactions
tails assay for enrichment, use a considerably higher assay
for operations, and make up the increased fuel requirement
out of its stocks. For example: the value of the enriched
uranium charged to the customer (transactions basis) is com-
posed of (1) the units of fuel needed by the customer plus
(2) the number of separative work units purchased by the cus-
tomer. However, the AEC enrichment plant fills the order on
the basis of the operating tails assay. This, too, is com-
posed of two parts: (3) the amount of U o o actually used by5 o
the AEC to manufacture the enriched uranium plus (4) the
number of separative work units actually used in the enrich-
ment process. It should be noted that (4) is less than (2)
.
This requires (1) to be greater than (3). However, the dif-
ference is made up not by additional U~0 but rather by the
amount of fuel withdrawn from the AEC stockpile. The value
of this is recovered in the unit charge for separative work.
Until June 30, 19 73, the AEC used a 0.3 percent
tails assay for enrichment while the customer supplied feed
on the basis of a 0.2 percent assay. Subsequently, while the
transactions assay remained at 0.2 percent, the operating
assay dropped to not less than 0.275 percent. Thus, the
enrichment customer slowly buys the surplus and the AEC avoids
the open market. The stockpile was expected to last until the
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end of fiscal 1982. Currently, it is expected to be used up
before 1978.
In the explanation of its pricing policy for the
stockpile, the AEC is a model of rectitude. Based on a 0.275
percent actual tails assay and the then current enrichment
price of $32 per SV7U, there are two components. First, the
50,000 tons U
3
O
ft
equivalent surplus should yield the commer-
cial U-,0 o price, year by year, until 19 82. This would be
o o
based on AEC records of actual prices plus its estimates of
prices for sales yet to be made. This information is not
public. It may be noted that the commercial prices in the
early stages of the stockpile disposal were considerably
below the $10-12 per pound that AEC originally paid, even
without consideration of inventory costs. Therefore, an AEC
loss or customer subsidy may exist until the late 1970 's.
•"
~
-
-
-
(53 -j-B
--
-b-
This cost is classified.
b . Embargo
The embargo on foreign uranium supplies is based on
the AEC refusal to enrich foreign uranium for use in domestic
reactors. As long as foreign enrichment facilities are inade-
quate, this is tantamount to an embargo on foreign uranium in
general. The AEC proposes to enrich foreign uranium in 19 77
for domestic use. However, this './ould be limited to ten per-
cent of the enrichment customer's requirements . The remainder
is reserved for domestic producers. The embargo is slated to
disappedir after 19 84 when higher prices arc e:cpected and the
( 54)AEC stockpile has been exhausted. This, however, is no
more than a current plan.
The arguments for and against the embargo are as
traditional as the results. (1) There is an oversupply of
uranium in both foreign and domestic markets. It is expected
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to last no later than the 19 80's but meanwhile the embargo is
needed to help domestic producers, i.e., raise prices. (2)
Small producers need access to land, capital and a market.
(3) Foreign imports would allow the enormous foreign reserves
to pre-empt the domestic market with concomitant high security
risks. Foreign producers could sell uranium in the U.S. at
the price of $8 per pound while domestic producers in meeting
the price would (by poor production management) irretrievably
lose hundreds of millions of pounds of associated $10-15 per
pound reserves in operating mines.
The similarity of this argument to that raised in
1959, at the time of the imposition of mandatory oil import
controls, should be especially noted. It should also be re-
called that while prices rose and the domestic market was
protected for the small producers, exploratory drilling and
reserve additions slowed as domestic companies moved overseas.
Even the line-up is similar: consumers want the embargo
lifted, some producers would rather substitute subsidies,
while buyers and domestic producers with foreign production
sound just like their oil counterparts during the first hear-
ings on the oil embargo. Additionally, the risk factor for
uranium is not of the same order of magnitude that it is for
oil. Safety margins can be bought at the cost of stockpiling.
The AEC has already shown how to maintain a supply equivalent
to 50,000 tons of LUC)^. Finally, the plea for the small pro-
ducer should be looked at carefully. Again, it is standard
in the oil industry. Are these small producers, upon whose
welfare all policy devolves, kin to the legendary widows and
orphans who own stock? Are they the counterparts of the 40 6
coal mines (71.5 percent of the total) which produced only
(55)9.9 percent of the 19 70 output? When referring to the
basis of uranium price increases, the AEC-producer argument
indicates the lack of importance of the small producer. A
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few firms control largo quantities of uncommitted reserves
where production costs can be estimated.
In the debate on the embargo, Canadian producers
hoping to sell to the U.S. insisted that they wanted either
payment at world market prices at the time of delivery or a
negotiated price with a price floor to provide downside
protection to support capital expenditures. (The latter is
close to the argument of the Texas Railroad Commission for
oil.) The development of a world price is noted as a mark
of the "coming maturity" of the uranium industry. In the
context, v/hat was meant is essentially a cartel supported by
producing and consuming country governments. The same is
currently being suggested to maintain oil prices.
The success of the cartel! nation , reduction of
domestic competition, embargo and stockpile disposal can be
seen in the lack nf responses to current bid solicitations
.
There is no lack of a market to account for the unresponsive-
ness. Spot prices during the period from 196 8-19 72 averaged
$5.75-^6.00 per pound. Buyers do not want to pay $8 prices
much less $10-11. But at these prices, producers report
little incentive to explore or add new capacity. Given the
current situation, it pays to speculate on future prices by
holding on to current reserves. In this, producers are backed
by the embargo and the absence of competing fuels: coal
because of air pollution control regulations and the lack of
support for stack gas scrubber development, and oil due to
price and the shortfall in domestic refinery capacity. It
(57)
remains to be seen how permanent are these conditions.
c . The Breeder Reactor
Elsewhere in this study it is shown that the AEC
has consistently underestimated future nuclear power costs.
This leads to low quotations of consumer power costs in terms
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of mills per kilowatt hour. It also makes nuclear power
appear very competitive. Only in the area of uranium is the
AEC prepared to support and ratify higher prices. While it
is true that these increased fuel prices can be pushed through
directly to the electricity consumer via fuel adjustment
clauses and that the net effect on the electricity bill is
relatively small, this represents a reversal of the whole
thrust of AEC actions and implied goals. A consistent explan-
ation can be made in terms of the shift in AEC emphasis from
light water reactors to the liquid metal fast breeder reactor.
The explanation is, in part, bound up with national honor.
The U.S.S.R. 's BN350 reportedly achieved criticality in
October, 1972. It is rated at 350 MWe gross. In France, the
Ph6nix reactor (250 MWe) was due to achieve criticality in
August or September, 19 73. In the U.K. the PER reactor is
due soon and the SNR300, supported by West Germany-Benelux,
emon
(59)
is due in 1979. Our own d stration reactor will not
be ready until the mid-19 80 's.
The relationship between a breeder reactor and
several light water or high termperature gas cooled reactors
can be called symbiotic. The combination power system is
supposed to be almost entirely self-sustaining in terms of
fuel. The breeder generates fuel for the fissile fuel reac-
tors but, in turn, it is charged with only fertile fuel.
Almost no additional fissile fuel is needed. Most important,
the charge can be made up of the depleted uranium or thorium
from the fissile fuel reactors. This obviates much of the
current waste disposal problem. Additionally, the tails, or
waste, resulting from the uranium enrichment process, which
belongs to the customer and which is currently useless, can
also be utilized by a breeder reactor. Again, a waste pro-
duct, which now gives rise to either a disposal or an inven-
tory cost, would have a positive value.
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Dr. Dixie Lee Ray has pointed out that breeder
economics does not depend only upon the cost of construction
and operating costs of the plant. It also depends on the
entire fuel cycle including the design and testing of advanced
fuels. "The issue may be put more concisely. The breeder
reactor has a higher capital cost and a lower fuel cost than
a light water reactor. Therefore, for commercial operation
the present discounted value of the fuel saving must be
greater than the present discounted value of the extra capital
expenditure. The higher the capital cost rises for the
breeder, including research, development, cost overruns and
inflation, the greater must be the price of natural and/or
enriched uranium if the program is to be justified on commer-
cial grounds
.
Original cost estimates for the demonstration
breeder were about $699 million. This does not include
a share of the cost of the Fast Flux Test Facility which is
considered essential to the breeder program. Original esti-
mates for the Facility were $88.7 million for construction
and $105 million for research and development. The budget
for fiscal year 1973 indicated a cost overrun of $83.4 mil-
( c o\
lion. At the end of 19 7 3 it was already scheduled to
cost $400 million and be delayed until 1977. (63 ' By the end
of 1973, the Facility was reported behind .schedule and over
budget. The scheduled startup date of 19 3 for the breeder
was regarded as shaky. Both TVA and Commonwealth Edison
were already asking for indemnification against cost over-
runs. The utilities engaged in the program had tried
to pledge no more than their original $250 million coirjnitment
,
leaving the AEC responsible for any cost overruns. However,
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy required that a formula
more equitable to the AEC be worked out. In contrast,
Southwestern Public Service Company has tentatively offered
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General Atomic Company up to $300 million toward the building
of a privately developed gas cooled breeder reactor. More
important, the breeding gain, or fuel generated by the breeder
reactor for use in fissile reactors, was no longer considered
as great as was originally thought. Therefore, the need for
the Test Facility increased in order to develop advanced fuels
in an effort to get the doubling time down to no more than ten
( co\
years. The longer the doubling time, the smaller the
quantity of fuel generated per unit of time for use in the
fissile reactors and the lower the value of the breeder reactor
either separately or as a part of a symbiotic process.
Currently, the breeder is expected to cost $1.74
billion by 19 82 instead of the $70 million with a 19 80 com-
pletion date forecast two years ago. ^ The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget is reviewing AEC budget requests and the EPA
has disputed the AEC's Draft Environmental Statement.
Given the cost and fuel gain problems, AEC support
of high uranium prices is consistent with its support of the
breeder reactor. However, when and if the breeder is truely
commercial, the need for U-0
R
reserves will be mitigated. This
is especially true if the AEC's symbiotic scenario is correct.
AEC Commissioner Kriegsman appears to believe that this will
occur after the year 2000. If the AEC wished to reduce
dependence on high cost uranium, more fabrication plants could
be built to permit the recycle of the plutonium produced in
present nuclear plants. Currently, there is no plutonium re-
cycling and the AEC has stopped buying the product. Utilities
have, in the past, been in the habit of taking a credit for the
plutonium generated in the normal course of their operation.
This has allowed them to subtract about 0.21 mills per kilowatt
hour from the anticipated cost of electric generation. Under
present circumstances, it would seem more logical to consider
the plutonium in terms of either a costly waste disposal prob-
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lem or a fuel inventory, the holding of which involves a cost.
Similarly, increasing the capacity of reprocessing plants
would reduce the demand for new enriched uranium for core re-
loads. Currently, the reprocessing delay is measured in years,
involving a significant storage and inventory cost problem.
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SECTION V: FUEL CYCLE
COMPONENT COSTS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Section III presented the methodology for evaluating
nuclear reactor fuel cycle costs. Explicit fuel cost calcula-
tions in 19 80 dollars for a model 1,000 MWe reactor were pre-
sented. In Section IV, a discussion of one component cost,
natural uranium, was examined. In this Section, background
material concerning other components of fuel cycle costs will
be discussed. Although much of the data are qualitative, they
show that the unit costs used in this study are conservative.
The ordering of the discussion follows the cost component item-
ization in Table III-2.
A. Uranium Hexaflouride Conversion
In Table III-l conversion costs in 19 73 dollars were
reported to be $2.97/KgU (AEC) and $2.52/KgU (NPC) . In Section
V it was shown that market contracts for UF
fi
were $18.60/KgU
for 1972 delivery, $20 . 45-20 . 80/KgU for 1975 delivery and
$21. 00-26. 15/KgU for 1976 delivery. (1) Escalating the AEC con-
version costs at seven percent/annum to 1976 yields $3.64/KgU.
Subtracting this from the 19 76 UF
g
bid prices gives an implied
price for U
3
O
g
in 19 76 of $7 . 89-10 . 23/lb. The same methodology
implies a $7.20/lb. price for U
3
O
g
in 1972. Unfortunately,
from the same source, it appears that U o o for 19 72 deliveryJ o
was $6. 10-6 . 50/lb . while for 1976 delivery, the range was
$7. 73-8. 50/lb. Starting with these U^O prices and deducting
from the UF
g
price yields 19 72 conversion costs of $4.30-5.18/
KgU rather than the AEC's estimates of $2.9 7/KgU. Using the
same methodology, implied conversion costs in 1976 are $3.51-
6. 35/KgU.
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The use of the AEC stockpiled uranium to reduce the
separative work unit demand of utilities reduces the cost to
the utilities. However, this is at the expense of commercial
conversion plants. The stockpile is converted to UF
r
in gov-
ernment facilities despite excess conversion capacity in the
private sector. The government cost is reported to be $.30-
$.40/lb. uranium. The private cost is estimated to be over
$1.25/lb. uranium. The difference arises because the govern-
ment cost basis excludes taxes, certain depreciation, and
profits. According to Allied Chemical, this is a subsidy to
the toll customers. To the extent that the government stock-
pile is used, the costs of conversion used in Section III are
(2)lower than those based on fully private usage. When gov-
ernment stocks are exhausted, average conversion costs will
rise.
The AEC apparently uses the commercial UF
fi
conversion
charge of $2.9 0/KgU ($1.31/lb.U) plus its estimate of the cur-
rent commercial price of uranium concentrates to reach the
value for the additional feed needed to operate at a higher
tails assay. This becomes a component of the charge for enrich-
ment services. The logic is that it results in the same price
utilities would pay if they supplied the additional feed them-
selves. However, if the cost of the uranium in the stockpile
plus the imputed interest is greater than the current commer-
cial price of uranium concentrate, the profit to the government
on conversion will be less than the loss on the uranium in the
stockpile. As the stockpile was created for defense purposes,
(3)there is no requirement for full cost recovery.
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B. Uranium Enrichment
The three gaseous diffusion enrichment plants in the
United States are at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky;
and Portsmouth, Ohio. The size of these plants was based on
the need to meet cold war requirements for fully enriched
uranium for atomic bombs. This mission was rendered obsolete
by the 1952 development of the H-bomb. Subsequently, the
plants were run at minimal capacity and have still not reached
full capacity levels. By 19 70, the power level of the plants
was about 1,900 MWe or about 31 percent of the full rated
capacity. In terms of the output of enriched uranium for
civilian reactors, even at the lower overall capacity level,
the plants far exceeded their requirements. This is because
of the significantly lower enrichment levels required for power
p^.an^.3 COrTipaireCi CO ui~iC icVCj. iiCuL<\_:n i.vj1 vviicLpvjiifcj yxciue iUi ni^si-i.)
uranium. Had the enrichment industry been privately owned and
operated, with the end of their original mission, it is probable
that one or two of the enrichment plants would have suspended
operation or failed. As a government operation this was not
the case.
1. Enrichment Supply-Demand
The start of the AEC interest in civilian nuclear
power goes back to 1963 and a new mission. Of interest in this
study is the price of enrichment services when there is a large
amount of excess capacity and the price when the excess capacity
disappears. Economic theory suggests that in the former case
price would be just sufficient to cover incremental costs for
a government plant. Moreover, a privately owned plant may
incur additional costs due to taxation and royalties. The
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price may include some profit. The capital costs of the en-
richment plant and the past research and development expendi-
tures committed when the plant was developed to produce weapons
grade enrichment services should be regarded as sunk costs
which are not recoverable under the new circumstances. The
price per separative work unit would be relatively low. Whether
the plants are privately or governmental ly owned, as the demand
for separative work units rises, the price of these units would
not rise rapidly until capacity is approached unless incremen-
tal costs of operation are rising at a faster rate than output.
As capacity is reached, rationing by the price system becomes
necessary. It is at this point in time that new plants, either
public or private, must be built and a new price structure
developed. Therefore, it is important to determine when the
existing enrichment plants will reach full capacity. Therefore,
respect to the price of separative work units because it deter-
mines whether or not the price should be based upon existing
enrichment facilities or on the cost of construction, public
or private, of new enrichment facilities. The decision is
current because it takes approximately six and one-half years
to construct a diffusion plant or five and one-half years to
construct a gas centrifuge plant. The power for the diffusion
plant must be provided by the construction of new electric
utility capacity. Assuming that these are nuclear, the time
horizon is approximately nine years.
AEC estimates of U.S. enrichment capacity are pre-
sented in Table V-l. Like all estimates they are based on
specific assumptions.
(1) AEC estimates of foreign and domestic nuclear
power growth are based on their best estimates
of reactor developments through the year 2000.
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TABLE V-l
U.S. Enrichment Capacity - AEC Projection
Cumulative Separative Work
(10 6 SWU)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Through
FY Committed
12.0
Available
27.7
(2)-(l)
15.7
(3)/(2)
(Percent)
1974 56.7
1975 20.4 41.9 21.5 51.3
1976 29.3 57.6 28.3 49.1
19 7 7 38.7 75.7 37.0 48.9
1978 49.7 95.5 45.8 48.0
19 79 60.4 116.1 55.7 48.0
1980 71.7 139.7 68.0 48.7
1981 83. 8 165. 3 81.5 49.3
1982 96.2 192.2 96.0 50.0
1983 108.5 219.4 110.9 50.5
1984 120.7 247.1 126.4 51.2
1985 132.4 278.8 142.4 51.8
1986 144.7 302.6 157.9 52.2
Source: Atomic Industrial Forum, Nuclear Industry , December
19 73, p. 19.
Note: Committed includes: non-pov;er and other domestic and
foreign requirements contract, other foreigh agreements
and domestic fixed commitment contracts.
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These include approximately 2 80,000 MWe in
the U.S. and 30 3,000 MWe of installed nuclear
capacity in the rest of the world, excluding
the East Bloc countries, by the end of 19 85.
(2) Demand includes government and non-power
applications for the military, production
reactor support, the production of highly
enriched material for domestic and foreign
test reactors, engineering test reactors, and
critical facilities.
(3) The AEC assumes a credit for the return of
enriched materials for recycling from reactors.
characteristics of reactors are those listed
in AEC document, WASH-1139.
(5) The AEC assumes recycling of plutonium on the
following schedule: 25 percent of the avail-
able plutonium will be recycled as early as
19 77, 50 percent will be recycled by 19 78,
75 percent by 1979, and 100 percent by 19 80.
Shortly thereafter, due to the introduction
of the breeder reactor, it is assumed that the
amount of plutonium recycled will fall to zero.
(6) AEC projections are based upon the introduction
of the breeder reactor by 19 86 with market
penetration at the rate the AEC hypothesized
for the light water reactors since 1967. An
147
alternate forecast assumes that the breeder
will not be introduced until 1990.
(7) The amount of enrichment available overseas
is based on United Kingdom and French capacity
and inventories with further expansion expected
in a few countries, excluding the East Bloc,
at some time after the early 19 80 's. Specifi-
cally, it is assumed that the U.S. will supply
75 percent of the needs of the rest of the
world, excluding the East Bloc, through 19 35,
and 60 percent from 19 86 through the year 2000.
(8) The tails assay at the enrichment plants for
the fiscal years 19 74-78 will be 0.30 percent,
tor FY iy/y-81 it will be 0.2 75 percent, and
for FY 19 82 through FY 2000, it will be 0.30
percent.
(9) AEC production plans are based on increasing
the power level at the diffusion plants to the
full power level of 61,000 megawatts by FY 1979,
the introduction of the Cascade Improvement
Process with first appreciable production by
FY 19 76, and the introduction of the Cascade
Uprating Program with first appreciable output
starting in FY 1979. (4)
It is beyond the scope of this paper to make an exact
assessment of the AEC projections. However, it is possible to
make some qualitative judgments.
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(1) The AEC estimate for 19 80 has twice been
scaled down from the estimate in WASII-1139
which was 132,000 MWe. If for 19 85, the pro-
jected maximum reactor capacity developed in
this study is taken as the base, the number
of separative work units demanded is reduced
by about ten percent. Realistically, the
reduction should be even greater.
(2) The assumption of a credit for the recycling
of the spent material from the reactors does
not appear to take into account the current
long term lag between discharge and recycling.
It also fails to consider the present condi-
tion of the processors. Currently, the time
iuij ±ij wj. i_iivj uiuiji oj j_uujl years. L'Tiuxj. tnis
is altered, rather than recycled uranium, there
will be greater than anticipated requirements
for fresh feed and the number of separative
work units must also be greater than those
anticipated.
(3) Compared to the model plant discussed in this
study, the power characteristics assumed in
WASH- 11 39 indicate a lower burnup rate, approx-
imately the same efficiency, and a load factor
of 80 percent. Decreasing the load factor to
65 percent decreases the amount of uranium
and, therefore, the enrichment services neces-
sary. A low burnup rate also decreases the
amount of uranium and enrichment necessary.
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(4) The amount of plutonium to be recycled appears
to be overly optimistic, at least within the
time dimension suggested. Currently, there is
virtually no plutonium recycled and it does not
appear that capacity will be available as early
as 19 77. As a result, more fresh feed and,
therefore, more separative work units will be
required. The .AEC estimates that if there is
no plutonium recycling, the requirement for
separative work units increases by about 2 5
percent.
(5) Given the notorious delays in the breeder
reactor program, it would appear that even a
1990 date for the operation of the first com-
iae jl cj-cil bieeder reactor is opriirdS'Cic. mere
will almost certainly not be a market penetra-
tion at the rate of the light water reactors.
If the breeder reactor is delayed from 19 86
to 1990, the increase in separative work units
increases' by about eleven percent.
(6) The amount of U.S. enrichment services demanded
for European reactors depends upon the final
outcome of the Eurodif-URENCO dispute concerning
enrichment capacity and the availability of
Russian enrichment services. This is discussed
below. Here it may be noted that if there is a
future shortfall of U.S. uranium enrichment
capacity, it could be well within the national
interest to exclude foreign purchasers. Elimina-
tion of the foreign commitment is of the same
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order of magnitude as a shift in the recycling
of plutonium to zero from 100 percent.
(7) If the tails assay is lower than that specified,
separative work unit requirements increase by
(5)
about six percent.
Given the slowdown in the rate of increase of elec-
tric power consumption, it is difficult to determine when
additional enrichment capacity would be needed. In 19 73, it
was reported that approximately 25 million separative work
units would be needed in order to avoid an enrichment gap. It
was assumed that the present capacity would be contracted to
the full by the end of 19 74. After that, the AEC could not let
any further contracts for enrichment. Consequently, General
sell reactors because the sale, to be effective, would have to
have a concomitant fuel contract. It was reported that four
new plants would be needed between the end of 19 82 and the end
of 1985 if utilities were to build reactors at the expected
rates. At the end of the year, it was assumed that enrich-
ment facilities would have to be constructed at the rate of
nine million separative work units every 18 months during the
(7)1980 's. In hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, it was argued that, in order to keep the light water
reactor program going at the rate expected by the AEC, three
new diffusion plants would have to be built by the end of 19 85.
( 8
)
A supply shortage in existing plants was predicted by 19 82.
Phase II of the JCAE hearings continued the expectations of en-
richment shortages. It was reported that the demand for nuclear
fuel was expected to exceed AEC supplies, including the uprated
(9)
and improved gaseous diffusion plants, by the early 19 80 s.
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By mid-1974 it was apparent that some changes in
AEC predictions had taken place. It was reported that, with
the delay in building new nuclear plants, it was thought that
the AEC would be able to provide fuel processing, possibly
until the mid-1980's with existing plants. ' The AEC had
already planned to enrich foreign uranium for domestic cus-
tomers up to a maximum of ten percent of the uranium furnished
for enrichment by the customer. This was to start in 19 77.
(Originally, the Commission had planned to remove uranium
enrichment restrictions on foreign uranium by 19 73. However,
the market for uranium was weak and the AEC sought to protect
the market for domestic companies.) The percentage of enrich-
ment of the foreign uranium would increase to 15 percent in
19 78, 20 percent in 19 79, 30 percent in 19 80, 40 percent in
19 81, 60 percent in 19 82, and 80 percent in 19 83. No restric-
, , , .
„„-,,'. cm - . ...
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enrichment services becomes tight, this schedule might be
easily revised. It was also reported that the AEC had found
the needed extra capacity for the 15 U.S. and 3 3 foreign
utilities which had been affected by its last enrichment con-
tract cut-off. Moreover, forty-five additional plants could
be served if plutonium could be used as a fuel supplement.
This increase in contracting capacity v/ill serve all U.S.
plants due to be on-line before June 30, 19 82. The AEC reports
that it will use its small enrichment capacity reserves and
will draw down its enriched stocks. The recycled plutonium
(12)is expected to cover one-fifth of the total fuel demand.
However, as yet there is no plutonium recycling.
Part of the current supply-demand problem exists
because the AEC requires long term contracts for fuel enrich-
ment. These are designed to firm up separative work unit demand
(13)
and aid the mining industry. To help maintain the contracts,
termination charges are high. If the fuel contract is terminated
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prior to the end of the contract, these charges range from
57.3 percent of the charge per KgU for the remainder of the
enrichment period, if the contract is terminated within the
first year, to 2 3.9 percent if the contract is terminated in
the ninth or tenth year. The total on v/hich the percentage
is imposed includes escalation of costs and gross additions.
For example, increases due to added electric costs for separa-
, (14)tive wok .
To avoid the rigors of the AEC contracts, four pro-
grams are being developed which are akin to the creation of
a spot or exchange market for nuclear fuel. These are the
World Nuclear Fuel Market, backed by the Nuclear Assurance
Corporation, the Separative Work Administration Pool, the
Separative Work Units Corporation, and the pool backed bv the
(15)NUS Corporation. v '
2 . Separative Work Unit Cos ts
•In estimating the future price of enrichment, whether
public or private, there are a number of uncertainties. A
sample list would include ARC licensing requirements, the price
of uranium, whether or not plutonium is recycled, the date of
the advent of the breeder reactor, and the cost of electricity,
of primary interest for gaseous diffusion plants and of one-
tenth the interest for gas centrifuge plants. Additional
uncertainties arise in the area of financing: bond prices and
the ability to sell stock, equity/debt ratios, the cost of
research and development, and whether the results are passed
directly from the federal government to private licensees or
whether they must be paid for, allowable profits, tax rates,
insurance, and the type and degree of competition among firms,
not only the gaseous diffusion plants but also the number of
potential suppliers for the components of the enrichment plants
The ammortization or payout period is also important because,
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while the original plants were ammortized over a period of
33 years, if the breeder reactor were to become of major
importance by the year 2000, a diffusion plant coming on-line
in 1985 would have 15 to 20 years of useful life. If the
breeder is unimportant until 2020 or 20 30, an enrichment plant
can be ammortized over 30 or more years. Finally, there are
costs associated with the feed and product flywheels, insurance,
safeguards, and new environmental requirements.
a. Capital Costs
Using AEC cost estimates for a gaseous diffusion
plant with a capacity of 8.75 million separative work units
per year, at a new site, and escalating at an annual rate of
seven percent from FY 1974 to FY 19G0, capital costs for the
plant, including CIP technology, are $2.1 billion. For a
gaseous aiiiusion plant: using aavanced cechnoxogy , iine ±9Su
cost is $1.8 billion. These costs exclude in-plant uranium
feed and enriched product inventories and pre-production.
Furthermore, the estimates are for a government rather than a
private plant. Therefore, the costs exclude taxes, royalties,
research and development and the cost differential of money in
the private sector. Finally, the costs include %the enrichment
plant alone. They do not include the necessary power plants
required to serve a gaseous diffusion plant. The AEC estimates
that it requires 3.3 kilowatts per separative work unit capacity
at these gaseous diffusion plants.
One of the capital problems involved in the private
development of enrichment facilities is that assuming that
plutonium recycle and/or the breeder reactor become generally
available, the facilities may not be needed after 2020 or 2030.
Therefore, companies building enrichment plants in the 1980's
and 1990 's must recover costs in a short period of time. More-
over, the utilities, as consumers, do not wish to become
- 154 -
involved in the enrichment process. Commonwealth Edison has
urged that the electric power industry not be required, directly
or indirectly, to supply any of the enrichment capital needed.
The utilities appear to be quite willing to subscribe to five
or ten year enrichment contracts, but they do not want to have
(1 7)to undertake long term take-or-pay contracts.
Originally, there had been hope that one, or both, of
two private corporations, the Uranium Enrichment Associates
(UEA) , or the Exxon Nuclear-General Electric team would be
interested in building an enrichment facility. Alternatively,
the government, as proposed by Congressman Craig Hosmer, would
construct an interim facility to be run by the U.S. Enrichment
Corporation. The UEA had promised a go/no-go decision by
July, 19 75, although if they decided upon a gas centrifuge, the
decision would be delayed. The GE-Exxon decision was less firm
and was to be made sometime in 1976. While* hn-t-h f-he Office o^
Management and Budget and the AEC favored private development
of enrichment facilities, neither of the private groups could
promise to be able to sell enrichment contracts on a specific
(18)date. In July, 1974, it was expected that the UEA would
make a final decision on whether to build a gaseous diffusion
plant by October or November. According to the UEA, the major
problem was financing. UEA expected the utilities to commit
themselves to 20 year contracts for nuclear fuel supplies with
payment in advance. It was felt that government subsidies would
be unlikely but that the plant could be operational by mid-19 83.
The plant would be capable of supplying enrichment services for
about 90 nuclear power plants of approximately 1,100 MWe capa-
( 19
)
city each. However, by September 1974, of the original
three members of the UEA, Dechtel, Union Carbide, and Westing-
house, only the Bechtel Corporation remained. In the same
month, GE backed out of its partnership with the Exxon Corpor-
(21)
ation. More recently, Atlantic-Richf i eld and Electro-
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Nucleonics are jointly deciding on whether to make a bid to
build a gas centrifuge plant. If constructed, the plant would
be on-line by 19 79-19 80 and would serve three to four reactors.
Electro-Nucleonics, in con junction' with Burns and Roe, is also
(22)
studying the construction of a gas centrifuge plant for TVA.
The basis for these decisions appears to be two-fold.
First, on the part of the utilities, Commonwealth Edison and
its associates issued a statement concerning the problems of
(23)dealing with a private enrichment monopoly. Furthermore,
the Edison Electric Institute, as spokesman for the privately
owned electric utilities, and supported by TVA, in a position
which had changed .180 degrees from its earlier one, told the
JCAE that the government should assume the task of expanding
the nation's capacity to enrich uranium. Support and endorse-
ment of the new position by the American Public Power Associa-
Liun wuo tApuuLuu, jjUa-triOix Liectnc and j.'va witnesses lgj.q trie
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the UEA was offering
unbusinesslike terms, in effect asking the utilities to assume
all the risks of expansion. TVA's power manager testified that
the UEA proposals, "...do not yet indicate a clear willingness
to accept the risks associated with entering a new large: scale
capital intensive enterprise on a normal competitive basis."
He noted that the enrichment group wanted the utilities to sign
up for enriched uranium under contracts that would oblige the
utilities to make payments even if the fuel was not available
on schedule. The administration argued, on the other hand,
that if the utilities wished to assure their future supplies of
fuel, they would have to come to terms with UEA, the one indus-
try group that proposed going into the business. *
From the point of view of the companies potentially
entering the enrichment business, they must obtain the results
of research, development, and expertise from the government for
either the gaseous diffusion or the gas centrifuge enrichment
- 156 -
operation. Problems exist concerning classified information
and costs. The companies appear to want subsidization either
directly, or through AEC purchase of the output of enriched
uranium at negotiated (i.e., non-market) prices.
b. SWU Price Estimates
Enrichment service charges were originally established
in 1967. Toll enrichment started on January 1, 1969. Prior to
1968, enrichment cost $30/SWU. In the period from 1968 through
February 19 71, the price was $2 6/SWU; from February 19 71 to
September 1971, it was $28.70/SWU. In September 1971, prices
rose to $32/SWU; and in August 19 73, they rose again to $36/SWU
for long term . contracts and $38.50/SWU for short term contracts.
After January 19 74, long term contracts were based on a $36
(25)price with a two percent per year escalation. The SWU
emerges cxc^.UuC hi-— e^.w^i_ <ja \~xi<j l.w«_>l. ui liciuuicij. uxainuin asso-
ciated with pre-production. Only the market value of the feed
is covered. If interest charges are included, it is estimated
( 9 C \
that the price would increase by about $2.50/SWU.
At the AEC rate of increase the prices quoted above
imply separative work unit charges of $40.54 per unit in 19 80
and $44.76 in 19 85. Using an inflation rate as low as seven
percent, implies separative work unit charges of $5 4.0 3 in
1980 and $75.77 by 1985.
In line with current inflation rates and general in-
creases in the electricity rate, a seven percent rate of infla-
tion seems much more reasonable than that used by the AEC. If
the AEC were to maintain its rate in the face of mounting in-
flation this could be considered a subsidy to the utilities.
In a review of separative work unit charges, the AIF noted that,
in setting the new rate, the AEC would have gone further than
the two percent per annum increase because of increasing elec-
(27)trie costs. However, the idea was rejected. The reason
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may, perhaps, be traced to the trade-off between a desire for
a low separative work unit price for the benefit of the utili-
ties and the domestic reactor program, and a higher price in
order to maximize the balance of payments advantage accruing
(28)
to U.S. enrichment. At least in the past, given the rate
of European reactor developments, the former would appear to
be of greater benefit to the AEC.
Government and private industry differ somewhat in
their estimates of future separative work unit charges. Govern-
ment estimates for a government owned new gaseous diffusion
plant range from $51.08 to $60.82/SWU in 1974 dollars. The
government estimate of charges at a privately owned plant is
$6 4.91/SWU. The price estimate for a gas centrifuge plant is
lower, but with a relatively wider range. In 1974 dollars, a
government owned gas centrifuge plant is expected to charge
Detween ^29.67 and r?4 / . 83/bvvu . a similar private plant woulei
charge in the range of $40.06 to $59 . 53/SWU. ^ 29 ' If the gov-
ernment's gaseous diffusion plant estimates for separative work
unit charges are escalated at seven percent to 1980, the range
for the publicly owned plant is $76. 6G to $91.27/SWU. A newly
built private plant would charge $9 7.41/5WU. The 19 80 enrich-
ment charges used in this study (Table III-2) were $97.
In making the estimates, the government used several
assumptions
.
(1) The plants were ammortized over a period of 15
years. This is realistic only if it is assumed
that the breeder reactor will be on-line accord-
ing to early AEC schedules.
(2) It is assumed that the capital cost will be
$1.5 billion. This is lower than the AEC capital
requirements cited above.
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(3) The cost of power, which is critical particu-
larly for the gaseous diffusion plant, is esti-
mated at 10 mills per kilowatt hour. Given the
recent rate of increase of electric rates, 10
mills/Kwh is a low price estimate for 19 80.
Aside from the general assumptions, which affect both
public and private facilities equally,
(1) Government facilities were assumed to be funded
on the basis of 10 percent debt, but at an
interest rate of only 5.5 percent.
(2) Private plants were expected to have a debt/
equity ratio of 50/50. This implies a low debt
ratio compared to the standard utility debt/
equity structure. This is important because the
cost of debt assumed for private plants was only
eight percent; far lower than current rates.
(3) The estimates for the gas centrifuge plant are
much more tentative them those for the gaseous
diffusion plant. The former is in a far earlier
stage of development.
Private estimates of separative work unit charges also
vary widely. Commonwealth Edison, based on escalation of data
provided by the Atomic Industrial Forum, estimates 19 80 separa-
tive work unit charges at $70 to $80/SWU
.
( 30
' Former AFC
Commissioner, Phillip Sporn, reporting for the Electric Utility
Consortium Plan, estimated 19 82 charges at $4 7.2 8/SWU. His
estimates are a classic example of "accentuating the positive."
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(1) Plant costs for 1982 are $1.5 billion; exactly
the same as the government's estimate for 1974.
Assuming an inflation rate of seven percent and
a plant construction start-up date of 1977, his
estimates imply plant costs of $1.84 billion.
(2) Pov/er costs are estimated at only 8 mills/Kwh.
If power costs are 10 mills as suggested by the
government, the increase in the Sporn estimates
for the first two items alone is $7.16/SWU,
bringing the separative work unit costs up to
$54.44.
(3) The ammortization period is 20 years rather
than 15 years.
(4) The debt/equity ratio is 90/10; somewhat higher
than utilities have currently been able to
establish, and the cost of the debt is only
eight percent; far less than they have been
able to obtain.
Aside from the cost of construction, the critical
operating elements in the separative work unit charge are the
percent enrichment, the tails assay and the electric power
requirement. For example, in order to produce one kilogram of
uranium of three percent enrichment, if the tails assay by
2 35.
weight percent of U ' is 0.10 percent, and the feed component
is 4.746 kilograms of uranium per kilogram of product, the
separative work requirement is 5.981 SWU/Kg of uranium product,
If the tails assay is 0.50 percent, then the feed component
must be 11.848 KgU/KgU product. However, the number of separa-
(33 )tive work units required falls to 2.429. Obviously, it is
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possible to hold any one of the four components, the level of
enrichment, the tails assay, the feed component, or the number
of separative work units, constant and, within limits, vary
the other three.
The electric power component depends on two factors.
One is the cost of electricity in mills per kilowatt hour, the
other is the number of separative work units actually used.
The latter depends on the considerations discussed above. In
general, it requires 8,2 50 Kwh electrical input to produce one
kilogram of 2.8 percent enriched uranium. In a boiling water
reactor this would yield approximately 217,800 Kwh of elec-
trical output. The ratio is 3.8 percent, but this depends on
the reactor load factor, burn-up rate, and the efficiency of
the plant.
In early 19 73, the Atomic Industrial Forum reviewed
i - - . - . p ., _ rr . ------ i _•__ .. 1_ _ 1 _ _ mi- _ _ i _• l. _ ji j_ l- _
electric power component to be $35„70/SWU in 1983, from $21.68
on January 1, 19 73. Adding the power component, the labor com-
ponent, and a constant component together they arrived at a
ceiling charge, (price) of $39.12/SWU for January 1, 1973, and
$5 8.21/SWU for 19 83. However, the electric power component
costs were escalated prior to the new higher fuel prices.
Furthermore, while electric rates increased according to AIF,
by 1.9 7 percent per annum from January 1, 19 67 to January 1,
1970, they rose by 11.8 percent per annum between January 1,
19 70 and January 1, 19 73. However, the AIF assumed that be-
tween July 1, 19 72 and 19 83, electric power costs would escalate
at an average rate of only 5.14 percent per annum. If the power
component is escalated at the 11.8 percent rate existing be-
tween 19 70 and 19 73, by 19 8 3 the power component alone is
$66.14/SWU yielding a separative work unit ceiling price of
$88.65. If the escalation is assumed to be 8.47 percent, half-
way between 11.8 and the 5.14 percent assumed by AIF, the power
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component cost alone is $48.88/SWU yielding a ceiling charge
for separative work units of $71.39 by 1983.
It is possible to similarly increase the labor com-
ponent because its annual percentage increase was 5.63 percent
between January 19 67 and January 19 70, and 7.0 percent per
annum between January 19 70 and January 19 73. AIF, in its
escalation, assumes an average increase in the labor component
of only 5.84 percent per annum between July 1, 19 72, and 19 83.
ml_- 1 x. ( 32 )This is surely too low.
3. European Enrichment
The amount of spare domestic enrichment capacity is
partially dependent on the demand for enrichment in Europe.
Annual consumption of enriched uranium in western Europe is
currently about 2,500 metric tons. It is expected to be just
unaei y,uuu tons by i^bU, and just over 21,000 tons by 19 85.
The French group, Eurodif, plans to build a gaseous diffusion
plant which can produce about 10,000 tons of enriched fuel.
It is expected to be on-line by 19 80. The plant, if running
economically at full capacity by the beginning of the 1980 's,
would leave little room for imports from the United States. A
rival group, URENCO , which is sponsoring a gas centrifuge en-
richment facility, fears that there will be excess capacity.
Even though American terms are not as favorable as they used
to be, the Soviet Union has become a potentially large supplier
in the western European market. The planned URENCO centrifuges
would yield only 2,000 tons of enriched uranium per year by
19 80, but capacity would be increased to 10,000 tons by 19 85.
However, since none of the new European power stations that
will use the enriched uranium have yet been built, and may be
delayed because of pressure from conservationists, the demand
estimates for the 1980's may be shifted to the 1990's. 33)
Currently, the URENCO consortium expects to have two semi-
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commercial centrifuges operational by 19 75. The output of the
two is expected to go to 200,000 separative work units per
year. By 1985, at a minimum, these are expected to be able to
( 34}produce two million separative work units per year.
Both Eurodif and URENCO feel that there is room in
western Europe for only one of them. France , while it has said
it will proceed alone with the Eurodif proposal, wants some
assurance about finding European buyers for the fuel in the
19 80's as well as an EEC understanding to stockpile enriched
(35)
uranium surpluses when necessary. ' However, it has become
obvious that European utilities, like their American counter-
parts, are unwilling to place long term orders. Furthermore,
the European utilities have asked the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission to reconsider a plan for American cooperation in
building European enrichment capacity. The original suggestion
fui cooperation dated irom 19 71, but was linked by the AEC to
Draconian conditions which have not basically changed. Further-
more the AEC no longer believes that the suggestion for coopera-
tion is realistic. However, the AEC has announced that it is
ready to consider postponing contract deadlines for European
utilities already engaged in serious contract negotiations and
is confident that the U.S. will find buyers for its enriched
uranium. The willingness of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to be more flexible about tying European utilities to long
term contracts (previously these had been for eight years) was
based on the desire of the AEC to assure itself of customers
before it committed government money to any new enrichment
plant construction in the United States. Despite this, and
despite the opinion of France's original minority partners in
the project, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Belgium, who believed
the French must win agreement from European utilities to buy
at least two-thirds of the annual production, the French gov-
ernment announced that it formally guaranteed to begin construe-
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tion of a gaseous diffusion plant in January, 19 74. By then,
some of the utilities that refused to bach the French plan had
already committed themselves to buy fuel from URENCO or from
the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The French offered
to scale dov/n their plans so that the full capacity level would
be reached by 19 85, four years after the originally scheduled
date. However, at a low volume, the scaled down project, which
would cost between $1.6 and $1.7 billion, was expected to pro-
duce heavy losses.
By the first quarter of 1974, the Eurodif-URENCO dis-
pute was still unsettled. Sweden had pulled out of Eurodif and
many European electric utilities were signing up with the
United States, leaving the expectation that Eurodif capacity
would be surplus by the. late 1970 's. Japan, however, placed an
order for enriched uranium with Eurodif and suggested that it
ucijvv^ u fciiicijuc j-ii uiic p j. u j t= <.; L ; pe
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(38)doned by Sweden. Additionally, Japan and Australia, with
either France or West Germany, plan a uranium processing plant
to be located in Australia, Japan will provide the money and
the market, Australia the land and the uranium, and West Germany
( 39
)
or France the technology.
Unless the rate of increase in the demand for nuclear
power becomes higher than the current rate, a possible result
of Arab success in pricing oil out of the long term market, if
current enrichment plans are put into effect, it is likely that
an international surplus of enrichment capacity will develop in
the mid-19 80' s. However, if additional U.S. capacity becomes
available, history suggests that governmentally supported re-
strictive practices will prevent the SWU price from falling.
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C. REPROCESSING COSTS
In December 19 72, the Atomic Industrial Forum report-
ed a ballpark estimate of fuel reprocessing costs, excluding
the cost of high level waste disposal, of $40,000 per metric
ton. In 1962, the AEC had proposed a price of $16,850 for
reprocessing. Escalating the 1962 figure at seven percent,
which is too high, yields a price of only $33 , 146/metric ton
in 19 72. Therefore, there was a quantum increase in prices to
reach $40,000. Escalating the 19 72 figure by seven percent,
which is probably to low, yields a 1980 estimate of $64,231/
metric ton.
Both plutonium and uranium are recycled in the same
plants. The only reprocessing firms are Nuclear Fuels Services,
Inc., West Valley, New York, which expects to have a capacity
of 750 tons per year when it opens sometime in iy/8, General
Electric, Morris, Illinois, which currently has a 300 ton per
year plant, and Allied Gulf Nuclear Services, Barnwell, South
Carolina, which is due to open a 1,500 ton per year plant in
1975. Atlantic Richfield entered the market briefly but dropped
out. It entered by buying existing contracts for reprocessing.
As a result of this, the price fell. Reprocessors have reported
that they are still trying to establish what they call realistic
cost/price ratios.
Even though competition is very limited in this mar-
ket, reprocessors have, in the past, had some serious problems.
The major problem was that as long as the price of yellowcake
was low, utilities were unwilling to place for\\Tard orders for
reprocessing spent fuel; uranium from natural feed was avail-
able when needed. As the price of uranium rises, reprocessing
becomes a more realistic activity for the utilities. Secondly,
reprocessors have not given very much economic incentive to the
utilities
.
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The future of recycling is somewhat sketchy, pri-
marily because the conditions under which recycling is to be
permitted are not yet fully defined. Therefore, utilities
cannot yet initiate license modifications to permit fuel re-
cycling in their reactors, place firm recycle orders or get
firm recycle contracts, including prices. The major problem
appears to be the form which the recycled manufactured product
would take. This may be changed by AEC fuel restrictions.
Given AEC type projections for nuclear reactor capa-
city (2 80,000 MW in 19 85) a need is estimated for one 1,500
metric ton reprocessing plant on-line every 15 months between
19 82 and 1990. If only the original three plants including
the Morris plant are in existence by 1985, the reprocessing
backlog would, be approximately 8,000 metric tons. This includes
approximately 64 tons of plutoniuv, , The total is equivalent to
about; 10,000 tons of natural uranium feed, wnich must be mined
and enriched. Plutonium storage by 19 80 is expected to be over
m 4. (42)50 tons.
Based on AEC projections of nuclear power demand for
enriched fuel, it is expected that a fourth plant will be
necessary by about 19 81. The plants are expected to recycle
large amounts of uranium-2 35 and plutonium from the spent fuel,
reducing the demand for mining, milling and enriching uranium.
According to Congressman. Craig Hosiuer, the Nuclear Fuel Services
and Allied Gulf Nuclear Services plants may be delayed while a
third might be dismissed as nebulous.
Following the failure of the GE reprocessing plant at
Morris, Illinois, the U.S. for at least two full years, will be
without a facility to reprocess nuclear fuels after they are
withdrawn from the cores of utility reactors.. The AEC has begun
a nationwide check for additional storage capacity for the un-
• • . ( 4 3)anticipated accumulation of fuel waiting to be reprocessed.
The Morris plant may have to be scrapped as the advanced tech-
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nology apparently does not work. It was due to start in 19 70
and may not start until 1978, if ever. It is estimated that
the redesign and rebuilding may cost between $90 and $130
million. The other two plants cannot begin to cover reproces-
sing needs. The plant dismissed by Congressman Hosmer as nebu-
lous is the Exxon Nuclear Company plant to be located in Loudon
County, Tennessee, which may be operational sometime between
19 80 and 19 82. Thus, a reprocessing crunch is expected by the
late 19 70's. Utilities, therefore, are carrying a very large
inventory of spent fuel and may wait years before reprocessing.
Nuclear Fuels Services is currently holding unreprocessed fuels
for four years and may hold it for another five years before it
(44)is returned to the utilities that own it.
Due to the shortage of reprocessing capacity and the
failure of the GE Morris, Illinois facility, storage of spent
material to be reprocessed will have to be found for over 3,000
tons of the spent fuel between 19 74 and 19 78. This involves
both an investment cost or alternatively a waste disposal cost.
As the reprocessing of spent fuel is expected to be
cheaper than that of the enrichment of fuel from fresh feed,
one can assign either a high cost of reprocessing or additional
costs to enrichment.
D. PLUTONIUM RECYCLING
Currently there is no plutonium recycling. However,
the AEC has recommended general approval. It expects to start
recycling plutonium by 19 77 with all plutonium recycled by
19 80. They predict that plutonium recycling will cover about
five percent of the enrichment needs of utilities by 19 85 if
the schedule is met. However, with the lag in fuel reprocessing
capacity the likelihood is small.
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If used as a fuel plutonium could reduce the annual
uranium requirements in the early 19 80's by about 15 percent.
Alternatively, if there is no recycling, incremental enrich-
ment capacity requirements would increase by over five percent
by 19 85. Furthermore, the need for the new enrichment capacity
will be brought forward in time. Based on AEC estimates of the
number of reactors, which should be derated, by 19 75 plutonium
production from all reactors will be about 5,700 kilograms per
year. By 19 80 this will rise to over 20,000 kilograms per
year. However, even if all three fuel fabrication plants for
recycling are in existence they will only be able to handle at
most 3,000 kilograms per year. There is a need, therefore, for
a great increase in capacity. However, this would require
about a six year lead time. By 19 80 the AEC expects to have
plutonium recycling capacity of only 10,000 kilograms per year.
As :'- result storage is needed, but the current storage capaciLy
is only 4,000 kilograms while the projected demand for storage
(45)for plutonium by 1980 is about 51,000 kilograms.
It would appear that rather than consider plutonium
produced in commercial reactors as a credit , to be deducted
from the fuel cycle costs, the production of plutonium from
TOO
U involves either an inventory cost or a disposal cost. As
the AEC has not yet indicated what conditions must be met for
permission to recycle plutonium, there is as yet no way to make
firm price commitments for recycling. Even by 19 80, it is not
expected that there will be much recyling so that storage must
be found for over 50 tons of plutonium.
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E. TRANSPORTATION
The American Association of Railroads has recommended
that special trains be used for the transportation of fuel,
spent fuel, and waste. Among other things these trains should
be limited to a speed of 35 miles per hour. It is estimated
that the use of special trains would cost an additional $14/ton/
mile/cask containing fuel assemblies. The use of special trains
may lead to problems with respect to turn-around time, special
scheduling, and special equipment.
To date there are no transportation problems. In
the South and the West, regular railroad tariffs are used, but
the railroads- require a release from liability from either the
Price-Anderson Act shipper or consignee. In the Northeast the
railroads have special tariffs in addition to the released
liability. Some refuse to handle wastes at all, ana most in-
dicate that they want special trains. The increased rail rates
may move shippers to truck, transport, but this would require
very much smaller casks, many more trucks, and possibly severe
road hazards. In the special case of the movement of plutonium,
the proposed AEC rule is that it be shipped as a solid to avoid
leakage if the plutonium is in excess of 20 curies per package.
Currently, plutonium moves as an aqueous nitrate. For the
utilities and processors, this is cheaper than solidifying.
The bottleneck in shipping fuel is related to the
number of casks available to carry the fuel assemblies. More-
over, there are only two companies involved in this activity:
Nuclear Fuels Services and General Electric. This does not
lead to price competition. The older form of the NFS casks,
designated NFS-4, carried two boiling water reactor assemblies
or one pressurized water reactor assembly. Pressurized water
reactors average 120 to 200 assemblies per core loading while
the large boiling water reactors average 360 to 760 assemblies
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per core loading. In February 19 73, there were only two NFS-4
casks available. The NFS-5 cask carries three boiling water
assemblies or two pressurized water reactor assemblies. In
February 19 73, two were available and two more were on order.
The GE casks, designated F-300, of which there was one in
October 1973, carry seven pressurized water reactor assemblies
or eighteen boiling water reactor assemblies. They replaced
the earlier casks designated F-100 and F-200, of which there
was one each with a capacity of only one boiling water reactor
assembly or one pressurized water reactor assembly.
F. WASTE MANAGEMENT
1. Plutonium Contaminated Wastes
Contaminated wastes from reprocessing and fabrication
plants, for example, clothing, ion exchange resins, filters,
fuel hulls and solidified liquid wastes are currently buried
in commercial land burial sites. So far this has been accom-
plished by dispersing a small quantity of waste in a large
volume of land fill material. By the early 19 80's the cumula-
tive total could be in excess of eight million cubic feet, the
equivalent of several hundred kilograms of plutonium. There-
fore, the AEC is considering a respository. This solution is
not considered attractive by the fuel industry as it would
involve compaction, leaching and incineration. These increase
costs and introduce more safety problems.
2
.
High Level Waste
High level nuclear waste material comes from both
the reprocessors and the reactors. It has been estimated that
solidification, transportation and perpetual care of the waste
material from reprocessors would cost between $10,000 and
$15,000 per metric ton of fuel processed. This is equivalent
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of about $200,000 to $300,000/1,000 MW reactor/year added onto
the fuel costs. Because the AEC has not yet firmed the solidi-
fying activities, reprocessors are unwilling to move ahead with
the completion of plans.
Reactor wastes are of the order of 9,300 cubic feet
of unsolidified wastes per one thousand megawatt reactor per
year. These wastes must be disposed of for the next 25 years.
Currently, there are only six commercial sites in the United
States. Five are owned by Nuclear Fuels Services, one is
owned by Chem-Nuclear Services, Inc. While some of the wastes
have a relatively short half life, cesium-137 has a half life
of 30 years and plutonium-239 has a half life of 1,000 years.
The Atomic Energy Commission is considering building
a $100 million above ground vaulted storage for high level
wastes. This would need close monitoring and is expected to be
used only to the end of the century. The AEC Lujjuo Lo develop
a permanent method although no such method now exists. They
have not yet decided upon which of three types of vaults are
to be used. There are three possible sites: (1) the Nevada
test site, (2) the National Reactor Testing Station, and (3)
the Ilanford facility. As these are all government property,
no environmental review would be necessary. According to
Dr. Pittman, head of the AEC Division of Waste Management and
Transportation, "There is not an implicit faith that a permanent
storage method will be found." The AEC considers that it does
have sufficient knowledge to develop permanent salt bedded waste
(49)disposal. If, however, high level wastes are not salt bed-
ded, other means for the long. term are considered either imprac-
tical or too expensive unless the highest level radioactive
waste material is removed.
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G. SAFEGUARDING
It takes approximately 34 pounds of highly enriched
uranium or 16 pounds of plutonium to make a crude bomb. The
Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project has recommended a govern-
ment security force to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.
Of particular relevance is plutonium and the highly enriched
uranium used as fuel in the high temperature gas cooled reac-
2 35tors. The three percent enriched U used in boiling water
and pressurized water reactors is not bomb material. The
most vulnerable sectors are reported to be in the area of the
fuel cycle: reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants and
transportation. The costs involved here may be passed through
. . . (51)to the utilities.
The AEC has increased the safeguarding requirements
w-'- -i- •— >_» a- ... ~. _ i. x *-» •— v- *-* ,- ci-L-w j- v,j^'j u--uj.a^j t—W ^ll> u u- ^ \^O *- »_J / Ciiivu. iiCiO J-V^^'w'^
nized that future requirements may have to be strengthened
(5 2)
again. Moreover, the AEC is requiring utilities to hire
armed guards for their facilities. The utilities, however,
contend that this should be a federal function primarily because
(53)
of the additional costs.
To pay for its safeguarding function, the AEC request-
ed $87 million to hire guards, install alarm and detection sys-
tems, install fences, provide tamper-proof shipping cases, and
purchase nuclear tracking equipment. The Office of Management
and Budget recommended $18 million. Of the difference, $5
million was restored by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
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SECTION VI: CAPITAL
AND RELATED COSTS
The data in this section, while numerical, can at
best be considered qualitative. Neither secondary sources
nor corporate submissions to the Atomic Energy Commission
provide sufficiently disaggregated and/or mutually consistent
data for comparison or analysis.
A. Capital Costs
Reported capital cost data are sparse and relatively
unsatisfactory mainly because they are not sufficiently dis-
aggregated. Even estimates for roughly similar plants due to
be on-line at the same time differ widely from plant to plant
because of the uniqueness of each plant and, furthermore,
because of differences in contingency reserves, LIio iui-fc;xfc:fc>L
rate used for the cost of capital during construction, escala-
tion, and discounting. Finally, cost estimates depend on
differences in cooling systems, which may not even be included
in the capital cost estimates, the treatment and estimate of
other direct and indirect costs, and because of differences
in land values in different parts of the country.
The Atomic Industrial Forum has indicated that capi-
tal costs were $130/Kw in May 19 67, $220/Kw in June 19 69, and
$300/Kw in January 19 71. Presumably these costs will not
continue to escalate at the increasing. rate implied by this
history. Using the first pair implies capital costs of about
$56 2/Kw in 19 80, using the second twe implies a 19 80 capital
cost of $780/Kw. Consideration of the rate of change of the
increase yields much higher capital costs. In testimony before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, AEC Commissioner Larson
reported that estimates of capital costs have risen from about
$125/Kw installed to over $500/Kw of installed capacity at
(2)
some plants. v '
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By far the most detailed analysis of direct con-
struction costs, only a part of capital costs, is to be found
in AEC document WASH- 12 30 Volumes I and II. These two volumes
indicate that for a 1000 MWe boiling water reactor, in 19 71
the total base construction costs were $211,963,200, for a
1000 MWe pressurized water reactor the total base construction
costs were $210,483,000. Escalating these costs at seven per-
cent from January 19 71, to January 19 80, implies costs of
$389,680,000 and $386,960,000 respectively. The document
recommends that the prices must also be adjusted for contin-
gency costs, including material, labor, and professional ser-
vices, and for escalation and interest charges during construc-
tion. Furthermore, the estimates exclude the cost of land and
land rights and assume the unrestricted availability of water,
once through cooling, no provision for extended discharge, and
no provision for restricted intake velocity or dilution in the
t *. (3)
For comparison, the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power
Commission has indicated that the estimated cost of nuclear
( 4)
reactors in 1982 will be approximately $460/Kw installed.
Toledo Edison estimates the costs of its Davis-Bessee plant,
(5)due to be on-line in 1976, at $450 million. However, this
is for a 90 6 megawatt plant. Increasing the size of the plant
to 1000 MWe and escalating at seven percent to 19 80 yields a
cost of $651/Kw installed. In the Arthur D. Little study
referred to in Section I, direct capital costs, escalation
and the allowance for funds during construction totalled
$562/Kw for a plant to be completed in 1981. The addition of
taxes, utility costs and contingency allowance brought total
capital costs to $702/Kw. ^'
A 1971 study by Union Electric resulted in a basic
capital cost estimate of $422/Kw for an 1175 MWe nuclear plant
to be completed in 19 80. Contingencies and escalation were
reported to be appropriate to conditions in 1971. Once through
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cooling was proposed. In a subsequent study, Union Electric
recalculated the costs at $715/Kw including natural draft
cooling towers. This was based on total construction expen-
ditures for Callaway Unit No. 1 of $839 million. As the
cooling tower is expected to cost $61 million, construction
costs for 19 81-82 operation, without the tower, are approxi-
(7)
mately $622/Kw of installed capacity.
The two proposed Union Electric Callaway .plants are
part of a package of six identical plants known as the. Stan-
dardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS) designed by
the Bechtel Corporation and sold by Westinghouse. The advan-
tages of this standardized package are asserted to be increased
reliability and savings in costs of engineering, manpower, con-
struction, start-up, operation, and procurement. If success-
ful, they may also minimize licensing problems for both the
AEC and Westinghouse. It is possible that, in order to put the
„ £ „ „ _ „i. „ . . 1 ~ j — j- i- -3 J — .r i — . .rr. . i - - . - i
standardization, Westinghouse and/or Bechtel were willing to
set a comparatively low price on the first set of units.
Standardization possibly leads to the increased
reliability and cost savings claimed. It is not impossible
that standardization leads to the mass recalls experienced in
the auto industry. It is not always clear that a standardized
item is made with more care and precision than a unique item.
It is probably cheaper.
Average 19 80 capital costs for the Illinois Power
Company's Clinton reactors have been estimated at $386/Kw by
the company and $456/Kw by the staff of the AEC Directorate of
(9)Licensing. These cost estimates have been challenged as
too low.
It has already been pointed out that the capital
costs associated with the UE SNUPPS contracts may be low.
Reports in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times in-
dicate that Combustion Engineering may have also enabled the
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utility industry to obtain temporary low prices for reactors.
Apparently, this was done in order to increase market share.
The low prices have been based on special warranties with
respect to performance and required AEC changes. Moreoever,
some utilities were apparently permitted to obtain no-cost •
contract cancellation clauses. To the extent that the
warranties are more than usually favorable to the utilities,
the associated contingency reserve is reduced.
Reactor capital costs are likely to increase in the
future. In part this is due to increasing finance costs which
have led to a number of reactor delays and cancellations.
Increasing costs have also been responsible, perhaps, for
several utilities joining together to build a single reactor.
Delays in construction increase capital costs. Commonwealth
Edison has said that, because of lengthy delays in the con-
struction of the LaSalle County nuclear plant, it was increas-
i y.n "i + p. pnn «•.•£r^ct i<">n budget b Tr ^300 million for the 1973-1977
(12)period. Furthermore, both GE and Westmghouse are attempt-
ing to renegotiate contracts, including some that have already
been made, to include five to eight percent price increases.
Contracts written after January 1974, have automatic escalation
n (13)clauses.
B. Cooling Systems
Next to the nuclear steam system, the major capital
cost is the cooling system. Both in terms of direct cost and
environmental impact the system choice affects the fossil-
fissile alternative. Heat rejection from nuclear plants is
about 50 percent greater than that from fossil plants. When
comparing alternate power sources, neither the unit size nor
the type of cooling system need be the same for both.
There are three basic types of cooling systems: 1)
open cycle, 2) closed cycle, and 3) auxiliary cooling. The
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first includes once-through cooling and lakes, lagoons or
ponds. The second covers wet mechanical and natural draft
cooling towers, spray channels, dry mechanical draft towers
and wet/dry mechanical draft towers. Auxiliary cooling systems
include lakes with wet mechanical draft towers or lakes with
spray channels. There is evidence that the Environmental
Protection Agency is moving toward requiring closed cycle
cooling systems. In general, this means cooling tov/ers rather
than very large lake impoundments where all cooling is done
by evaporation.
Cooling towers are not new. In September 1972, it
was reported that of sixty commercial plants under construction
or recently completed, twenty-one had cooling towers. Of the
twenty one, there were ten closed cycle towers, five open
cycle towers, and six combination types. Of the rest, twelve
commercial plants utilized cooling lakes, three used diffuser
uVpC ulSCiluxy'S SyS u£iu3 r ai"iC; CWbjj C" -" uV/O iiclCj. CiiCS— Cil!LO dCjii tCOi-
ing. Effective April 1, 1973, the Federal Power Commission
indicated that for the 11 coal and 76 nuclear steam electric
plants of 9 00 MWe and over, under construction or due to begin
construction within two years, 38 would use cooling towers, 21
would have cooling lakes, and 24 anticipated using once-through
cooling. Cooling systems for ten more plants were not speci-
fied. If it is assumed that all 11 of the coal plants plus one
additional plant, for which the fuel was not specified, were
to use cooling towers, then 26 nuclear plants would be using
cooling towers and only 21 using cooling lakes. Apparently,
cooling towers are considered desirable by more companies than
i • i i (15)are cooling lakes.
It is difficult to assess the cost of cooling towers
because what is included is not always specified. Costs for
closed cycle tov/ers have been reported in a range from $4-20
million, with average costs of $8-10/Kw for mechanical draft
and $12-15/Kw for natural draft towers. Estimates made by the
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Wisconsin Electric Power Company for a closed cycle system
are $23 million for mechanical draft cooling towers and $32
million for natural draft cooling towers. Evaluating all
costs over the life of the plant, Wisconsin Electric estimates
that costs range from $45 to $56 million. Cooling tower costs
for Commonwealth Edison's Dresden Units 2 and 3 totalled $30.7
million. By comparison, costs associated with the cooling
lake for the Oconnee Nuclear Plant were estimated at $25 mil-
lion (16).
Two more recent cost estimates may also be noted.
Consolidated Edison estimates the cost of a closed cycle system
at the Indian Point Power site on the Hudson River at $70 mil-
lion plus approximately $20 million/year for operating costs.
They calculate that approximately one-eighth of the plant's
(17)873 megawatts must be used to supply energy to the tower.
Consolidated Edison does not want the towers. By comparison,
draft cooling towers at a total cost in excess of $25 million.
(18)The company has taken an option on two more towers.
An interesting comparison of estimated costs of
cooling system alternatives can be made by referring to
Tables VI- 1 and VI-2. It is, perhaps, superfluous to note
that the Illinois Power Company prefers a cooling lake and
Union Electric has opted for natural draft cooling towers.
Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to explain the gross
differences. The AEC Directorate of Licensing has already
accepted the Illinois Power Company estimates for its own
environmental statement. Table VI- 3 is simply a copy of the
Illinois Power Company submission. The Union Electric Company
data were also prepared for AEC submission. The difference
between the IPC and the UE estimates can be found in Table VI-4.
Perhaps most revealing is a comparison between the
two companies' evaluation of land costs. It must be remembered
that a) Illinois farm land is among the most costly in the mid-
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TABLE VI-h
COOLING SYSTEMS: COMPARATIVE COSTS
ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY vs.
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
($ million — UE base)
Land and Equipment Costs
Operation and
Land Construction ,Etc
. Maintenance Total
Cooling Pond (l.oiO (258.66) (82.1U) (3M.8U)
Spray Canals 12.79 (33.210 (51.90) (67.35)
Natural Draft
Cooling Tower 13.57 (18.25) (11.08) (15.76)
Wet Mechanical
Draft Cooling
va.ol; 1 1 r> m > /-IT t?f\ \
- Concrete 13.
9
1
* (20.02) (29.3*0 (35.82)
Wet /Dry Mechanical
Draft Cooling
. Tower 1U.15 ll».02 (U8.95) (21.61)
Source: Tables and
Note: Cooling pond— land (1.0H) means that the Illinois Power Company
estimate was $1.01+ million below the Union Electric Company estimate
for a similar facility subcategory.
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west, b) closed-cycle systems use less land than does a lake
and c) a spray pond requires only five percent of the area
required for a cooling pond due bo the increased heat transfer
(19)
coefficient. Considering only land and equipment, if the
IPC estimates for the lake are substituted in the UE table,
the capital cost subtotal in Table VI-1 is $31.63 million.
Therefore, the present value of the total cost is $176.06
million. According to UE's estimates, this is still more ex-
pensive than any alternative except spray canals. Alternatively,
using UE's land costs in the IPC table, yields the following
total costs:
LAND AND EQUIPMENT
SUBTOTAL TOTAL COST
($ Million) ($ Million)
37.33 101.20
42.81 107.83
32.33 96.49
72.64 138.38
Spray Channel
Natural Draft Cooling Tower
Wet Meehnical
Draft Cooling Tower
Wet/Dry Meehnical
Draft Cooling Tower
From the background information provided, there appears to be
no way to reconcile the differences in the total operating and
maintenance costs supplied by the two companies. If the rele-
vant .Illinois Power Company O&M costs are substituted in the
UE comparative cost table, total costs become:
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UNION ELECTRIC TOTAL COSTS
(IPC O&M Costs)
Cooling pond
Spray canals
Natural draft cooling tower
Wet Mechanical Draft
Cooling Tower - Wood
- Concrete
Wet/Dry Mechanical
Draft Cooling Tower
$353.62 million
$129.44 million
$126.08 million
$110.40 million
$116.51 million
$124.36 million
One can understand perhaps, gross differences in the estimates
of land costs. The differences listed for equipment, construc-
tion, miscellaneous, escalation, etc., and for operations and
maintenance for the cooling towers and other systems appear
.--..-. A 1 -,'.-. 1 ~
C. Nuclear Safety
The issue of the safety of nuclear reactors is beyond
the scope of this study. However, to the extent that questions
of safety and their solutions arise, the costs of nuclear power
increase. Certainly, contingency allowances increase.
1 . Emergency Core Cooling Systems
Following a two year hearing, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission issued nev; preliminary emergency core cooling system
regulations to be effective August 19 74. The rules reduced
fuel rod temperatures and the level of permissible oxidation
of the metal cladding on the rods. However, the primary
question of the adequacy of the emergency core cooling system
itself remained. Tests of the hardware, rather than computer
simulation models, are not expected to be completed before
- 187 -
(°0
)
19 76. Even to comply with current regulations, some
plants may have to retrofit, others may reduce their electri-
cal output or shift the placement of rod bundles. The cost
effect of the current regulations v/ill be felt primarily by
utilities owning reactors now being constructed or that have
already been built. Prior to the decision, an early estimate
of the cost of the rule changes included an average five per-
cent derating of all reactors through mid-1976, plus approxi-
mately $19 3 million for replacement power plus $70 million/
1000 megawatt reactor or $35 million/500 megawatt reactor for
modifications and bringing the plant back to 100 percent of
rated capacity. Moreover, there would be a fuel cost penalty
of approximately $520 , 000/year/1000 MWe reactor and $215,000/
year/500 MWe reactor. If further derated, capacity and re-
placement power penalties are exptected to increase substan-
(21)tially. It is possible that, subsequent to the tests on
in regulations and requirements will be made. These will
further increase costs of construction and retrofit
<
While the emergency core cooling system is the
largest and most important item of cost subject to change,
there have been a number of problems and equipment failures,
reported in the general and trade press, with respect to both
the nuclear steam system and the non-nuclear systems. These
have involved design, quality control, and basic understanding
of engineering at the tempertatures
,
pressures, and special
atmospheres involved in reactors. All of these lead to costs
in terms of construction, maintenance, repair and purchased
electricity, sometimes over long periods of time. It has been
argued that among the problems of reactor construction is the
fact that the reactors currently being built are all unique.
Westinghouse has pioneered standardization with the construction
of six identical reactors, arguing that standardization will
lead to better quality control and better engineering. Because
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of their size,, however, reactors must be field assembled even
if most of the components are built elsewhere. Furthermore,
while it is possible that standardization will lead to better
quality control, it is not impossible that standardization of
nuclear power components can, like the auto industry, lead to
massive recalls. The recent example of pipe cracks in the
primary cooling system of a number of GE boiling v/ater reactors
•
. (22)is a case in point.
2
.
Radioactive Wastes
Radioactive wastes are vented to the air from reac-
tors and can be found in the reactor effluent. This is per-
missible within prescribed limits. However, these limits are
subject to change. Changes, however, are costly. For example,
it has been estimated that for a boiling water reactor, to cut
the dosage .of iodine-131 to an offsite individual from 25
millirems per year to 0.0 4 millirems per year requires a capi-
tal cost of $3.48 million. To cut the dosage from 25 to one
millirem per year, the capital cost is $2.8 million. Retrofit
costs are higher. With a pressurized water reactor, to reduce
the dosages as noted above is much more expensive. It is
considered impossible to reach the low levels of a boiling
*. (23)water reactor at any cost.
3. Decommi ss ioning
Under current regulations the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion generally requires that all quantities of source, special
nuclear, and by-product materials not exempt from licensing
under Farts 30, 40, and 70 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regu-
lations, either be removed from the site or secured and kept
under survcilance. To date only six nuclear electric generating
stations have been decommissioned. Four of these were Commis-
sion owned and operated facilities. Several alternative modes
of decommissioning have been experienced in these cases. They
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may be summarized generally as four alternative levels of res-
toration of the plant site, each with a distinct level of
effort and cost. At any level, economically salvagable equip-
ment and all reactor fuel elements are removed. Some equipment
will be decontaminated and wastes of the type normally shipped
during operation will be sent to waste depositories. However,
the following restoration measures would then have to be taken.
1) At the lowest level there would be minimal
dismantling and relocation of radioactive -
equipment. £11 radioactive material would
be sealed in containment structures, primarily
existing ones, which would require perpetual,
continual surveilance for security and effec-
tiveness.
2) At the next level some radioactive equipment
and material would be moved into existing
containment structures to reduce the extent
of long term containment. Surveilance as
in the lowest level would be required.
3) At the third level radioactive equipment and
materials would be placed in a containment
facility approaching a practical minimum
volume. All unbound contamination would
have been removed. The containment structure
would be designed to meet minimal perpetual
maintenance surveilance and security.
4) At the highest level a]l radioactive equip-
ment and materia] s would be removed from the
site. Structures would be dismantled and'
disposed of on-site by burial or offsite to
the extent desired by the tenant.
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It may be noted that in all but the highest level,
the nuclear program would leave the nation dotted with ceno-
taphs. The AEC estimates the cost of decommissioning at the
lowest level to be about $1 million, plus a maintenance charge
on the order of $100 , 000/year. The estimates vary from case
to case, because of differing assumptions as to the level of
restoration. For example, the AEC expects that complete
restoration, including regrading, would cost about $70 million.
They point out that at present land values it is not likely
that consideration of an economic blanace alone would justify
t i i * x. (24)a particular level of restoration.
In the specific case of the Illinois Power Company,
(25)
no decommissioning plans are given. Despite the lack of
information, the Atomic Energy Commission has estimated that
decommissioning costs in 19 81 are $50 million for the nuclear
power plant with escalation at 6.0 percent and discounting at
8,75 percent for a net discount rate of 2.75 percent n^rcr-
thirty years, the result is a present value of decommissioning
of $22.2 million. With an 80 percent load factor, this results
( *? ft \
is a levelized cost of 0.13 mills/Kwhe. '
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